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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 7 th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our
membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active transportation
researchers, policy- makers, industry executives, major corporations and research institutes from
28 countries. Our broad membership base and its strong enthusiasm have pushed the group
forward, to continuously initiate new events and projects that benefit the aviation industry and
research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an international conference at least once
a year. As you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers,
panel discussions and invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a
consecutive stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every
successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of the University College of Dublin.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent
Bowen, Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG
Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent
Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-ATRG Conference (being co-edited by
Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG members, I would like to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen and to the staff at the Aviation
Institute of UNO for their efforts in publishing these ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to
thank and congratulate all the authors of the papers, for their fine contribution to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG
website (www.eommeree.ubc.ca/atrg/) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations
and forthcoming events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would also appreciate
it very much if you would encourage others in the field, to sign up for ATRG membership.
Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2
Canada
/
E-mail: Atrg@commerce.ubc.ca

"Symposium Proeeedi_ngs :: : = _::
The Svnl )osium Volume 1, Nunlbcr 1
The ATRG held its Research Symposium at
University College Dublin, Ireland in July 1998,
following the main WCTR meetings.
The symposium attracted 106 delegates from ! 7
countries. Additionally a plenary session yielded
three views on the future prospects for European air
transport.
The I'rocccdinos
Once again, on behalf of the Air Transport Research
Group, the University of Nebraska at Omaha
Aviation Institute has agreed to publish the
Proceedings of the ATRG Symposium in a three-
volume monograph set.
Procccdinos Order InG_rmal ion
The Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG Symposium are
contained in a three-volume monograph set. Orders
within the U.S. are $7.50 (U.S.) per monograph
volume, and international orders are $10.00 03.S.)
per monograph volume to cover the costs of printing,
shipping, and handling. Allow 4-6 weeks for
delivery.
Please forward requests to:
UNO Aviation Institute
6001 Dodge Street
Allwine Hall 422
Omaha, NE 68182-0406
Phone: 402-554-3424 or 1-800-3FLY UNO
Fax: 402-554-3781
e-mail: nasa@unomaha.edu
http://cid.unomaha.edu/-nasa
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ABSTRACT
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In 1990, Australia deregulated its domestic air transport. Prior to deregulation there had been two
trunk airlines which had been subjected to tight regulation, though there had been some
liberalisation during the 1980so International comparisons of costs and productivity suggested that
there was considerable scope for efficiency improvement, and that deregulation would provide the
impetus for substantial productivity growth. The early deregulation period saw two serious
attempts at entry, but both of these failed, leaving the same two airlines dominating the market.
Early studies have suggested some moderate, though certainly not large, productivity gains since
deregulation; since these were done, there have not been major changes.
Available evidence in recent years is evaluated to determine how performance has changed over
the post deregulation period, and how it compares to performance overseas, for example, in North
America. Analysis is made more difficult by reductions in data availability since deregulation.
Emphasis is given to changes in productive efficiency, since this is likely to be the main source of
welfare gain, though other changes "are also considered. The paper assesses whether the
expected gains have been achieved.
The paper concludes with an interpretation of the results. The relatively modest improvement,
coupled with a remaining gap in performance compared with overseas, raises the issue of whether
competition between two dominant airlines is sufficiently strong to ensure minimum cost
production. If so, there may be a lesson in this for other small to medium sized airline markets.
Another explanation of the results may lie with the airline labour market; unlike What happened
after US deregulation, there has been little change in airline labour markets, and possibly
Australian labour market arrangements are hindering the achievement of overseas levels of
productivity.
Introduction
In 1990, Australia deregulated its domestic airline market. From a position of having two,
regulated, major airlines which dominated most of the routes, there are now two, unregulated,
airlines which dominate the market. In the intervening period there have been two unsuccessful
attempts at entry. Since the demise of the second entrant, now six years ago, there has been little
change in the structure of the industry.
There were high expectations of gains from deregulation. Fares and unit costs were high,
especially relative to those in North America, and it was considered that more competition, along
with stronger incentives for cost minimisation, would lead to large increases in productivity. Initial
studies, done soon after the demise of the entrants, indicated definite gains from deregulation,
though the falls in fares were, at least in part, achieved through reductions in profitability
(BTCE,1993). There has been little analysis since, and this raises the question of how large the
gains have been, and whether they are sustainable.
The objective of this paper is to undertake a medium term assessment of deregulation. It
concludes that there have been measurable improvements in performance, and that productivity
gains, as well as reductions in profitability, have enabled falls in real air fares. However, there still
appears to be a large gap between the productivity performance of the Australian airlines and best
practice overseas. The analysis also raises a number of questions. For example, granted there are
only two airlines with little likelihood of large scale entry, why have ti_ey onlybeen able to earn very
modest profits? Another question is why have costs not fallen further? Some answers are
suggested; while deregulation changed the product market, it did not change the aidine labour
market. Work practices and conditions changed little, and hence the productivity gains were
limited.
The paper commences with a brief review of the background to deregulation, and of the early
experiences. The next section explores how performance changed in the post deregulation period;
real air fares, traffic growth, profitability, and productivity are all considered, and some simple
international comparisons are made. In the following section, some of the puzzles which
deregulation has raised are considered; some tentative answers are suggested.
..... DomesticAi-rline Deregulati0-n-: Background and Early Experiences
Australia had tight regulation of domestic aviation until 1990, when there was extensive
deregulation. From the 1950s Until 1990, the "Two Airline Policy" formed the regulatory framework
for domestic aviation. Under this policy there were allowed to be only two major trunk airlines;
these were the privately owned Ansett and the government owned Australian Airlines ( formerly
Trans Australia Airlines). There were a number of regional airlines, most of which were owr_ed by
the major airlines, and which were not allowed to compete at all on the trunk-routes until the
1980s, and even then they _t_i'_-_very restricted in terms of how andwhere they could compete (for
a review, see BTE 1985).
The Two Airline Policy represented very detailed regulation. During its heyday, the airlines had to
operate identical fleets, offer identical fares and cooperate with- each other on fare setting. -They
tended to operate more or lessidentical schedules, though they were not required to do this. They
did have freedom over which routes to serve, and how to develop their networks (for example, they
were able to operate hub a-n-d spoke networks); their networks were very similar. They were
subjected to price regulation, initially of a less formal kind, and later formal rate of return regqlation.
Airline regulation was relaxed a_ttle in the 1980s. The airlines were permitted to purchase different
aircraft, and offer different levels of capacity; nevertheless, both retained close to 50% of the traffic
3limited freedom to compete on trunk routes; one of these, East-West, was active in trying to
expand its market share.
The airlines were strongly unionised, and have remained so. The unions supported the Policy, not
surprisingly since it enabled airlines to pass on higher wages through higher fares. The unions also
insisted on higher staffing ratios than were the norm in comparable overseas airlines. In the lead
up to deregulation, during 1989, there was a protracted pilots' strike; the pilots were opposed by
the airlines, the government and received no assistance form the union movement and ultimately
they were defeated. Dudng most of the years of the Policy, Australia was highly unionised, and
there was central regulation of wages; since the 1980s unionisation has declined, and wages have
been determined more at the enterprise level.
The Federal government determined, in 1987, to deregulate domestic aviation, and it gave the
industry three year's notice. Thus deregulation came into operation in 1990. This decision came
after a sedes of reports cdtical of the Policy, and was taken in an environment of extensive
liberalisation throughout the economy. The lack of variety and availability of discount air fares,
intemational comparisons of efficiency, and overseas experiences of deregulation all contributed
to dissatisfaction with the Policy. While the incumbent airlines would have preferred the status quo,
they had seen how the major airlines in the US had survived the onslaught of new competitors,
and considered that they would be able to live with deregulation. Deregulation was not complete;
foreign aidines were not permitted to compete on domestic routes, and the incumbent airlines were
granted extremely long term leases of the terminals they used at most airports; this ensured that
new entrants faced a major hurdle.
Before deregulation, it looked as if East-West would be a strong competitor for the major airlines. It
had been expanding, and positioning itself as a leisure traffic carder. However, before deregulation
came into operation, it was bought out by the interests which owned Ansett. It was operated as a
separate division for a time, but it was eventually merged fully into the larger airline. At the time of
deregulation, there was one new airline, Compass, ready to enter. This airline entered with
substantial capacity, and offered deep discounts. It quickly gained market share, but this was at
the cost of a price war. While its costs were quite low compared to those of the incumbents, it was
not able to sustain this strategy, and in late 1991, it collapsed For the Compass story, see Nyathi
et al, 1993). A second new entrant, Compass Mk 2, later appeared; while it was smaller and had a
much more focused operating plan, it quickly ran into financial difficulties, and exited. The rapid
collapse of two new entrants soon after deregulation has given a strong signal to potential entrants
that entry into the market is extremely difficult, and made financial markets very wary of new
airlines as an investment.
Since 1993, Australia has had two trunk airlines, with a few independent commuter airlines. The
government airline, Australian, was merged into the international airline, Qantas, and the merged
airline was pdvatised in 1995. Bdtish Airways has a 25% share Qantas. The domestic operations
of Qantas represent a significant though minority share of its total operations. More recently, Air
New Zealand has taken a half share in Ansett, which commenced limited international operations
when Australian and Qantas were merged.
These experiences pose the question of what has been achieved by deregulation. The market has
moved from one of regulated duopoly to unregulated duopoly, and it is unlikely that it will change
from this in the new future. There is the issue of whether there have been real gains from
deregulation, and whether any such gains have been as large as might have been expected.
Evaluating Airline Deregulation
There have been some studies of airline deregulation in Australia, but most of these were done
soon after it began, and thus do not pick up the medium to longer term effects of the change. The
4attention to service quality issues. It concluded that there had been net welfare gains from
deregulation. The entry by Compass was studied by Nyathi et al (1993) and by the Trade Practices
Commission (1992). More recently, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996)
has examined its own air fare data. However, there has been little by way of comprehensive
evaluation of deregulation since the BTCE study.
Data Availability
While the Australian airlines have in the past been subjected to a number of time series and cross
section studies of performance and productivity, it is becoming increasingly difficult to replicate
these because of data non availability. This is due, in some cases, to some data series no longer
being collected, mergers and erratic reporting. There are series of air fares, but since 1996, these
have ceased. Information from annual reports of airlines is becoming increasingly less useful for
studies of domestic aviation as there are no purely domestic airlines, apart from small commuter
operators, left. The major airlines only report very limited information about their domestic
operations. The airlines have not been providing regular or extensiVe statistical information to
international agencies such as ICAO, _ _ __
Some air fare data wer'e pulolished up to 1990, and in that year, (the predecessor to) the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission began collecting detailed fare information on the 21 major
routes. In 1996 it ceased collection. While it is still possible to collect data on fares such as
economy fares from primary sources, these fares have ceased to be useful as a proxy for air fares
in general. Information on the use of different fares is generally not available, though some limited
occasional studies have been done. Data on domestic airline traffic have still been published.
Strictly speaking, there are no data ava_able on costs, reWSu-e oron iabourd_ed_in the 'domestic
market- thus it is no longer feasible to estimate_tota]_0_r_du_ctivlty for time _se_es_ _cr0ss
section purposes. At this stage, one airline, Ansett, isprirna_i_, _till a d6mest=_c=cam'_=r;hence it is
still possible, with some inacCOtacy, to use its performance aS a _easure of perfo_ance in the
domestic market. Australian Airlines data are available until 1991-2, a rather atypical year because
of the presence of Compass. Qantas now publishes a limited amount of information about traffic
and earnings, though not sales, in its domestic operation. The upshot is that it is feasible to make
some measures of performance of the domestic airline market, but such measures are going to
become increasingly unreliable.
Most studies of deregulation in Australia take the beginning of deregulation at the end of i990.
While formally, this was the start of deregulation, it is best to not rely too heavily on this date to
take measurements from. For a start, the industry was still recovering from the 1989-1990 pilots'
strike, and demand had not fully recovered; the boom in air travel in 1991 is partly explained by
recovery from the strike. Secondly, the aidines had been informed about deregulation in 1987, and
were preparing for it from about 1988 onwards. Thus, where data allow, it is preferable to regard
the "start" of deregulation as around 1988.
Real Air Fares
Until 1996, data on average air fares are available. During the decade before t990, air fares had
remained fairly constant in real terms, even though improvements in technology might have
suggested that some real falls could have been expected. Air fares fell, in real and nominal terms,
in the immediate aftermath of deregulation. This was the period when Compass was present in the
market, and a price war was under way. After Compass I and II had exited, fares rose again;
however, they rose to a level below that of 1990. Since 1992-3, real air fares have changed very
little. Overall, in the 1990-96 period, fares fell by 20-24% (Table 1). On these figures, it would
seem that deregulation has made quite an impact.
The interpretation of these figures has been challenged by Quiggin (1996) who argues that there
=N
have fallen. The fall in the average has been effected through a shift from the high priced to the
low priced categories. Using Paasche and Lasperes indices, he notes that fare indices have
changed little since deregulation-fares have fallen by about 1% on average. Quiggin concludes
that deregulation has had only a very minor effect on fares.
This argument fails to recognise that the main impact of deregulation has been on the availability
of discount fares. Discount fares are quantity constrained; partly for price discrimination reasons,
and partly so that they can be used to fill aircraft more effectively. Deregulation has made discount
fares much more readily available. The index technique, used by Quiggin, is only correct if all of
the fares are available on an unconstrained basis at the beginning and end of the period. This is
not the case with air fares. For many leisure travellers, discount tickets, with conditions attached,
are almost perfect substitutes for the more flexible, though much more expensive, full economy
tickets. Thus, while there has been some reduction in the average quality of the services on offer,
this has not been great; the reduction in average fare per kilometre is a slight, though only slight,
overestimate of the fall in real effective air fares.
Another way of examining the quality issue is to look at load factors. Load factors are a measure of
the average flexibility of air fares on offer. They can be increased if more restrictive fares are sold,
and account for a greater proportion of the traffic (at the limit, a scheduled operator becomes more
like a charter operator, with little flexibility in travel). If the Quiggin view were correct, we might
expect to see a significant rise in load factors, being achieved by a greater proportion of less
flexible, and hence lower quality, tickets being sold. As it is, there is very little change in load
factors. These were high before deregulation (at around 70% to 75%) and they have remained so
since.
Another possible source of inaccuracy may come about from a shift between short haul and long
haul traffic. Since deregulation, the greatest reductions in average air fares have come in the long
haul routes (see Table 1); these are the routes with the lowest per kilometre fares. Traffic growth
has been greatest on long haul routes, partly as a result of the greater price reductions. To this
extent, the movement in average fares per kilometre will overstate the real reduction in air fares. It
is difficult to measure how serious a qualification this is likely to be. The average passenger stage
length of Australian Aidines rose, though not by very much, over the 1987-88 to 1991-92 period.
The overall assessment on air fares must be that they declined fairly significantly in the post
deregulation pedod, though that the fall in average per kilometre fare is a small overestimate of the
fall in real effective air fares.
Traffic Growth
If deregulation has resulted in lower real air fares, it would be expected that traffic would grow
strongly. In fact, one of the most prominent features of the post deregulation period has been a
sharp and sustained boom in air travel. Traffic grew by neady 50% in 1991, the period of the price
war, but it has continued to grow since then. A better base for calculation is 1988, since the
industry was still recovering from the pilots' strike and the economy was in recession in 1990. Over
the seven year 1981 to 1988 period, c0verir_g_bo6m to boom in the economy, traffic growth_was
3.3%, while in the 1988 to 1995 period, also boom to boom, growth was 7.7% (Table 2). This
suggests that deregulation has had a major impact through lower fares. However, alternative
explanations of the boom in air travel must be canvassed.
One explanation is that there could have been mUch more effective price discrimination, and that
this may have led to higher output. Fares u._ed by low elasticity travelers (businesstravelers using
economy fares) have risen, and fares used by high elasticity travelers (leisure travelers using
discount fares) have fallen and become more freely available. This would have resulted in an
overall increase in traffic. This however can be regarded as a result of deregulation, and it is also
Normally,this could have been expected to result in increased profits, but in the more competitive
environment, airlines were not able to raise profitability (in fact, profitability fell- see below). In
summary, some of the growth in traffic can be ascribed to fare structure changes, not just falls in
fares; this is a desirable outcome of deregulation however.
Another possible explanation of the growth in domestic traffic has been the growth in international
tourism to Australia. International tourists also use the domestic airlines; however they remain a
small proportion of total traffic. In 1993 the BTCE made anestimate of the propensity of Australian
residents to use domestic airlines; it concluded that there had bee a sharp increase in this
propensity by 1992. in Table 3 the BTCE estimates are updated to 1995, using the methodology
developed by the BTCE. It suggests that the propensity to travel has further increased.
It is difficult to find any alternative explanations of this boom in domestic travel. Population has
been increasing only slowly, and GDP per capita has been growing more slowly than in the 1980s.
International air traffic from Australia has not been growing nearly as rapidly. All of this strongly
suggests that falls in real effective air fares, coupled with changes in the structure of fares, have
been behind the boom in travel.
Profitability
Deregulation has been followed by a sharp drop in the profitability of the two major airlines. The
1980s were a period of high and sustained profitability for the airlines; the only difficult period,
before the pilots' strike, was a pedod of recession early in the decade. Ansett was particularly
profitable. In the immediate post deregulation period profitability fell; this was to be expected given
the price war with Compass, and a recession in the economy. After the exit of Compass, fares
rose, though not to their previous level. This was also true of profits. As a group, the airlines have
been rather unprofitable since deregulation.
Good measures of profitability of domestic airlines have been difficult to come by, since sales
revenue and assets data are no longer published. In Table 4 data are presented on Earnings
before Interest and Taxation; this is not a pure measure of profit, and it can be affected by leasing
policies. Granted these limitations, it suggests that profits have been, at best, quite modest since
deregulation. Airlines are larger, but they are not earning as much profits, This is evident in the
measure of real EBIT per revenue passenger kilometre; this has fallen significantly (. In spite of
facing limited competition since 1992, the airlines have not been able to restore their profits. ,:
Productivity Trends
While air fares have fallen, this might not be a result of a real improvement in the productivity of
the airlines; it could be because profits or input prices have fallen.
There is evidence of increasing labour productivity. Over the period 1987-88 to 1991-92, labour
productivity in Australian Airlines increased by about a third (Table 5). In the later five year period
to 1996-97, labour productivity in Ansett grew quite rapidly; however some of this improvement
must be ascribed to the inclusion of long haul in_tern_ationa| routes happening over f,he pedod.
Labour productivity measures are partial and are prone to error; for example when there is a trend
towards contracting out.
Another approach is to use information on unit costs and input prices to estimate trends in total
factor productivity. No direct data on unit costs of domestic traffic are available, but unit costs can
be estimated from output price (fare) and profitability data. changes over 1990 to 1996 are
summarised in Table 1. EBIT per RPK was around 3c in t_n_1980S and lc in the 1990s; were it not
for the decline in profitability, fares per RPK might have been about 2c higher in 1996. Thus the
adjusted fare, allowing for the 1980s return on capital, would have been 20c per RPK. Deflating by
?Input prices seem to have been approximately tracking the CPI. Avtur prices have moved around,
and they have increased more than the CPI. Data on aidine wages are not available, but economy
wide indicators, such as average weekly earnings, have kept pace with the CPI. There have not
been major swings in exchange rates and the prices paid for equipment over this period. Overall,
diJring this period, move/.nents in the CPI are probably a good proxy for movements in the input
price index. '
Thus, a reasonable measure of the change in total factor productivity over the 1990-1996 period is
a 14.5% gain. This suggests that productivity has definitely grown, though it is not a spectacular
growth for a six year period for the airline industry. At 2.3% pa it is less than that achieved (2.9%)
by the European carriers over 1986-93, but more than that achieved by US carders (0.7%) (Oum
and Yu,1995). The Australian carders were perhaps between the two groups in terms of TFP,
though probably closer to the European carriers. If unit fares are a measure of unit costs in the
1980s, the productivity growth in the post deregulation period has been significantly greater than
before.
International Comparisons
Ideally it would be possible to make comparisons of total factor productivity, adjusting for different
output mixes, or to embody the domestic Australian airlines in a cross country cost or production
function analysis. Data limitations prevent this being done. It is possible to make some crude
comparisons of unit cost and productivity.
Some estimates of cost per tonne kilometre available and performed are given in Table 6 for 1995.
The cost estimates for Ansett would include some non aidine operations, and also include some
international aidine operations. Costs are given in USc- in 1995, the official Australia-US exchange
rate faidy closely reflected purchasing power. Ansett's unit costs are considerably higher than
those of Qantas (including domestic operations, but with most of its output being international) and
those of other airlines, several of which have low stage lengths. The difference between Ansett
and the other airlines is unlikely to be explained fully by output mix. Unit costs for the domestic
component of Qantas are likely to be similar to those of Ansett, though probably a little lower
(currently Qantas faces the same output prices, but makes larger profits on its domestic services).
This pattern is also reflected in differences in labour productivity. Labour productivity in 1993, as
measured by tonne kilometres performed, is presented for a number of airlines, including several
short haul airlines, in Table 7. Data for Australian Airlines is presented for 1992, its last year of
independent existence_ Even allowing forthe' fact that some non airline employees may be
included for Ansett, its labour productivity is Very low, even in comparison with airlines which are
not regarded as being especially productive.
Prior to deregulation, it was considered that the domestic airlines in Australia were significantly less
productive than comparable overseas airlines; for this reason it was expected that the gains from
deregulation could be large. These; figures suggest that while deregulation has improved
productivity, there is still a wide gap between the productivity of the Australian domestic airlines
and overseas best practice.
Domestic Deregulation; Some Stylised Facts and Questions
The discussion above suggests some stylised facts about deregulation.
• Air fares have fallen in real terms since deregulation, though by a little less than the fall in
average fare per passenger kilometre.
• Traffic has boomed, mainly as a resl_onse to lower fares, and esl:)eciallv the clreater availability
i• Even with limited competition since 1992, airline profitability has been poor.
• Total factor productivity has increased by about 14%; this reflects a faster productivity growth
rate than in the 1980s. Some of the fall in air fares has been made possible by the fall in
profitability.
• The productivity of domestic airlines still lags well behind that of comparable overseas airlines.
• There has been relatively little change in performance since1992, after the exit of Compass.
These facts in turn give rise to some questions.
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• Why, in the presence of ver_-Iimited _mpetiti0n, has the profitability of the airlines been so
modest?
Why is labour productivity so low, and why has there been such limited catch up with overseas
airlines?
Interpreting the Results of Deregulation
The answers to the two questions raised above are far from obvious. It is worth exploring the
possible answers with a view to suggesting whether further changes in the market are likely.
Duopoly Behaivour
The Australian airlines have moved from a situation of regulated duopoly to unregulated duopoly,
though their behaviour since deregulation does not seem typical of aggressive, profit maximising
duopolists. Profits have, at best, been modest, and pdces have been close to costs. With the long
history of cooperative behaviour, it might have been expected that the airlines would have been
able to make more effective use of their market position.
-_..... C)r_e pos_|e _exl_ia_nati0n might_be a struggle for market sharei_it could be that the current
outcomes are temporary, and that fares_ll be increased once an equilibrium has been
established. There has been some fight for market share. At the beginning of the post deregulation
period, Ansett had a greater share of the traffic on competitive routes than Australian. After the
merger, Qantas domestic scheduled a significant amount more of capacity, and it now has a
greater share than Ansett. Its weapon appeared to be more one of increased frequency and
convenience rather than of price, since there was no price war at this time. It could be that the
struggle for market share is holding back fare increases, though both airlines would probably do
better, in the long run as well as the short run, if they raised fares somewhat.
Fear of competition is not likely to be restraining price behaviour. There has been no entry for six
years, and new entrants are not very likely in the near future. Should a new entrant appear, it is
likely that it would seek out niche markets rather than mount a full frontal assault on the market as
did Compass I. If need be, the incumbent airlines can reduce prices quickly if competitors appear,
and they do not need to keep pdces down in the absence of entry. Until recently, there has been
pdce monitoring; however this was not price regulation, and the airlines were not constrained in the
pricing decisions.
Another possibility is that the low fares are a remaining effect of the Compass pdce w_r. Possibly,
having reduced pnces, the airlines are finding it difficult to raise them again. This is not likely
zand it is possible for them to continue to raise prices in an inconspicuous manner, by making
discount fares more restricted and difficult to get- they do not need to raise published fares.
In one way the airlines are making effective use of their market power; this is through keeping
costs higher than might be the case if there were more competition. As noted in the previous
section, there is scope for the airlines to reduce costs further. They have not been under strong
pressure to do so, and the incentives for cost reduction are possibly not great. The airlines are
thus using their duopoly position to enable higher staffing levels, and better working conditions,
than would otherwise be the case. The duopoly rents are being enjoyed by the workforce. This
however still does not explain why prices are as close to costs as they are; even if costs are higher
than the minimum, there would be scope for the two airlines to charge above actual costs and
generate some rents for themselves.
The two airlines do appear to be somewhat tacitly cooperative in specific city pair markets. Fares in
some markets, dominated by low elasticity business travel, such as those out of Canberra, are
relatively high, while those dominated by leisure traffic are low. At the route market level, the
airlines are not competing fares down to cost. Overall, however, they are together scheduling
sufficient capacity to keep prices close to costs. The airlines are less cooperative at the capacity
scheduling stage than they are at the route pricing stage. This is in spite of the fact that their route
networks, schedules and frequencies are very similar;, they are under no illusion that they are not
involved in direct head to head competition.
Overall, the two airlines are more competitive between each other than would have been expected,
especially given their history of cooperation. The reasons for this are not clear. The worry that they
would use their market power to earn large profits has not materialised. However, the presence of
market power has given them scope to keep costs higher than might be achieved in a more
competitive environment.
Explaining the Productivity Gap
Overseas experience suggests that the Australian airlines could operate with much less labour,
and achieve much lower per unit costs. It was the expectation of major gains from this source
which was one of the main motivations for deregulation. Current experience, especially the limited
change since 1992, suggests that the environment in which the domestic airlines operate is not
such as to force them to maximise efficiency.
The airlines do have an incentive to minimise costs, and to convert cost savings for their owners.
Both airlines are now private, and both have overseas private airlines as major shareholders. In
both airlines there is a recognition that cost savings are possible, and both are currently attempting
to cut costs. Their progress in this respect seems to be slow. On the other hand, neither is forced
by pressure of competition to lower its costs. They seem to be taking advantage of their duopoly
position by allowing costs to be higher, rather than by putting up prices and achieving greater
profits.
It is possible that domestic airlines in Australia face operating disadvantages and that higher unit
costs are inherent. This is rather implausible though. They operate with very good weather, and
experience delays at only one airport, Sydney. The international division of Qantas has been a
relatively efficient performer in comparison with other international airlines. The levels of service
quality_offered by the domestic airlines may be higher than that offered in other domestic systems,
but this is unlikely to be much of the explanation.
Probably the main difference between the Australian and other domestic airline systems lies at the
labour market level. Labour market conditions and regulation are different. In spite of the failed
pilots' strike, the airlines are strongly unionised, and there is also centralised labour market
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same levels of productivity. This is not likely to be the result of generally lower efficiency of labour
in the Australian economy, since productivity in other industries is high by international
comparisons.
The airline labour force is still in a strong position, is spite of deregulation. There is a monopoly of
supply of critical labour inputs to the industry. The workforce can use this power to insist on high
pay and good working conditions. It is possible that the Australian workforce has chosen to enjoy
its monopoly rents through easier jobs rather than higher pay, and achieved this through- having
more staff per task, and hence lower productivity. This may be the result of an efficient, or an
inefficient, bargain at the labour market level; the cost, in terms of increased effort, of achieving
higher pay through greater productivity may not be worthwhile.
The airlines may not be willing to challenge current arrangements. Any cost reductions they
achieve will probably be matched by their competitor, and thus will not be _.6hve_ea int6_rofits.
On the other hand, if they challenge the situation, they could be faced by costly strikes and lose
market share to their competitor. Deregulation may have lessened market power at the product
market level, but it did not reduce market power at the airline labour market level
It is interesting to contrast the Australian experience with that in the US. The Australian aidines
have not been challenged in the same way that the incumbent major airlines were in the US.
These aidines were faced with multiple entry by low cost ca,Tiers; they were able to achieve their
lower costs partly by paying their (non union) staffs lower pay, but they were also able to achieve
less labour using work practices. To survive, the incumbent airlines were forced to conclude new
deals with their workforces; these embodied higher pr0ductivity, and sbmetfm'__e_-_SwSr pay. Entry,
at the airline or product market level, put pressure on at the airline labour market level. The airline
employees' market power was weakened; employees were forced to accept heavier work loads for
less pay. (To the extent that work loads became heavier, the real productivity gains in the US may
have been overstated).
Thus a good deal of the answer to the productivity comparisons puzzle probably lies in the airline
labour market. In Australia there is still strong market power present, the use of this leads to high
staffing requirements. There may be some possibility for airlines to achieve productivity gains, if
they are prepared to pass some of these on in the form of higher pay to their employees. However,
their ability to do this may be limited, because workforces are often conservative, and often they
are unwilling to change. Negotiated improvements in productivity are likely, but they will take time
in coming.
Another possibility is that the workforce's market power may be challenged. This could happen if
there were successful entry by low cost airlines, which achieve their low costs by having more
efficient work practice._, and perhaps by paying less. At present this does not seem very likely.
..... C6nciusions /
The analysis here resolves an number of issues, but it poses additional ones. The initial
assessment of deregulation is confirmed; there have been gains, but there have only been minor
changes since 1992, when the competitive episode in the industry ended. These results are
preliminary, but they are not likely to be changed much by more detailed analysis. The changes
that have taken place have been attributed to deregulation; there is always a problem of identifying
the appropriate counterfactual, but there is nothing to suggest that the same productivity growth or
increase in availability of low fares would have taken place in the absence of deregulation.
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of deregulation has been the boom in air travel, which cannot
be explained by other factors. All of this refutes the view, now being expressed, that deregulation
has changed little, and produced only minimal reductions in fares.
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The paper suggests that both the fears and hopes have not materialised. There was a fear that
there would be no new competitors, leading to unregulated duopoly with high fares and profits,
While there is a duopoly, it has not resulted in high fares; this does pose a question of why the
aidines have not been able to make more effective use of their market power. There was a hope
that deregulation would lead to productivity levels comparable to those of the best systems
overseas. This has not happened; there is still something of a gap to be made up, and current
progress is not rapid. This poses the question of why the airlines seem to have stabilised at lower
productivityilevels than achieved elsewhere. The answer to this may lie in the nature of the airline
labour market in Australia; this market has been little changed by deregulation.
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Table 1: Air Fares (Cents per passenger kilometre) 1990-96
Distance
0-500 km
501-1000 km
1001-2000 km
2001-4000 km
Average
CPI
September :1990
32.67
24.5
16.0
13.1
19.7
September 1996
33.6
22.9
15.5
11.5
18.0
% Change
+ 3.1
- 6.5
- 4.1
- 12.2
- 8.6
+ 16.3
Source: ACCC Journal, September 1997, p50
Table 2: Traffic 1981-95 ['000 Revenue Passengers]
1981
1988
1996
11,388
14,321
24,073
% increase per year
3.3%
7.7%
Source: BTCE, Transport Indicators, various years; BTCE (1993)
Table 3:
Year
Ending
June
1982
1988
1992
1995
Propensity to Travel, 1982-1995
Short Term
Foreign
Visitors
950,172
2,239,490
2,519,700
3,436,000
Estimated
Domestic Trips By
Visitors ,
712,629
1,679,618
1,889,795
2,577,000
Estimated
Domestic Trips by
Residents
10,537,475
11,929,792
16,048,525
20,845,000
Australian
Population
15,184,200
16,518,400
17,528,900
18,054,000
Ratio of
Trips/Population
0.69
0.72
0.92
1.15
Source: Transport Indicators, various years; BTCE(1993)
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Table 4: Airline Profitability 198112- 1996/7
Year
1981182
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987188
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996197
Earnings before Interest and Taxation
Ansett
($m)
106
116
223
180
250
297
391
225
281
-7
82.__ s
191.7
328.8
198.6
80.9
96.6
Australian/
Qantas
Domestic ($m)
24
24
31
55
68
72
125
164
40
182
12.5
10.6
133
164
168
Total EBTT/
RPK
in Current $
1.31
1.55
2.74
2.39
3.00
3.25
3.31
2.97
3.38
1.34
1.24
2.10
1.35
0.89
0.90
in 1990 $
2.40
2.55
4.21
3.53
4.08
3.87
3.83
3.21
3.38
1.27
1.16
1.90
1.19
0.77
0.77
S ou rces:
Table 5:
Airline Annual Reports; B.T.C.E. Transport Indicators, various yearsi ACCC
(1996); BTCE (1993)
Aidine Labour Productivity, RPK per Employee (000)
Year Australian
1987188
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
594
642
421
590
838
Ansett
w
665
741
824
86O
997
i]5
i
|
| •
|
i
z
=
|
i
=-
Table 6:
Table 7:
Unit Costs, 1995, Selected Airlines
Airline
American
U.S. Air
America West
CostJATK
USe
40.1
65.5
42.5
Canadian
All Nippon
Qantas
SAS
Ansett
35.8
131.4
52.8
112.5
115.1
Source: Annual Reports; ICAO. Digest of Statistics: Financial Data
Labour Productivity, 1993, Selected Airlines
w
Airline Passenger Stage
American Airlines
U.S. Air
Canadian
All Nippon
Qantas
Lufthansa
SAS
Ansett
Australian (1992)
Length
1566
866
1630
1034
4257
1071
702
1001
975
Sources: Annual Reports; Oum and Yu (1997)
RTK (000)/
•Employee
184
122
171
289
292
218
124
76
92
\
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Why can't Japan deregulate the airline industry and open
the sky immediately?
Yasuo SAKAKIBARA
I A brief history of deregulation in Japan
I. Dividing the market into three airlines (1970)
(i) Many small regional airlines were born soon after the reopening of civil
aviation in 1953.
(ii) JMOT recommended (an administrative guidance) that small ones be
merged
(iii) Unwritten "constitution" (an understanding of a cabinet meeting) divided
the market into three airlines.
JAL: int-e/r/atibnal and do/n-esfic trunk routes
ANA: domestic trunk and local routes
TDA: (now JAS): local and domestic trunk routes
(iv) How powerful was the "constitution?' Jr
2. Some relaxa_on Oi_hhe--'constitutiOn'(1985}
(i) Complete privatization of JAL
(ii)Double and tripletracldng allowed in domestic routes with heavy demand
(iii}ANA and JAS _owcd togo international
{iv}JMOT's discretionary power increased
(v} AirPort capacity limitation,good or badP
3. More relaxation in domestic market (1995-97}
(i) Room to play in fares
(ii) Double and triple tracldng expanded
(iii}JMOT announcement in 1997 that market intervention would be
abandoned on domestic routes by 1999. -
(iv) New entry on a large scale impossible under airline oligopoly and under
airport capacity limitations
II Aviation issue as a thorn in U.S.-Japan relations
1. How unequal was the unequal treaty?
(i} Landing and takeoff points
(ii) Issue of unlimited "beyond i right
(iii) Japanese passengers are 2/3 of the total and American carriers have 2/3
!
i
i
I
i
|= _
of the total on the trans-Pacific routes
(iv] Market forces vs. inequality
: = : = = =
2. New agreement of 1998
(i) Is it closer to "open sky'?
(ii) JMOT says that some inequalities amended
(iii] Perception gaps in the U.S. and Japan
(iv) Asian economic crisis and unattractive "beyond"
Ill Why does JMOT fear the inevitable?
1. Cost differences between Japanese and U.S. carriers
(i) Airport capacity limitations and very high charges
(ii) Fluctuations in currency exchange ratio
(iii) Fear of unemployment
2. World mega-carriers and anti-trust
3. Nature of Japanese bureaucmcy...'A wise man does
history'(Adlai Stevenson) in more impatient world
(i) Mediator rather than enforcer
(ii) Policy which makes the least number of people unhappy
IV Towards more opened sky
1. U.S. relations
(i) Aviation issue and trade issue
(ii) Yen vs. dollars
i (iii) ntinu
| .Co ed..'foreign pressure"i
i Asian conditions
":" . . .
! (l.! HOW long does Aman economic crisis continue? ....
[ (.n.! Posslbie excess capacRy a! Asian .airports
(iii} How fast do other countries m Asla go to open sky?
i
| 3. Global Alliance and Code Sharing to bypass government controls
not hurry
1 A brief History of Deregulation in Japan
When Japan was allowed to reopen civil aviation and Japan Airlines
(JAL) was reestablished in 1953, no Japanese government official, no member
of the government committee on civil aviation, and nobody in the airline
business could imagine that the new JAL would become profitable in a few
years and that it would grow to be one of the established air carriers of the
world. Therefore, the civil aviation policy of the Japanese Ministry of
Transport (JMOT) was geared entirely to strengthen JAL's position as Japan's
"flag carrier." _ _ _ ......
The JAL's performance improved with "the jimmu boom" of 1956
(Jimmu was the first legendary emperor of Japan, and the term Jimmu boom
means boom without any precedent). JAL made a profit from '55 to '61 and
paid dividends to private stockholders in '60 for the _st time (The gove_ent
owned the majority of its stocks) I.
On the other hand, none of the many small regional airlines born after
the reopening of the civil aviation were making money. The JMOT
recommended (an administrative guidance) 2 that small ones be merged into
larger ones. A series of mergers followed and two airlines emerged: All
Nippon Airways (ANA) and Toa-Domestic Airlines (TDA...later changed to
Japan Air System, JAS).
Soon after the three major airlines, JAL, ANA and TDA, came to existence,
an understanding of a cabinet meeting was issued (1970).
This understanding came to be called "the constitution" of civil aviation
because it completed the regulatory system and because it was strictly
observed, however informal the regulatory dictations were. What the
constitution did was to divide the market into three airlines.
J/U,: international and domestic trunk routes
The author taught the transportation economics for the first time in '58 at Doshisha
University. In a lecture, I predicted that soon the Japan_ese_wo_ u!d be able to go
w/th the money received as a one-time bonus. No student believed my words. I argued
that income elasticity of air demand had been high and Japanese income was rising very
fast, that technological improvements in air transportation would continue to be very fast
and ther_ore, the relative cost of air travel would severely come down, and, finally, that
the Japan_ e_se would want to know more things foreign and foreigners want to know more
about Japan.
i ".Arlrn/n/_trative guidance" is a technique used often by the Japanese governmenL It is
a mere recommendation or suggestion (therefore not based on a law and thus the
gov_ent has no power to enforce it), but it has had an almost sim/lar effect as
regulations based on laws. Japanese businesses hesitate to sue the government,
because they are afraid of a bad reputation and posm'ble retaliation by the government.
(On the other hand, private citizens occasionally sue the government.)
ANA: domestic trunk and local flights
TDA (JAS): local flights
Since fares and new entries were regulated, these three airlines have all
become regulated monopolists. Yet they were all dissatisfied because they
were deprived of the chance to expand to other markets, jAS experienced
financial difficulties, since it had to operate unprofitable local routes, and,
therefore, it was allowed to operate a few trunk lines to make cross-subsidies
possible. ANA's pleas to operate international routes were all denied. JAL
was allowed by the "constitution', to run domestic trunk routes because those
were JAL's original routes and because the JMOT wanted JAL's international
position to be strengthened by cross-subsidization between international and
domestic routes, yet the JAL always wanted to enter ANA's monopoly trunk
markets 3.
In 1985, the JMOT took a step to relax the "constitution." The
government committee on transport policy recommended the adoption of the
following three measures.
(i) jAL should be entirely privatized.
(ii) Double and triple tracldng should be allowed in domestic routes with
heavy demand (more than 1 million passengers for triple and 700,000
for double).
(iii) ANA and JAS should be allowed to have international routes.
We do not know how far the JMOT was recognizing the necessity of
competition in domestic and international routes in adopting these measures.
, In the case of international flights, it was most probably motivated by
American demand that more American airlines be allowed on trans-Pacific
routes. If Japan had to yield to the American demand, it would be better to
i
SThe market division hu _ a very touchy subject. In 1978, I wrote a paper entitled
"Open Sky and the Grandfather Clause" (in Japanese) in which I made a few policy
recommendations for more competition and -- eventual open sky. The paper had three
specific points that later in 1985 the JMOT would adopt, namely
(_ complete privatization of the JAL,
(h_ plural international carriers,
('_i) free entry to the domestic market.
As a result, I became unpopular among the airlines. The JAL did not like other
airlines entering the international markets, ANA did not like JAL and JAS entering their
monopoly trunk routes and JAS did not like to have new entries to local monopoly
markets. They all wanted to keep their monopoly markets intact and to enter other
markets. They must have calculated that the loss caused by losing monopoly markets
would be larger than possible gains from ent_ other markets. Furthermore, the
JMOT did not like to be told what it should do. As a result, all were unhappy with me.
have multiple airlines to fly trans-Pacific routes to achieve an equal right.
Government capital had accounted for 70% when JAL was established,
but with more capital raised in the stock market, its share had declined to
33% by this time. Thus, complete privatization was a natural step to take.
However these measures did not decrease the discretional power of the
JMOT. Because of limited airport capacity, the JMOT could continue to
dictate the routes wl_ airlines should fly. Airline officials had tO go to the
JMOT even more frequentIy than before to acqu_ n_routes. _ _
Japan had some 150 airports during the: World War II. When it
reopened civil aviation, there Were only nine rem_g. Most of the other
airports were turned into rice-paddies to feed s_g Japanese after the War.
Today, Japan has some 90 airports, mostly local ones, because the JMOT
butt the airports wherever the land was available, not necessarily in _e most
advantageous locations 4.
The airport shortage definitely contributed to keep the monopoly position
of the airlines and helped __ the discretionary power of the JMOT at the
expense of the consumer.
In 1995-1997, some more relaxation measures were taken. By this
time, it was clear to everybody what would happen after deregulation and
"open sky'because of American experiences. The JMOT figured that step by
step deregulation instead of one-time deregulation would achieve what
Americans had achieved, while avoiding the confusion Americans experienced.
It decided to set a fare ceiling on each route and allowed airlines to discount
from it. Some oligopolistic fare competition started involving hotels and other
related facilities in tour packages, discounts for early purchase of tickets, etc.,
in domestic routes. The number of passengers needed for double and triple
trackings was reduced, and the routes served by plural airlines increased.
This move took away some profits from airlines. And, finally, in 1997, the
JMOT announced that the market intervention would be abandoned totally in
domestic routes by 1999. That means that any airline can enter any market
ff it applies to the JMOT; this in cludesn_ en_ts. The JMOT now seems
to be in the mood of encouraging new entrants in the domestic market.
However, well-established oligopoly and the capacity limitation at major
airports make it impossible for other airlines to enter domestic market in a
"Because of the high land price in urban areas, because of the lack of the concept of
eminent domain, and because of the shortage of funds for airport construction, the JMOT
tended to build new airports where the land price was _reasona_b_!_e._d whe_ pop_
o_t/on tO-the const_-ction Of_e-a]rport was _al.__,_tematio__
in urban areas were hardest to Construct as the case of the Narita _rt symbolized.
=
large scale fashion. Recently, one of the major airlines even proposed
competitive bidding for the right to use newly increased slots. It may have
done so, knowing that the proposal will never go through the JMOT. The
JMOT actually reserved some slots from 50 new slots created by the relocation
of a runway at the Haneda Airport for newly established airlines. The JMOT
did the same for the old Osaka Airport when the municipalities surrounding
the airport agreed to increase the number of flights by 50. However we will
have to wait many more years till airport capacity limitations are eliminated.
II Aviation Issue as a thorn in US-Japan Relations
The U.S.-Japan economic relations have gone through periods of
antagonism as the two countries came closer. However, even in those periods
the issues between the two countries were more emotional than real, more
political than economic, and were oRen discussed more loudly than necessary.
As we end the '90s, an era different from the two previous decades, the U.S.
has regained self-confidence in its own economy while Japan has lost it.
With this change, emotions on both sides have subsided. Japan bashing has
become a thing of the past and Japan passing is the mood of the day since
Japan is no longer considered a threat to the U.S. economy. Japanese who
were often labeled as arrogant, now have nothing to boast about.
We can not be too optimistic about this situation, especially because the
trade imbalance is widening as the yen fails. If the Japanese economy picks
up and the American economy slows down, the trade issue will be ignited
again.
For the last two Years` , however, transportation and communications
have become an issue. Transportation and communications were considered
to be different issues-fr0m gen_ra] ec_bmlc relations, or trade. I do not
know why. One reason for it may be because they Were handled by other
divisions of bureaucracies. Americans pointed at cargo handling in the
Japanese seaports and termed" it as unfair. Japanese admitted the truth in
essence but would never say so. Cargo-handling workers are tightly
unionized like onetime Teamster, and the government can do very little to
change practices. American demands _'_ m a way welcome s_nce they can be
used it as _forei_ p_ssure" to achieve a domestic policy goal.
Another issue that was more re_l, was, of course, aviation. Am_can
policy has been consistent after 1980, demanding "open sky" in Japan. In
my judgement, Japanese policy towards the U.S. on this matter is more
emotional or at least it involves evoking nationalistic feelings in order to turn
negotiations to its advantage. There is a fear on the Japan cse_de Mat the
American position may have a strong appeal to the average consumer in
Japan. Thus, the Japan side insisted on the amendment of unequal treaty
concluded right after the World War II before accepting "open sky."
It is true that there is a certain inequality in U.S.-Japan air agreements,
real and imaginary. However, the Japanese insistence on _endment has
been tenuous and often resembled similar eagerness of eider statesmen of the
late Meiji Period who tried everything to amend unequal treaty concluded at
the time of the Restoration.
The American side has argued that there is no inequality in the
agreement and that Japan should honor it. And even if there is inequality in
the agreement, it will disappear once and for all if both sides adopt -o_n sky."
In the eyes of American negotiators, it looked as if Japan was trying to earn
advantage for Japanese carriers.
Then, how unequal was the U.S-Japan air agreement before the new
agreement was concluded in March 14, '98. ......
i) The number of incumbent carriers:
Japan 1 (jAL)
U.S. 3 (NW, UA, FedEx)
ii)Landing and take off points
In Japan American carriers
Japanese carriers
In the U.S. American carriers
Japanese carriers
no limit
limited
no limit
limited
"beyond" fights allowed only for incumbents
Japanese carriers limited
American carriers no limit
Actual "beyond" flights
Japan 2 a week
U.S. 179 a week
(7 points in use)
(7 points in use)
(24 points in use)
(11 points in use)
(1 point in use)
(12 points in use)
iii) Charter flights
Japan limited
U.S. limited
(200 a year)
(400 a year)
As the result of these inequalities, Japan argued that Japanese _ers were
losing their share of trans-Pacific flights. Japan argued that two-thirds of the
passengers were Japanese but two-thirds of them were _ed by American
carriers.
The American side argued that it was simply the result of market forces.
American carriers offer cheaper fares and better services than Japanese,
including, of course, better connections within the United States. "Beyond
rights" look unequal on the surface, but in fact they were not. The American
side argued that for Japanese carriers there was no demand for "beyond," but
for American carriers there are strong demands for "beyond." The Japanese
argued that ff the Untied States excised unlimited "beyond" rights to Asian
and Oceanic countries, Japanese should be allowed to have landing and
takeoff rights everywhere in the United, while pointing out the difference in
geographical size. This is an interesting but lame logic and reveals both the
intention and real anxiety of Japanese negotiators.
At any rate, a new temporary agreement leffective to the year 2002) was
concluded in March "98, in which some "inequalities" are amended as follows.
i) The number of incumbent carriers:
Japan 3 (ANA and NCA)
U.S. 3
ii) Landing and takeoff points
in Japan Japan Unlimited
U.S. Unlimited
in the U.S. Japan Unlimited
U.S. Unlimited
iii) 'beyond' rights allowed for incumbents
Japan unlimited
U.S. unlimited
iv) Charter flights
.... Japan 400 ayear Year 2000"-- 600 a year
U.S. 400 a year Year 2000"- 600 a year
Japan acquired nominal equality after long negotiations, but that
equality will not change the nature ofthe market. I presume that the U.S. did
not lose anything by this agreement. Currently, the Asian air market is much
less attractive as Comp_ wi_one ye_r_g0 when Asia was the growth center
of the world. 'Beyond' rights are also less lucrative. Giving away nominal
inequality to achieve a freer market where American carriers have cost
advantages was a good policy to take for Americans.
After the new agreement, American carriers are increasing the number of
trans-Pacific flights more rapidly than Japanese carriers, using the so far
Cf-"-
unused slots vacated by FedEx and also the slots opened by the increase in
number of landing-takeoffs per hour at Narita Airport.
III Why are Japanese afraid Of Open sky?
There are several reasons why the Japanese are afraid of "open sky."
The first reason is, of course, the lack of competitiveness of Japanese
international carriers. According to the studies made by Professor Oum, the
.cost per passenger kilometer of jAL and ANA is considerably _.gher than the
Cost of--maj0r US carriers, ifJap_ -libels intemTafioBal aviation
completely, _e Jl_lOT iS_ai'rm_-dfl_a{_ Ja15"fifie_=_es would I_aVe=agreat deal
of difficulty, and many thousfin-ds 0t jobs directly _d _d_recfly _nnected to
aviation would be affected. .................
.... _h-'6_ _ _e _m_at h'responsibly _at_en_ffjAL _d ANA fail,
Japanese consumers would be better off because they could travel at cheaper
prices. For the JMOT, that sort of argument is, and will be, an absolutely
unthinkable alternative.
Then, why is the cost of Japanese carriers high? Many economists
emphasize unnecessary government mterventions, _gff we abolish them
all, we would achieve a similar level of efficiency as American carriers in time.
Some analysts point out individual causes, such as high wages of flight
attendants, low handle hours for pilots and other feather bedding. The JMOT
is also pressing hard on airlines to increase productivity. But _e loss of
competitiveness of Japanese airlines is mostly results of the high yen price.
Back in '8S, 240 yen equaled a doUar; now 130-140 yen equals a dollar.
Eight _on yen yearly pay for a flight attendant was $35,000 _ 1985, but it
is now $60,O00(converted at the rate of 133.50 yen to a dollar). The
purchasing power parity between dollar and yen now stands at 180 yen to a
dollar. It took ten years to adjust to the lowering ofyen from 240 to 180, and
it may take another 5-7 years to adjust to 130-140yen to one dollar. It is not
easy to move prices and wages downwards, yet many Japane_ industries
such as automobile marlufacturing, shipbuilding, etc. maintained
competitiveness. Those industries which regained competitiveness have
been industries operating in fiercely competitive domestic markets. Since the
yen is falling now, exports by these industries are increasing. Airlines should
have done better. _ ........
Then, there is an absolute shortage of _rt Capacity and very high
airport cha1"ges. As is well known, only a total of two runways in two airports,
Narita and Kansai, handles 80% of the international passengers and freight.
Many local airports can not accommodate large planes and shut down at night.
As a result, Japanese airlines can not use planes in an efficient manner. For
example, the average flying hours of a 747 used by Japanese airlines are 2,400
hours, while averaging 4,000 hours in other major world airlines. Besides,
airport charges in Japan are high. Landing fees of Narita and Kansai for
international flights of 747-400 are almost 1,000,000yen, Haneda is
870,O00yen, other Japanese airports are 725,600yen as compared with Los
Angeles 148,430 yen and New York JFK 379,5S4 yen (133.50yen=15).
Similarly, for domestic flights of the 767-300, charges are 364,800yen in
Narita, 288,800 yen in Kansai, 276,000 yen in other airports, while Los
Angeles is 78,753 yen and JFK 139,589 yen. Since Japanese airlines have to
use Japanese airports more oflen than foreign airlines, the share of airport
charges in the total operating cost is high: 20.6% for domestic operations,
5.1% for international operations. Among three airlines, JAL which has more
international flights, has the lowest share of airport charges (7.6%), ANA has
the second (I 1.3%] and JAS has thehighest (13.0%). Nevertheless, all three's
shares are much higher than representative American airlines.
The JMOT hopes by the time Narita's second and third runways, Knasai's
second runway, Chubu's first runway will be open for international flights, the
competitiveness of Japanese airlines will be realized.
The second reason for Japanese anxiety concerning "open sky" in the
trans-Pacific market is due to the difference in the size of domestic markets.
Airlines both American and Japanese, that fly over the Pacific, also operate in
the domestic markets. The U.S. domestic market is roughly ten times larger
than the Japanese market, and American can'iers are five times bigger than
Japanese carriers. Both have the cabotage fight. Therefore, it is like 'fair
competition' t_tween heavy weight and _a_e_vei_t Cla_s. Of court, this
is a false argument 0fultefior purpose. I heard similar arguments when
Japan liberalized automobile imports. ........
The JMOT also argued that there is no way to prevent monopoly and
oligopoly in trans-Pacific routes once we agreed on open sky. Some measures
for precautionary control of _e market for the sake of consumers are needed
before adopting open sky.
The JMOT may simply be worrying about the monopoly or oligopoly by
American carriers, but the argument itself challenges the concept of the
_ complete laissez-faire as the best system. Donl we need some sort of anti-
monopoly laws in a world with a globalized economy and the rise of world
corporations?
The third reason for the JMOT rejecting open sky is its political
J
J
consequences and its impact on the bureaucracy. For some reason, many
foreigners assume that the Japanese Government is a powerful policy maker
and enforcer. Not at all. The Japanese Government is relatively small in
size, and most officials were born after WWII and believe in democracy. They
are careful in weighing public opinion and balancing a variety of interests.
That is what politicians do in other countries. The Japanese Government
tends to pursue a policy of making the least number of people unhappy.
Time, patience and money have been its means of implementing policies.
But now the government has neither time nor money. Yet the JMOT is
still playing the role of a mediator among various interests, foreign pressure
being a newcomer to the interests, and not of the enforcer. .......
The JMOT has not yet found the way to malc:e the least number 0f _ople
unhappy. When it finds that "open sky" is the way tO=ac:hi_e_e goal, it will
accept it.
Table 1 The numbers-0f-flirghts in a week between........ two-:+ --points ....(as ....of=_july...... 1, '97
Route
Tokyo-Los Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Chicago
Seattle
Detroit
Washington, DC
Minneapolis
Dallas
Portland
San Jose
Atlanta
Honolulu
Guam/Saipsn
Sub-total
Osaka-Los Angeles
San Francisco
,Seattle.
Detroit
Minneapolis
Honolulu
GuamLSaipan
Sub-total
Nagoya-Portland
Honolulu
Guam/Saipan
Fukuoka-Honolulu
Guam/Saipan
Sapporo-Honolulu
Guam/Saipan
Japa_ .......
Co.
2(JL13,NH7)
2(JL 8, NHT)
I F_Sh_
20
15
7
7
4
3
36
14
I(JLT)
I(JLT)
I(NH4)
I(JLZ)
I(JLZ6)
I(JL14)
2_-L88,NH18) 'ir06
7
I
i
14
I{JL_
_(JL14)
2(JL12, NH7)
2(JJ.33, NH7)
e_
2(JLT, NHT)
19
4O
m
14
I(JLT) 7
1_'L7)
m
7
U.S.
CO.
3(NWT, UA7, DL6)
2(NW7, UAI I)
2_7, UA2i)
2(NW7, HA6)
2_7, AAT)
I¢¢W7}
I¢NW7)
1(NW14)
I(AAT)
I{DLT)
I(AAS)
3(NWIS,UAI5,CS7)
2_¢W14, CS17)
5(NWg0,UA60,
D.L l.S , CS24)
2(mVT,UA7)
1¢UA7_
I_¢W7}
1_Wn_
I0_C_
2(NW14, UA14)
2(UA7, CS 14)
I F_h_
20
18
28
13
14
7
7
14
7
7
6
35
31
AA20, 207
14
7
7
7
7
28
21
3_W42 a UA35_ CS14)
I(DLT)
1(t_'7)
2(_.., cs14)
l(sw7)
llcstl)
1(cs4)
91
7
7
21
7
11
wm
4
Sendai-Honolulu
Guam/Saipan
K/roshima-Guam
Total
:(JLS) S
2(JL147, NH36) 'i83
._ mm
i(cs9) 9
5{NW1531 UA95, AA20, 364
DL20, CS76)
70
6O
55
40
30
I
I "4--Pmmenp'r(Jsoam) --B--pusenpr(US/O ---e-- fvelght(Japan) --4)-- f_|ght(USA)
Figure 2 Market share of the Pacific routes
IV Towards a more opened sky
•- I do not think that Japan will change its stance quickly and
spontaneously. For domestic markets,theJMOT willcontinue totake steps
toward deregulation slowly but steadily. A few new entrants will establish
themselves in the market. Competition will spread more and fares will come
down if they are averaged.
Airport capacity limitations Will continue. At Narita, the number of
farmers who own land within the airport is down to two. Narita may be able
to provide a parallel runway in a few years, but the opening of Chubu will not
be until2005, and Kansa/'Sparallelrunway around 2008. There are other
airportsthat can accommodate internationalflights,but what airlinesWould
like to fly into airports of less known smaller cities?
For the crowded airport, the JMOT will not adopt the price policy nor
competitive bidding suggested by many economists, because most airlines
would oppose them.
Instead the JMOT will try to reduce airport charges by expanding
landside revenue and/or by acquiring subsidies from the Finance Ministry.
What will happen in the international arena depends on the course of
events.
i) Will aviation continue to be separated from trade and other economic
negotiations or in future negotiations will aviation be treated as a trade
issue? There is no economic reason why aviation should be treated
separately. The U.S. may propose to combine them in future
hegotiations at the time when Japan has a huge trade surplus with the
U.S. Japan may have to yield in the field ofaviation to avoid the rise of
protectionism in the U.S.
fi) What will happen to Asian economies? Will they recover quickly or
slowly? How fast will "beyond" rights become 'attractive' again by the
recovery of air demand?
iii} What will be the price of yen vis-tt-vis U.S. dollars? The price will
have impact On pas_nger flows and also on the competitive edge of
airlines.
iv}How far will liberalization of international aviation continue in Asia and
Pacific? If its impact on Japanese airlines is strongly felt (for example,
already some10 percent of the Japanese passengers who go to Seoul
have destinations other than Korea], the JMOT _ be forced to follow
-U_d-c_rowd, ......
v) Currently a number of large airports are under construction in Asia.
Once these airports are completed, there will be excess capacity if only
temporarily. Many countries may bffer incentive packages to foreign
airlines in an effort to become their international hubs. Unless Japan
adopt 'open sky,' hubs will move to other airports in other countries
from Narit ....
vi)How fast will global alliance, and code-sharing develop? Global
alliance and code-sharing are ways to gain access to new markets that
a single _e can not afford to enter or that are blocked by
government regulations or capacity limitations. Global alliance and
code-shag could be the way to defeat the government regulations.
Together with these development, if "foreign pressure" in aviation
continues, Japan may accept more 'open sky' in the 2002 negotiations with
the United States.
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After se_en years of declining demand and deteriorating performance, the Russian civil aviation sector
began what might be an incipient recovery in 1997. This paper describes the performance and emerging
industry structure, and main policy issues as of early 1998. Due to the lack of consistent data and the
difficulD- in securing public release of the information that is available, this paper should not be viewed as a
traditional academic analysis, but rather more of a clinical study.
Background
Russia is so vast that air transport, though much reduced since the 1980s, v-ill continue to play a major role
in the economy. More than two-thirds of inter¢it)." passenger travel and a material part of cargo transport is
done by air. In a number of Russian regions, especially in Siberia and the Kola Peninsula, air transport is
the only mode providing access to the other parts of the country.
The importance of civil aviation is reflected in the size of the sector. There were about 275,000 persons
employed in the sector in 1997. The old integrated Aeroflot system has fragmented into about 340 airlines,
_ith a total fleet of about 8,000 aircratt (of which 2,700 are core passenger and cargo planes), serving 845
airports. There are 14 training institutio_ and 4 research agencies dedicated to aviation, not including
governmental organizations. Civil aviation isbig businesS: users spend $4-$4.5 billion per year on
domestic and international air tickets (about 0_g_: 9 percent of GDP).
Prior to 1991, the Russi_ civil aviation system _s_'a _zmssive vertically-integrated monopoly) Aeroflot
was responsible for everything - air services, airports, air navigation, training, accident investigation, and
virtually all related services. When the Soviet Union Collapsed, the old Aeroflot ministry-cure-holding
company (for all air career operations, airports and air navigation systems) shattered into hundreds of
fledgling separate companies, amidst confiision over the role of the federal government.
The effects of transition have been devastating. Passenger traffic m 1996 v,as 43 percent of 1991 levels,
and only about one-third of the peak i999 v0iiin_e. Dbifiestic passenger tra_i/was aboiit 20% of the
maximum levels reached during the 19g0s ami ,.s_s stiil-deci_ through I996. Ton-mileage in 1996 was
just under half of the 1991 level. By 1997, international air passenger traffic and cargo traffic had begun to
show grox_dl in line ssith the economy, while preliminaD" domestic traffic data indicated that 1997 may have
been the first ,,'ear this decade in which volume has not fallen.
Two significant international passenger flows have sprung up since 1992. One is "shopping tourism'" small
merchants fl._ing to Turkey and the Gulf states to stock up on foodstuffs, liquor, clothing and the like for
street kiosks, bringing back large quantities of accompanied luggage The other is wealthy "new Russians"
I For a description of Aeroflot's structure and performance during the Soviet era, see chapter 7 in J. Strong and J.
Meyer (with C. Harral and G. Smith). A/oving to Alarket: Restructuring Transport in the Former Soviet Union,
(Cambridge, MA. USA: Harvard University Press. 1996). pp. 135-156.
taking vacations in the Mediterranean. Both rely on charters to circumvent the regional airlines' lack of
rights to operate scheduled services under Russia's bilateral agreements. So-called "'regular charters" have
emerged to serve these market segments. The small trader business is likely to ease offas conventional
import/export business matures, but the outbound tourism is likely to keep gro_ing rapidly.
These trafficdeclines have had severe consequences for financial performance and investment. The
estimated sector loss in 1996 was ! .7 trillion rubles (about 350 million US dollars, or about 7 percent of
revenues). Most airports were reported as profitable; the losses were incurred in airline operations.
However. the airports rely for revenue on user fees paid by airlines, since the "concessions" which generate
more than half of airport revenues in the West (car parking, duD' free shops, restaurants, etc.) are still
rudimentary in Russia.
It is clear that financial disparities are growing: between large and small airlines, between domestic hub and
non-hub airports, and be_'een international and domestic activities. However, it is very hard to know where
the profits are being made and how much these estimate_w0_fe_s_ if _i-1 _6_r ae-_uriting
s_ere made of liabilities. For example, while it appears that airports are making money overall, debts from
these enterprises to federal and local budgets (many of which are m 10ng-term arrears) continued to _'ow. At
the same time, many of the remote airports provide services for which they have not been paid by the local
governments. An example is the Murmansk Airport, that provides heat and hot ssater for the adjacent
community, a suburb on the outskirts of the main city.
Investment in all sub-sectors has been virtually n0n-existent excei_t :_b-r-a-'fewforeign Ormul_lateral _ced
infrastructure projects to renovation older airport and air navigation facilities and io repair or replace broken
or deteriorated safety-related systems.: The government estimates that 70-75 percent of sector assets are
depreciated. Only about 60-65 percent of the required airport and air navigation systems were in service at
any given time in 1997. In 1996, all Russian airlines together purchases 5 aircraft and g helicopters. _
Leasing has played a larger role, but this has taken the form of short-term time charters, rather than as a
long-term substitute for outright ossaaership. 4 The fleet remains economically inefficient and environmentally
restricted in international services, due both to noise and emissions problems.
Safety levels continued to be poor. In 1996, fourteen aircraft accidents were officially recorded, claiming
230 lives. News agencies reported 50 crashes, most of them non-fatal but causing maj0i hull damage.
There were 725 additional equipment failures (engines and airframes) that did not result in fatalities, and
growing numbers of flight crew-related accidents began to appear. Because operational data is unreliable,
estimation of accident rates is difficult, but it appears that rates are at lease 3-5 times worse than those in
Europe and the United States. In many ways, the safety performance is remarkable, given the lack of
investment and oversight of a sector undergoing extreme fragrnentadonl _'
2 Low-cost refurbishment of airport terminals, such as has already been carried out successfully at Kiev Airport,
may be affordable ff the airports are willing to charge users a facility fee (departure tax) of a few dollars per
passenger. Several cases to date (mostly in o_er former Soviet republics) have cost in the range $15-25 _!lion.
Airports handling international traffic can do tliis rnore reacU]v. In contr'/_t, gr_nfield airport projects (t39ically
starting from $200-250 million) are unjustified and unaffordable today and foi-tlie foreseeableTu_. -Mo_ _avs
are adequate for today's reduced traffic volumes. Better approach radar and runway lighting to upgrade tOCategory
2 ms)" be warranted in some eases for safet) and economy ($10-15 million)_ There ma.vbe a few eases of impending
pavement failure which pose a safety hazard, but with complete resurfacing Wpically costing $60-70 million, few if
any regional airports will serve enough traffic in the short'to-medif_m term to afford more than patching.
various parties within Rnssia contlnue to-express concern about the imminent collapse of the aircraft
manufacturing industry. In 1996 only five new aircraft were delivered from Russian suppliers, who before 1990
routinely supplied several hundred planes per )'ear. Two new models are being offered, the TU204 and the Ilyushin
96. including with Western engines, but market prospects are vet3"unpromising.
4 Leasing payments in 1996 were about 140 million US dollars, equivalent to average annual equivalent of 7-14
aircraft
However, the apparent bottoming-out of traffic declines and a potential incipient recover)' is likely to place
growing stresses on safety. In the past six years, maintenance and repairs have relied heavily on
cannibalization of underutilized aircraft and equipment to provide spare parts, so that man}" assets are no
longer viable for service. Moreover, activity levels have been low enough so that strains on systems such as
air navigation have been held v*ithin manageable levels, except at a few airports and en route centers at peak
periods. Sectoral grov*2,h has the potential to cause a further deterioration in system safety.
Aviation Indusarx Structu. r¢ and P¢ff0rmance
Reality has taken root to a major extent - the oblast-level integrated aviation operations have begun to
realize that most of them will not become international gatev*_ays. There is increasing recognition oft he role
of regional hubs. There are noteworthy exceptions, though - such as the failed attempt by ARIA to take
over the regional carrier in Nizlmy Novgorod in summer 1997, due (in part) to the ambitions of the regional
government.
Restructuring of the aviation enterprises .is proceeding. (A summary of one of the major unified enterprises,
the Russian Aviation Consortium, is presented in the Appendix to this paper.) There are now about 360
carriers in the sector and 845 airports, independent from one another in varying degrees. Of the airlines, 96
are licensed to operate scheduled flights, 127 operate charters and air taxi services, and 129 serve specific
clients. Among the first eatego_', 40 airlines carry. 85% of all traffic. The remainder are a source of
concern as to their impermanence and questionable safety standards.
Aeroflot Russian International Airlines (ARIA) has a market share of about 40 percent. (revenues about 1.5
billion USD). The number two airline is Vnukovo Airlines, which carried about 2 million passengers in
1997 with revenues of about 300 million USD. Transaero, a new airline, has had notable success and is
planning to add more Boeing equipment to its fleet. But competition between ARIA and Transaero has been
all but eliminated, in the wake of an agreement between the two carriers. Each nov,"has a cross-ownership
stake, and schedules, frequencies, and fares have been worked out that minimize competition between the
txvo. It also is important to keep relative size in mind - Transaero has only 14 aircraft.
Entry of new carriers on trunk routes has caused sporadic fare wars. For example, the entry of 2 new
carriers on the Moscow-Novosibirsk route created a fare war between 4 airlines in which prices in February
1997 fell from 880,000 roubles to 450,000 roubles. The discounting abated by spring, but three carders
remain, gith fares about 700,000 roubles.
Civil aviation market is distorted by so-called "one-day airlines" that operate charters on lucrative routes.
There are many complaints that such airlines are able to operate without pa}ing air navigation charges to
Rosaeronavigatsia or to airports, as a result of corruption. Many bribes appear to be generated by
smuggling aeti,,itv on such charter flights. Additional competitive pressures result from the permission of
military planes to conduct commercial charter flights.
Financial relations between airports and airlines are confused and far from transparent. Of the 63 federal
airports (which serve 80% of all traffic) 40 still belong to integrated airline-airport enterprises. Many of
these "unified enterprises" receive implicit or explicit support from the regional government. For example,
Krasnoyarsk local administration assumed responsibilit2," for the debts of the unified airline/airport, so that
the enterprise had sufficient financial capacity to lease DC-10 aircraft. Even those companies which have
been "'privatized'" have, in most cases, become joint stock companies in which the federal, regional and local
governments retain minority shareholdmgs. Even where legal separation has occurred, holding companies
and cross-shareholdings abound which diminish the effective separation.
Many airlines are illiquid and the airports are able to collect only about 60% of billings. The airlines have
sought --and been given-- financial relief by their home city or region, chiefly in kind or by deferral of taxes
and charges. In consequence, discriminatory behavior toward the "home" airline is commonplace. As a
result, air navigation and airport fees are a very significant cost item for those airlines gho do pay
(averaging 18-20% of costs). For many airlines, air navigation charges are 70% of labor costs. For
comparison, airport and air navigation charges appear to be 3-4 times higher than in western Europe.
The Moscow-based Aeroflot - Russian International Airlines (ARIA) has legally separated from
Sheremet)evo Airport. while the St. Petersburg Aeroflot is in the transition process to legal separation from
Pulkovo Airport. Others are follo_ving suit at differing speeds. Other new entrants are eager to "upgrade"
from operating "regular charter" flights to scheduled operations, but the legal issues surrounding ownership
and reassignment of operating rights, airport landing slots and terminal gates are still confused.
Almost all international bilateral rights went to ARIA as "heir" to the Soviet Aeroflot, when Moscow ,,as
'.irtually the sole international gateway, but there are now many claimants and applicants. Policy toward
international air agreements is being developed on a bilateral basis. The major airlines, especially ARIA,
have played a key role in determining this policy. For example, the 1997 agreement svith Germany alloss_
Luflhansa and ARIA each 10 gateways in the other's country.
Institutions managin__and regulating the sector - : -: _ _
After a period of confusion, the structure of government organizations is making significant progress. The
1997 Civil Aviation Policy appears to have clarified and defined responsibilities for certification of airlines,
flight safety responsibility., air navigation, accident investigation, and interstate aviation. Organizational
structure is very similar to that of US FAA.
The Federal Aviat-i0n_e_ce (FAS) has all keyregulatory powers, _ClU_g over infrastructure. It is
independent of the Ministry of Transport (MOT), reporting to a deputy prime minister. It has its own
revenues. Air traffic control (other than at airports) is managed by Rosaeronavigatsia, a department of
FAS. MoT has its Department of Air Transport, which responsibility for policy making. The Inter-State
Aviation Commission manages aviation agreements among the CIS republics and investigates accidents; it
is also independentof MoT. s
The first major policy initiative was the certification of airlines. Compulsory airline certification and
licensing ,,,,'as introduced at the end of 1992. Formal procedures were adopted by Presidential Decree in
December 1993, but it gas not until the 1997 air code was adopted that full certification effo_ were
undertaken. By earl)" 1998, 543 airlines had certified, of which 320 are_i_iC_ for pas_n_r_r Service.
The operating certificate is good for two years. Of the 543 licenses, 184 licenses have been revoked for
financial problems or flight safety, violations. In 1997, 65 licenses were revdk_. Re_ocati0n is for Six
months minimum, gith subsequent review. Major efforts now being undertaken to harmonize
certificatiordlicensing with Europ_ standards (currently, a Russian airline certificate/license is not
reciprocally accepted in Europe).
Govtrrnment's reform objectives
In 1997 the Federal Government proposed a'reform program to address all the above issues. It is driven by'
a desire to arrest the decline of Russian air transport and aircraft manufacturing, enhance safety,, and define
an appropriate role for the Federal Government in the subsector. This covers questions such as what
powers it should retain to regulate for safety and market failure, what rights and obligations should be left to
the market or to regional and municipal governments, and the criteria which should guide the limited use of
sovereign borrowing and guarantees for airports and air navigation systems (ANS).
The draft reform program is set out in a document entitled: "Basic Provisions of the RF Air Transport
Adjustment and Reform Concept", issued by the Minist_" of Economy and Federal Aviation Service,
Moscow, 1997. The program is large and comprehensive, covering:
5 M_t western coumries _'e_ USA. UK. France and Gernaanv_ have indeoenclent accidem investigation unit_
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(a) reform objectives and tasks: safety and economic regulation for airports, airlines and air traffic
control, financial sustainability, and improvement and modernization of services;
(b) _: pro-active government involvement in unbundling of airlines, airports, fuel supply and
aircraft servicing_ their commercia!ization, privatization, safet3" regulation, classification into
levels (federal. regional and local), and consolidation into a smaller number, with foreshadowed
• government interventions to "achieve intended efficiency", including "protection of local airlines"
and subsidization of aircraft;
(c) airoo_s: separation, establishment as joint-stock companies with minority* public ownership,
safety and economic regulation, including guarantees to support upgrading and transfer of "social
facilities", together with the obligation to re-invest profits in the airport;
(d) fuel suppb,': separation, privatization, and removal of entry barriers to achieve at least two
independent operators at each large airport, preferably through competitive tendering;
(e) airport-based aircraft maintenance facilities: separation and removal of entry barriers, facilitating
the option of reintegration with an airline;
(f) air navigation systems: higher safety through a _ide range of upgrading to full compliance with
ICAO standards, minimizing ANS charges to Russian air space users;
(g) passenger reservation s_'stems and the clearing house for inter-airline settlements, which serve as
"'market infrastructure"; and
(h) aviation staff development: upgrading and expanding of aviation staff training, including pilots,
maintenance, licensing and certification, and management.
A current major FAS initiative is to "restructure" the industry, through aggressive review of licensing of
both carriers and route entr)'. Goal is to stabilize the industry and create an industry structure of 4-5 major
carriers and 15-20 regional carriers by the end of 1998. Effective late 1997, special conditions on route
licensing were adopted, regulating seat capacity on major trunk routes Quotas are to be assigned based on
length of time flying the route, social responsibilities, and financial health of the company. This regulator)"
initiative is beginning to be applied on trunk routes to/from Moscow, most recently in the routes to/from
Ekaterinburg.
Public Policy Issues Conhained in the Reform Initiative
Government's role as re_iator and maarantor
The Reform Concept document advances a wi_ range of major reforms, man}' of which are in keeping with
the establishment over t_e of a competitive and'_cially independent sector in most areas. However, it
also advocates several policy initiatives that are_mc0nsistent with this objective. It appears to advocate
strong government intet_-ven_fionto b_ abtut a_substantiai reduction in the number of air carriers, rather
than allow market, commercial and financial forces to shape the industry. This _arrants close attention. So
do the issues of (i) separation of carriers from airports, so far less than complete in many eases, (ii) user
charges for airports. (iii) the justification for. and financial sustainabilit3' of, the extensive improvement
proposed in ANS, and (iv) protection and State aids for domestic aircraft manufacturing and sales.
There is also a need to redefine the role Of the Federal Aviation System and the government. Rather than
detailed route licensing and- tariff revie'is_.,_the Go_-_ve_ent_s role should focus on:
(a) ensuring a level pla._ing field among competing private carriers, through non-discriminatory user
charges, access to operating rights, airport runway slots and terminal gates, and access to
reservation systems:
6 The Reform Conceot oaoer s_cifies "'up to 380 State oxs_ershiD'"
(b) setting standards for safety, licensing carriers and crews, aircraft and airports;
(c) investigating accidents and safets' violations:
(d) negotiating international operating rights (with attentionib-the issue 0fdesignating _ers other
than ARIA to operate routes from gatewa.vs other than Moscow):
(e) subsidizing essential services (public senice obligations) to remote locations (especially northern
regions): and ....
(f) providing direct finance from Federal Budget or guaranteeing loans for infrastructure of national
importance: Class 1 airports and ANS. Conditions should b_eattached to this financial support to
give beneficiaries incentives to comply ,_,,ithGovernment polic}'.
A main policy objective of Government financial support to airports or ANS entities -and by extension any
multilateral financing- should be to tie it to adoption by the federal government of"rules of the game" for
airport ox_=ership, planning and development (including commercial opportunities), and criteria for possible
federal support to airports. These rules of the game would require, among other points, that all monies
raised from airports at the local and regional level could be used only for airport development, so as to avoid
burdening the sector with cross-subsidization of other activities. Federal financial support would (a) only go
to rehabilitation and safer), needs; (b) have to be repaid by the receiving airport authority over time; it
would be conditional on (c) implementation of reforms such as dismantling of the vertical integration of
airports and airlines, privatization and demonopolization of airport service concessions and parking, and (d)
establishment of an effective safety and economic regulatory, regime.
The stress placed by the Reform Concept paper on measures to protect domestic suppliers of aircraft and
other aviation equipment risks coming into conflict with international trading rules under the WTO and IFI
procurement rules on competitive bidding. Other solutions to the manufacturers' crisis should be explored,
in the areas of marketing, finance and organizational restructuring. The sooner equipment decisions _ be
internalized as the responsibility, of private ox_aers, the quicker the domestic industr}' can stabilize its size
and finances.
Air Navigation
Reorganization of FAS brought Rosaerona,_igatsia into the organization: the State ATM Corporation
remains separate for investment and financing purposes, but is under control of FAS. Air navigation
charges remain arbitrary, in part because of discrimination and in part because of an inability to collect
charges. Rosaeronavigatsia appears to collect only about 60% of billings. International airlines complain
that the" are being grossly overcharged on overflight royalties for the trans-Siberian (Moscow-Tokyo) route,
on the order of $250 million per year. Rates average US$1.00 per kin, compared to US $0.40 per km in
western Europe. The State ATM Corporation says it needs to charge about USD 1.50 per km for overflight
fees. In defense, it is claimed that costs are high and charges are further raised to compensate for the
non-pa.vment by man},,"users. The European carriers are pressing for either lower charges or the
establishment of a mechanism to ensure that the revenues are plowed back into system improvements.
The State ATM Corp. =is just beginning t0 shape an investment program. A 1998 investment program of g64
billion roubles is planned - 376 billion roubles form internal sources, the remainder from borrowingS= o
Rosaeronavigatsia estimates that the)" xxill need about 800 billion roubles annually for the next 4-5 years to
complete the main ATM modernization. Key investment priorities were given as the Moscow ATC Center
(estin_ated cost l g0 million USD)': North Caucasus air routes (10 }'ears, 120 million USD)_;Khabarovsk air
routes (30 million USD): Far East air routes (lrkutia); Trans-Volga _i" romes; andi0 additional
modernization projects that have not yet been prioritized.
Moscow Center program has been aDoroved: in ]ulv biddin_ _ill he helH for f_rCtCt_aa AOm;llimn 11_1"_
With respectto new technologies, Rosacronavigatsia have received man)' proposals, but none appear to be
"'in the lead" and none appear to utilize Russian technoiogy and svst_s io-ihe extent desired by FAt. The
State ATM Corp. appears committed to GLONASS. About 66% of federal airports and about 4,000
aircraft are equipped sx_th GLONASS equipment. They contend that since control of GLONASS has been
transferred to the Russian Space agency from the military, it should be incorporated into the world's satellite
navigation plans. The main GLONASS problem is malntaining space segment ofpr0gram Need 24
satellites for fultglobal coverage, but Russia currently only has 13 functioning satellites (the other 11 have
exhausted their lifetime operations).
Moscow Airport Policy
The Moscow Airports problem was described as "a separate country within this country...although the
State has a controlling stake, it means reD' little in practice."
No status of a single Moscow airport has been determined. There are disputes concerning terminals versus
airside facilities, and about overall title and control of the land at each site.
The ownership/title problem is a significant hindrance to investment. The principal disputes involve the
Property Committees of the RF, Moscow oblast, and Moscow city. These issues also are muddled by cost
and revenue allocations from the cib', oblast, and federal governments. A summary of problems at each
facility follows.
1. Sheremetyevo II (SVO-2)
a. A federal airport, but claims also made on property by Moscow oblast.
b. Tensions between SVO-2 and Aeroflot appear to have eased, after getting very contentious.
The main reason seems to be an accommodation that facilitates coordination between the airline
and the airport. (These might be viewed as either discriminatory, or similar to an informal
"majorib'-in-interest" provision that major airlines frequently have with their hub airports in the
United States.)
c. Flight delays are limited, and not seen as a problem. Investment orientation is more toward
comfort and quality.
d. Severe land constraints face SVO-2, especially in expanding airside servicing capacity and in
landside access and parking.
2. Sheremetyevo I
a. Increasing amount of business aviation activity, with scheduled service fairly limited (to north
and Baltic countries).
b. Administratively completely separate from SVO-2. SVO-I has its own runway, tarmacs, etc.
c. Terminal facilities and landside access (especially parking) already quite busy, and will not be
able to handle any sizable increase in activity_
3. Vnukovo Airport
a. To many Russians, Vnukovo "makes sense" as Moscow's #2 airport and its principal domestic
/
facility.
b. Better access to city than Domodedovo.
c. Airline/airport separation was completed in privatization process.
d. State-owned airport, with status in limbo. Throughout 1997, it _sas expected that the State
would sell its shares, but no action. Originally, it v,_.s thought that the sale would be made to a
collective of airport workers, but the new law on privatization does not allow the Government to
sell to workers at "'bargain" prices, while the workers are not interested in busing the airport at
a Government-determined "market" price.
e. As a result of the osslaership dispute, almost all investment has been halted.
f. Vnukovo Airlines is the dominant carrier (about 50-60% of operations). While airline is
separate from airport, there appears to be a "working relationship" that has a different character
than the relationship of other airlines v'ith the airport. Both airline and airport officials view
this as a "counter-balance" to other markets where airline/airport separation has yet to occur,
and to the relationship between ARIA and Sheremet).evo.
g. The Moscov" city" authorities (especially Mayor Luzhkov) have been mcreasingl,_,, focused on
Vnukovo airport.
!1. Facilities at terminal appear adequate in terms of physical capacity, if not quality'.
i., There is a very" large unfinished maintenance hangar_that was halted _hen federal budget
money' ran out in 1991; there is much maintenance and repair acti_,ity going on outside in cold
winter weather.
h. Expansion plans are limited by condemnation difficulties (there are many prestigious dachas in
the surrounding area).
.
a.
Domodedovo Airport ......
b,
,
C.
d.
Still a unified airline/airport enterprise. Corporatization efforts still in process of
discussion/clearance.
Over the past three years, the airline has basically collapsed and is nov,' in the process of selling
its aircraR (especially IL-62s and IL-96s). Losses form the airline brought all investment and
upgrading activitiesa t the airport to a standstill.
Much uncdrizinty over what viii happen:
1. Potential home base for smaller regional airlines being "pushed out" of Sherernetyevo
and Vnukovo airports. (example: Ural Airlines serving Ekaterinburg)
Potential cargo development opportunity, especially as plans for a major cargo terminal at
SVO-2 have died.
1. Nearby Zhukovslq," Airfield, used by the aircraR design bureaus, generates a substantial
volume of cargo ....
2. East Line air cargo company is now based at Domodedovo andappears to be
commercially successful.
3. Rail/intermodal access better than at other Moscow airports.
Bykovo Airport
a. Unified airline/airport enterprise.
b. Small, used principally by turboprop flights from Ukraine. Cannot handle aircraft larger than
Tu-154.
c. Very" serious airport deterioration, especially on rtmw_y, ta.xiv'ays, and airside. Possible safety
risks.
d. Adjacent to aircraR repair plant, that has aggressively asserted control over airfield.
e. Major ongoing conflict between the factor' andByk0v0 Airport/Airline. Airport sought to
expand repair business claimed by factory.
f. Long-term future appears to be as a airport controlled by the repair company, _ith limited
flights on a contract basis.
/
Other Airports .........
Several regional airports are now seeking to attract direct flights from Western Europe and see the need to
upgrade their facilities to handle international traffic at quality' standards recommended by ICAO. Among
these are Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Sochi, which have already prepared feasibility" studies and
business plans to more or less acceptable standards. LuRhansa is ali'_y 0_raiing eight flights a week
direct to six internal cities, though the ground facilities are barely adequate. Other west European airlines
have been evaluating the market.
Whether it makes sense economically and financially to operate direct flights to and from Western Europe
depends in part on whether and when MosCow develops an airport capable of serving as an interchange hub
Domodedovo Airport has the best long-tern1 physical potential as the Moscow hub but very substandard
terminal facilities today, but Domoded0vo Afflines is bank_pt and starving the (still integrated) airport of
funds. Sheremetyevo ,rigorously defends its role as lead gateway. Vnukovo Airport is home to the countr)"s
second largest airline. This hot political issue seems deadlocked. Ideally the long-term strategy for the
regional airports would follow from the long-term strategy for Moscow, but they ma t' give up waiting.
Reservation and Ticketin_ Systems
Since transition, it has been difficult to implement ticketing and interline systems, as the entire civil aviation
sector fragmented. No.indMdual carrier or airport had enough incentive or financial capability to develop a
system in which others could participate. As a result, it fell to the public sector. Until 1991, all work _
financed from the budget, but then funding was halted. Not very much progress in the last 2-3 years on
integration of systems.
Since that time, the major airlines of Russia set up several specialized companies to do their own projects
for ticket reservations and settlement. In most cases, the developers ran into problems, couldn't keep to
goals, and ran out of mon_'. A particular problem was in getting the required technology to locations other
than in the headquarters city. ......
As a result, the airlines changed plans. Aeroflot x_,s not eager to participate in the domestic development of
the GABRIEL system that it uses for international reservations.
The current goal appears to be integration of the Russian-designed systems with western systems.
The current system is one in which the Gabriel and Siren systems operate in parallel, often with very
different market shares. For example, Aeroflot ticketing is about 75% Gabriel/15% Siren; Vnukovo
Airlines' ticketing is about 80% Siren/15% Gabriel. The parallel systems do not "talk" to each other, so
that on a _pical 150 seat flight, a carrier might have to set aside 100 seats for Siren bookings, and 50 seats
for Gabriel bookings. The result is often large numbers 0funsold seats, because it is very hard to transfer
blocks of seat avalabiiin; from one system to anb_erl Ho_,-ever, as growth returns, incentives to solve this
problem will be forthcoming.
Since 1995, standard ticket stock (a prerequisite for interlining, clearance, and settlement) has existed.
However, only 5% of all tickets are on such stock. The other 95% are on airline-specific stock.
Approximately 200 ticket agencies are now accredited, through the TKP (ticket clearing house) to use
multiple ticket stock. However, Aeroflot has announced plans to leave this system and to only clear other
carrier tickets on a case-by-ease basis.
Summing _Up
The civil aviation sector in Russia may be at the early stages of a slow recover)'. Recent public policy
efforts, especially the 1997 Reform Strategb', contain man.v much-needed guidance and has really helped
develop, define, and strengthen oversight,insti_tionsl The i997 Report recommended a fundamental change
of role for the government to allow the developmenffof a private, competitive, fu_ncially self-sustaining
aviation system However. ree_nt po_iicylififfaii_s °_-ea-i_n't_uiti-oddce economlc controls and oversight
that are quite extensife and almosi certainlywiql _6duce _ompetition. _
It is very important to legally separate carriers from airports. (A summart" of the issues that exist in such
situations is best understood by reviewing the Appendix to this paper, which shows how one unified
enterprise has expanded into geographic reach into both airlines and airports.) The public sector needs the
capaciV." to monitor the performance of the privatized enterprises and ensure a level playing field among
competing carriers. International operating and overflight rights needed to be renegotiated in concert with
the other CIS republics. Responsibility for financing airports needed to be devolved to regional and
municipal governments, with clear rules established for user charges (landing fees, passenger facility
charges, etc.) and criteria set for any federal participation in financing airport imprOve_mefitsl:
4.
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APPENDIX
The Russian Aviation Consortium ......
RAC is a fledgling aviation holding company tr)ing to establish a strong Moscow position _ith Vnukovo
Airlines, and a dominant position m the Russian north (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and charter business
related to natural resources and fishing). ',
1. Histor3.': RAC established 1995 subsequent to Presidential Directive, to support and improve aircraft
mdust_. Original founding organizations were Aeroflot, Tupolev, Ui_anovsk Design Bureau, Aviastar,
Perm (engines), as well as smaller participations by some banks and design bureaus.
2. Not long after, Aeroflot and Tupolev dropped out; orientation changed from aircraft manufacturing to
operations. There are no longer an}' manufacturers as owners, nor is there any airport os_nership of
RAC.
3. RAC is now an investment group that o_sm 75% of Vnukovo Airlines, 60% of Murmamk Airlines
(80% voting shares), 32% of Murmansk Airport (and intends to buy a controlling stake when the State
Propert3' Commission sells its current majorit2,' holding), and controls the Federal Industrial Bank. RAC
also o_xns Ore Avia Airlines, a charter operator operating YAK-40 and YAK-42D aircraft, _ith clients
including Conoco, Shell, Exxon, and Philip Morris. The RAC also is negotiating to buy a controlling
stake in Arkhangelsk airport.
Summary information on Vnukovo Airlines
a. Second largest Russian carrier.
b. 24 aircraft (halflL-86s; halfTu-154s)
c. 2 million passengers/year
d. 45 dest_atig___ __! _ ....
e. Primarily domestic (international only about 10-12% total operations)
£ Revenues about 270 million USD 1997 (preliminary); 212 million USD 1996
g. Profitable, but just barely (not able to confi_)
h. About 300 billion roubles debt; claim that asset value is greater than debt, but no figures
because revaluation has not been completed by auditors.
i. Financial statements for 1997 _ill be ready March 20, 1998
Summary information on Murmansk Airlines ....
a One of first airlines sold by federal government after bankruptcy proceedings.
b. Fleet of 4 Tu-154 aircraft (new planes - manufactured in 1993)
c. Airline inherited heavy burden from old regional directorate of Aeroflot, including helicopters,
small planes, and landing strips on the Kola Peninsula. These activities and assets have serious
negative effects on financial performance, but perform "arctic work": transport to icebreakers;
forest fire control; crew changes on ships; medical assistance. Local government pays subsidy
of 4 billion roubles per year for such se_ces .... •
d. Acquired by RAC m April 1997: effective management control beginning October 1997
e. Revenues about 150 billion roubles 1997 (2_-30tmqlionUSDj; not profi_bie, but "'_sithin
striking distance" of breaking even in trunk markets (about 75% of revenues)
f. About 200,000 passengers/year (stable past 3 years); compared with 1 million passengers/year
m 1990.
g. Cargo operations only 5% revenues (1,500 tonnes in 1997 vs. 8,000 tonnes in 1990).
h. Serve 3-4 markets with scheduled service; charter flights are about 20% of total flights
i. Hope to acquire 5 additional aircraft of 30-50 passenger capacit}" to serve smaller regional
markets.
Summary information on Murmansk Airport
a. Began operations 1936; current airport built 1976-1977.
b. Singlc runway 2,500 m; ICAO Cat 1
c. 1996 separation of airline from airport; 1997 purchase of stakes in both by RAC
d Airport aviation-related revenues about 60 billion roubles; collect about 40°/. of billings for
aviation charges.
e. Airport also operates fuel complex and provides heat and electricity to near_' settlement.
f. Runway reconstructed 1992-1993; needs repair now, but is subject to o_ership dispute, since
• technically all runways belong to State Property Committee. FAS is working out a model trust
agreement that would resolve long-term control aspects and transfer to airport balance sheets.
g Runway improvements need to focus on traction, strengthening, and (possibly) e.,cending.
h. Air traffic control operates satisfactorily, including glide slope, lighting, and communications.
i. Good all-,_'eather performance.
j. Major needs for airport equipment upgrades (plows, tugs, etc.)
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Up until the second half of 1997, there was widespread confidence that commercial air transport activity
would grow more quickly in the Asia Pacific region than it would in other markets. The airlines based in
the region embarked upon costly re-equipment and expansion plans while the major carriersin North
America and Europe actively expanded their presence by extending their networks and alliances. 'Die rapid
growth put pressure on the governments in the region to relax their approach to competition and the result
was the emergence of new Asian airlines with ambitious plans, opi:n skies agreements with the United
States, and agreements to form regional aviation markets in South East Asia. Within APEC there was a
commitment to pursue a more competitive air services regime.
Even before the currency crises leading to IMF bail-out packages for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea,
the airlines were losing traffic because of a variety of special conditions such as the smog conditions
associated with the forest fires in Indonesia. However, the abrupt decline in wealth, the @ate of business
failures, fears of job insecurity and austere economic programmes that occtm_ in late 1997 had
catastrophic impacts on _ffic levels for some markets. At the same time, the region's airlines were highly
exposed to cun'ency movements and their debt obligations escalated sharply along with interest rates. Many
other airline costs are incurred in hardcurrencies and the airlines have moved rapidly to refinance their
fleets, reorganise their routes and to take greater advantage of alliances. The adjustment process will
continue for some time and it will involve far-reaching changes.
This paper examines the impacts of the economic crises on the airlines and the responses being pursued by
management. Given the trend towards more liberal competition policies, an important question is whether
the current circumstances are likely to lead to a return to more protectionist attitudes. The temptation to
shield carriers from competition will have to be balanced against the need to open up markets, to forge
alliances and to attract investment. We argue there are strong forces likely to support further liberalisation.
Key words: airlines, open skies, regional trade agreements, bilateral system, Asian economic crisis
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Hooper, Chin & Cain: Impacts of the Asian economic crisis
The airlines have been left highly exposed with commitments to purchase aircraft in hard currency, the
value of their debt has escalated rapidly, interest rates and fuel costs have increased, and traffic has fallen
sharply. Profit projections for the region's carriers were written down immediately and the expectation is
that some will record losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars (US). The newer carriers that
relied on domestic and intra-Asian business have been the wors[ affected. Airline responses have included
selling aircraft, partly to reduce capacity and partly to finance deliveries of new aircraft. Sale-and-leaseback
deals have been common and aircraft orders are being deferred where possible. Airlines are striving to
realiocate capacity to stronger routes connecting Asia with Europe and North America.
The currencydevaluationswillhelptostimulatetraveldemand and therewillbe winnersand losersas
destinationscompete fortheirshareofa smallermarket.Also,assome airlinespulloutofroutesthe
remainingcarriershaveopportunitiestoincrea._theirevenue.Dependingon theabilityoftheairlinesto
maintaintheiryields,Asia'scarrierswillkeep theirattentionfmnly on reducingtheircostsand on
financingtheirfleets.However,therestructuringprocesswillbe painfulevenunderthemostoptimistic
scenarios.Thereisspeculationthatsome airlineswillmergeandthatmajorEuropeanandNorthAmerican
carriers willbecomepart-ownexsofAsiancarriers......
This paper examines the impacts of the economic crises on the airlines and the responses being pursued by
management. Given the trend towards more liberal competition policies, an important question is whether
the current circumstances ate likely to lead to a return to more protectionist attitudes. The temptation to
shield carriers from competition will have to be balanced against the need to open up markets, to forge
alliances and to atwact inv_tmenL Though we illustrate the impact of the economic crisis with examples of
recent developments, our focus is on long-term impacts on cost competitiveness of Asian carriers and the
regulatory environment in which they will operate.
Asla's Airlines and the Competitive Environment In the early 1990's
Asia's airlines can be categorised broadly in two groups for the purpose of discussing their historical
development. The first set began to make their presence felt in international markets in the 1970's as wide-
bodied aircraft were reducing the costs of long-haul travel. Traffic between Japan and North America had
grown because of the USA's military presence during and after the conflict in Korea. At the same time,
growth on the Kangaroo Route from Australasia to Europe was creating opportunities for aggressive
airlines based in South East Asia 0Ummer, 1996). Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways, for example, were
based advan_eously at interchange points and were convenient and attractive stopover airports. Asia's
emerging airlines of the 1970's possessed a significant competitive advantage through their low input
prices (Findlay, 1985) and they were able to capture a growing share of the market.
As the Asian economies began to prosper during the 1980's, these _ers expanded and the network of
intra-Asian airline services entered into a period of rapid development (Rimmer, 1996). In aggregate, traffic
in .Asia was averaging growth of more than 10%each year while some routes were sustaining growth rates
of over 20% a year for several years in succession (Air Transport Action Group, 1997). For various
reasons, the established Asian airlines were having difficulty coping with this growth and governments
began to relax their regulations to permit new, private-sector airlines to emerge (Nuutinen, 1991; Bailey,
1993; Bowen & Leinbach, 1995). This accelerated the liberalisation of airline competition through multiple
designation and the development of new _ntra-Asian routes as the new entrants pursued international
ambitions (Bowen, 1997; Hcoper, 1997).
In developed airline markets, the most common entry strategy for new airlines has been based to a large
extent on cost leadership. The source of the cost advantage can come from high productivity levels, say,
through high aircraft utilisation (eg. Southwest Airlines in the USA) or through low input prices (eg. paying
employees less and by operating older aircraft). The first group of Asian airlines did enjoy a significant
advantage in terms of input prices. For example, in 1976 Pakistan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and
Thailand all had input costs that were less than half those for the US carriers (Bnmker et. al., 1989).
Though the Asian carriers had low productivity levels, their unit costs remained competitive.
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especially the case for the exchange of fifth freedom rights with the result that the Asian airline industry
remains relatively fragmented.
The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Traffic Levels
Informal business networks, close •relationships between financial institutions and their borrowers were
mechanisms that facilitated rapid growth in Asia, but the financial _t0r _e_xp0s-ed to=_Sky
investments. A lack of control over lending practices and inadequate disclosure and reporting requirements
have been pin-pointed as fundamental weaknesses of the Asian economies. Speculation in property, in
particular, became a problem as the global economy began to slow down. In Thailand alone, 58 fu'ms
accumulated debts of US$16 billion as a result of speculation. Alan Greenspan highlighted "politically
driven lending" on conspicuous construction projects as a key contributor. When the weaknesses of the
financial sector in Asia began to emerge, currencies began to enter a free-fall. Property prices and S_
values have been cut and Asia's wealth was written down ain_o_ov-erm_ht: The=_f+O[ business failures
includes merchant banks through to steel producers. The laternadonal Monetary Fund (IMF) has had to
step in with rescue packages in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea.
vie,._ a_ut the prospecUof a q_ck==r_+dltter. :.................. .......... _=:: :_='+: ::::Some economists point Out that the fufidamental
strengths of Asia had been a plentiful supply of labour with increasingly high skill levels, the capabifity to
leverage growth with proven technology, government policies that supported export activity and that
provided necessary infi-astructure. A less optimistic view is that there are major ptl[fi_--afid__='nal +
barriers in Asia inhibiting further development and that it will take time _ _0Yve these problems. The
financial sector is high on the list of institutions requiring reform with less relianceon close relationships
with corporate borrowers and on informal networks and greater emphasis on strong regulatory and
supervisory structures (Walton, 1997).
Critics of the IMF argue that the rescue packages impose excessive austerity and that there needs to be
more attention paid to stimulating domestic demand. All of the while, Japan's economy continues to
languish. Japan is important for at least three reasons. The first is that an important ingredient in the success
of the Asian economies has been the investment by Japanese institutions. The poor returns and the risks in
Asia will see funds redirected to other areas. The second factor is a consequence of this - the leveraged
lease in Japan has reduced the costs to airlines of financing aircraft purchases. This appears certain to
disappear. The third factor is that the economic recession in Japan has fallen heavily on segments of the
population that had generated some of the strongest growth in travel markets.
The Government of lapan has kept interest rates low and has adopted fiscal measures designed to boost the
economy, but the failure of these measures is undermining business confidence within and outside Japan.
That Japan's financial institutions still are exposed to risk because of the amounts of non-performing debts
in their portfolios has been the signal for Moody's Investment Services to downgrade the nation's risk
rating. Sony's chairman, Norio Ogha, said in early April that Japan was on the verge of collapse and this
could be the trigger for a world recession.
Australia's Tourism Forecasting Council (TIC) has published several assessments that help in gauging the
impact of the crisis on tourism flows. The TFC produced a set of long-term forecasts of international visitor
arrivals for Australia in November 1996 (TFC, 1996). Along with most forecasting agencies, the TFC did
not anticipate the economic crisis that was to occur in the very next year and it quickly issued a bulletin in
December 1997 to revise its predictions. The new work took account of currency devaluations up to 31
October= 1997 .......
For some economies, though, conditions continued to deteriorate. For example, the In/ionesia Rupiah had
devalued by 40% against the US dollar compared to its average value in 1996. But the economic crisis had
not run its full course and, by the end of January in 1998, the Rupiah had fallen 246% from its 31 October
value. The Korean Won had remained stable in 1997, but by December it had accepted an IMF bail-out
LL=
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The economic crisis immediately placed Asia Pacific's airlines under severe finan_al- stresS. Air New
Zealand, with 13% of its operations in Asia, reduced its profit projection from NZ$200 mi-II-i0nto NZ$150
million after its revenue fell by 20% in December. Table 2 documents some of t_s_eimpacts. Korean
Airl!nes, for example, revealed in February 1998 that it had lost US$900 million as a result of the
devaluation of the Won. The IMF's guidelines make it difficult for governments to rescue their airlines
within the strict budgetary conditions of the bail-out packages and there is pressure to allow foreign
investment. Concerned employees of Korean Airlines used their bonuses in December 1997 to buy shares
in order to protect their management. Thai Airways has announced record losses andSempaii Air, a new
entrant in Indonesia, has gone into liquidation. Given this degree of financial st_ss, we examine the
responses of the airlines.
Table 2: Sample of financlal.and
Date Airline
rr
December Korean Airlines
1997
February Korean Airlines
March Air New Zealand
1998
All Nippon
Airways
manaseflal implicafi_ons of Asia n.economlccrlsls _ '
Event
Ends plans to offer shares: Employees use bonuses to buy stock to
protect current management after the Government allows up to 50%
foreign ownership
US$900 million dollar foreign exchange |oss dueto 40% devaluation
of the Won
Announces its profits for 97/98 fiscal year to fall fromprior forecast of
NZ$200 million to NZ$150 million
Predicts loss of US$25.2 million for financial year eading 31 March
1998 compared to net profit of a similar amount in previous year.
Announces a 3-year plan to restructure the airline and reduce costs.
Salaries of pilots and managers reduc,eA by 3% and staffing levels to
be cut by 1,000 over the 3 years
Bouraq Air Suspends300 staffon extended leave on 50% pay and announces
plans to suspend another 900 employees
Cathay Pacific Revealed profits for calendar year.` !997 were US$217 million, 56%
Airways lower than the previous year after load factors declined from 74% to
68%. Cathay announces intention to sell 7 B747-200 aircraft to reduce
capacity and lays off 40 flight engineers
Garuda Indonesia Announces it is selling non-core businesses (hotels, lravel agencies
and spare parts) and is selling up to 25% of its fleet to reduce its
capacity
Writes off US$1.2 billion of losses by reducing the value of
shareho!dings _d lo_s tO,subsidiaries and by reducing shareholder
Saeaga Airlines Malaysian start-up suspended its operations after preparing tO operate
to several Asian and Australian airports
Stafflevels reduced by 60% (1,400) and 2 of its 4 A300-B4's
impounded in Malaysia after the airlin e failed to meet lease and
maintenance payments
Thai Airways Cutting costs by 6 million baht after announcing an operating loss of
US$561 million for the December quarter of 1997 as a result of
foreign exchange losses
Japan Air System To cease employing ground staff and plan to reduce staff by 500 over
3 years/Wage rates and managers salaries to be held constant while
flight times for cockpit crews to be reduced
Government rejects proposal to increase fares and calls for a strategy
to improve performance
Downgraded its profit projection for the current fiscal year by 25%
Pilots pursue industrial action in opposition to 15% cut in salaries and
ANA cancels services to the USA, Hong Kon_ and Europe
Japan Airlines
Sempati Air
April 1998
' _VietnamAirlines _
Air New Zealand
All Nippon
Airways
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his permission, Sempati Air immediately cancelled services on I0 domestic and 4 regional routes
(including to Taiwan). The Minister intervened to stop Merpati Nusantara, one of the Government's
airlines, taking similar actions on 80 of its routes. Instead, the Minister agreed it could phase out routes
with load factors under 30%. Garuda Indonesia has cut its international flights by 30% and domestic flights
by 269'0. :
Qantas Airways, Ansett International and Air New Zealand were among a number of airlines to suspend
services to South Korea early in 1998 when the number of Korean residents travelling abroad fell sharply.
Asiana Airlines ceased 15 flights on 6 international routes and Korean Airlines dropped 48 flights on 21
international routes.
However, airlines have been seeking opportunities to re-deploy their capacity, Singapore Airlines and
Cathay Pacific Airways have both outlined plans to increase the frequency of flights to Australia. All
Nippon Airways was quick to take advantage of its improved d_the_A market under the new air
services agreement concluded between the USA and Japan'early in 1998.
Table 3: Service level changes resulting from the._ .eeon0 ._c e.,_Isls_ -................ : -:_
Airline Decision - -
Air New Zealand Reduces services between New Zealand and Indonesia. Thailand and Malaysia and
cancels services between New Zealand and South Korea. In February it annoys
plan to reduce capacity on Asian routes and redeployment to Australia-New Zealand
market. Adds more non-stop flights from Australia to USA
Granted international rights in June 1997 but announces it is concentrating on
domestic routes
Cancels services between Australia and South Korea and ceases daily flights from
Sydney to Kuala Lumpur via Jakarta after the load factor and yields fell
Ceases 15 flights on 6 international routes
Taiwanese new entrant to launch services to 3 cities in the Philippines
Withdraws direct services to South Korea
CathayPacific Plans to increase frequency to Australia, Europe and North America
Air Philippines
Ansett
International
Asiana Airlines
Astro Airlines
British Airways
Airways
Garuda Indonesia
Harlequin Air
Korean Airlines
Merpail Air
Northwest
Airlines
Orient Thai
Airlines =-.
Ceasing services fi'om Jakarta to Manila, Bangkok and Canton and from Medan to
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore as international frights are cut by 30% and domestic
flights by 26%
Affiliate of Japan Air System plans to commence DC-10 charters from Fukuoka to
Australia and add Hawaii, Bali, Kathmandu and others from mid-February 1998
Dropped 48 flights on 21 internationa/r0utes
Terminated services on 63 of its 423 domestic routes in February after earlier being
refused permission to cease operations on g0 routes.
Increasing its Tokyo-Los Angeles flights from 7 per week to 10 to connect with
onward services to other pans of Asia.
Ceasing suspends all domestic flights until permitted to fly to major cities
=i
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Table 4: Fleet decisions in the wake of the Asian economic crisis
[]
1
ll :
Date Airline
December
1997
Decision
Garuda Indonesia Fails to pay US$8 million on A330 leases. Government
provides sovereign guarantees so that airline can take delivery
of 17 B737's
Asiana Airlines Sold 4 B767s plus one other aircraft in a lea_back deaiand :
deferred plans to buy 5 new aircraft in 1998
Korean Airlines Already had sold 4 A300s and a B747-400 to its creditors under
a nine-year leasehack arrangement, it also sold a B747-200
freighter and was arranging the sale of 3 more aircraft
All Nippon Adding 10 aircraft in next financial year (to 31 March 1999) and
Airways selling 6 with 5.7% increase in ASK's. Its new aircraft will be
its first 4 e777-300s, 2 B777-200s, 2 B747-400s- _d 2 A321s ....
Asiana : = Defers delivery of 2 B777. Cancels plans to order 5 more
aircraft in 1998, sells some of existing fleet and leases them
back. Selling 3 B767-300ERjmd 2 B747-400
Cathay Pacific Defers options on 16 Boeing and 9 Airbus aircraft and place.s 7
B747-200's up for sale to reduce capacity
Garuda Indonesia Attempting to sell 4 DC-10, 4 B747 and 5 A300B4 after failing
to pay US$8 million on A330 lease payments
Korean Airlines , Sells some of its fleet and leases them back
Malaysia Airlines Sells a DC-10, an A300B4 and 6 737-500 to finance deliveries.
Negotiating with Delta to take over commitments to buy 4
B777s
Philippine Delaying aircraft deliveries and cancelling 613747-400 orders
Airlines and orders for 3 of its orders for 8 A320s delayed by one to two
years. Said to be Asia's first default on an order
Saeaga Airlines Cancels orders for 5 A320 aircraft in suspending operations
because of the state of the Malaysian economy
Thai Airways Delaying deliveries of 17 Airbus and Boeing aircraft and
intends to sell 3 DC-10-30Ers and 5 BAe146-300s. But
followed this within the month by ordering 5 A3(X)-6(X)Rs, 3
A330-300s and one B777-300 and one B747-400 for deliveries
in 1999-2000.
Asiana Airlines Defers deliveries of A330-200s to 1999 or later. By May it has
put all of its aircraft up for sale. Air Europe purchased 2 B767-
300s, Delta one B767-300, QF one B747-400 and UPS has
bought Asiana's B767 freighter
Bouraq Air Returns 2 B737-200s to lessors
Cathay Pacific Intends to take delivery of ! 2 new aircraft but will sell 5 B747-
Airways 200s. However, the lack of buyers has resulted in a decision to
lease the aircraft,
Garuda Indonesia Sells 4 B747-200s and 5 A300s and then leases them back.
Planned to sell 5 DC-I0-30s, 4 B747-200s, 5 A300B4s and 5
Fokker-28s. Withdrew DC-10-30s from market after failing to
attract offers at itsgoing price.
Continuing to negotiate delivery swaps and refinancing for 11
13777-200s and,3 _ _d 9B747-400s.
Philippine To sell 9 A300B4s and 11 B737-300s. Deferred 6 B747-400 (3
February
1998
March
1998
March
1998
April 1998
Malaysian
_:_:_ Air-lines "
Airlines
Sempati Air
Singapore
Airlines
of which were due in 1998) and 3 A320 deliveries.
By March, Sempati had only 5 of its 25 aircraft in operation.
Returns 4 A300s and 7 Fokker-100s to lessors
Defers deliveries of 3 B777s and one B747-400
,_ r
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Airlines. This alliance includes Japan Airlines and the feed traffic between Narita and Chek Lap Kok
airport is importantto bothairlines.The currentwave of alliance formationin Asia will help the region's
airlines rationaliseservices,to consolidatetraffic and to improve their finances,butthey also will play a
role in the decidingthecompetitivestrengthof the major globalalliancesatkey Asian hubs.
Table 5: Alliance development involving Asian carriers 1997-98
Airline Decision
All Nippon Airways,
Lufthansa & United
Airlines
Asiana Airlines &
American Airlines
C thayPaci c r ays
China Eastern Airlines
Iapan Airlines&
AmericanAirlines
EVA & Continental
China Airlines &
American
Malaysian Airlines &
Swissair
Qantas Airways
Singapore Airlines, Delta
& Swissair
Thai Airways
International
Philippine Airlines
China Airlines
ANA enters code share agreement with United Airlines and Lafthansa in
preliminary move tojoin Star Alliance
Formeda"strategicbusinessalliance"involvingcodesharingandshared
frequent flyer programme ,:: :
Evaluating bids from BA/AA/JAL, Star Alliance and KLM/Northwest
Eni_ c_le sl_lreal'_meni _-_ Aidines
Code sharing on mutes betwee n Japan and USA
Codeshareand shared frequeh{flyer programmes
Code share and shared frequent flyer programmes
Alliance on 3 weekly flights from Kuala Lumpur to Zurich
Enters code share agreement with Aeroline,as Argentinns as partof a
strategy to re-deploy capacity from Asia
Alliance breaks down as Singapore Airlines moves closer to Star Alliance.
MOU signed in December 1997 :
Air France, British Airways, Lufthansa, Qantas and Singapore Airlines
bidding for 25% share of Thai
Northwest Airlines evaluating an investment in PAL
Enters code share with Northwest Airlines between Beijing and Detroit
Regulatory Responses to the Economic Crisis
The airlines clearly are realigning their capacity to the new demand conditions while setting themselves up
to take best advantage of global airline groups and to pursue sustainable productivity improvements.
However, the impacts of the economic crisis are so great there will be a temptation for at least some
governments to provide their airlines with direct financial support and to protect them from competition. It
seems likely that some of the financiers backing the airlines in their sale-and-leaseback deals believe that,
ultimately, the governments of Asia will ensure their airlines remain solvent (Wiiliamson, 1998). Also,
equipment suppliers and their governments will be supportive of distressed airlines as dpi:_srs-evident with
the success Korean Airlines has had in securing a low interest loan of US$254 million (Mann, 1998). As
pointed out above, the Government of Indonesia already has given sovereign guarantees in order for
Garuda Indonesia to complete purchases of aircraft.
Governments also could step in to protect their airlines from competition, setting back the pace of
liberalisation in Asia. However, there are good reasons to believe these options will not be favoured in
12
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Table 6 continued: Regulatory responses in Asia Pacific 199%98
Economy Decision
Taiwan
Taiwan & USA
Thailand
Thailand
Civil Aeronautics Administration puts pressure on airlines to merge to
achieve greater stability and improvement in safety
Open skies agreement gives greater access to USA and beyond for China
Airlines and EVA and alliances emerging with American and Continental
Transport and Communications Minister announces new policy to _
deregulate domestic market and to allow multiple designation on
international routes, commencing with regional services (eg Indonesia).
Restrictions on charter flights by Thai and foreign airlines to be lifted.
Government increases foreign ownership limit in Thai by 10% to 30% and
announces intention to reduce its own stake in Thai Airways from 79.5%
to 49% or lower (pressures _om
Conclusions
The Asian economic crisis has generated a considerable amount of pessimism about the prospects for the
region's airlines. The carriers were highly exposed to currency risks and to a slowdown in traffic growth.
While the economic crisis is reducing the amount of intra-regional traffic, the currency devaluations will
stimulate more trips to Asia from North America and Europe. By virtue of the reduced costs of employing
labour and other local inputs, the cost competitiveness of Asia's airlines has improved. However, the
immediate problem facing the carriers is to refinance their debt, to realign their services and to match
capacity to the weaker demand conditions. While this adjustment process continues, the world's mega-
alliances are consolidating their position so that Asia's airlines are faced with difficult choices from a
weakened position.
It seems likely that the end result will be fundamental changes in the way Asia Pacific aviation markets
operate in terms of alliances, hubs, ownership, and regulation. Given the depth of the economic crisis in
some Asian economies, a desire to protect national airlines would be understandable. However, the longer-
term challenge for the Asian carriers is to turn the economic crisis into an opportunity to develop strategies
that give them a sustainable competitive advantage. This will come about through productivity
improvements that most likely will be pursued most aggressively in competitive conditions. At the same
time, competitive airlines will need access to markets. Attempts to protect airlines could have negative
consequences including pressure from the IMF and international financial community
In this paper, we have examined the initial responses of the airlines and governments. The evidence is
mounting that the airlines themselves want the flexibility to adjust capacity, to enter new routes, to enter
into alliances and to attract investment from the world's major carriers. Governments have shown a
willingness to liberalise competition, to privatise and to allow foreign investment. Far from being a flight
back to protection, the Asian economic crisis appears to have shifted attitudes of policy makers far more in
the direction of liberalisation.
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INDUSTRY OUTLOOK APPROACHING THE NEXT
MILLENIUM.
 g5339 -
Introduction.
By any standards, 1997 was a banner year for the aviation
industry. World passenger tr_Kfic increased by just under 7% over
1996 with the result that total demand was over one-third greater
than just four years earlier in 1993 .... an average rate of increase of
7.5% pa or nearly 50% above the consensus forecast for long-run
growth. While total deliveries of 100 seat jets increased from 438 in
1996 to 582 last year, the four year average of 490 pa was some
20% less than the consensus forecast of long-run• demand. This
almost unprecedented four year favorable trend in supply versus
demand has resulted in load factors increasing from 66% in 1993
to 71% last year while the number of surplus aircraft declined
from nearly 1,200 (11% of the world fleet) at the end of 1993 to 260
representing just 2% of the World fleet at the end of 1997. |
The world's airlines recorded record net profits of $7.5B last year
compared with $4.4B losses in 1993 which itself followed record
losses of $7.9B in 1992. The swing for the US airlines, which
account for about one-third of world airline revenues, was-even
more impressive over this five year period ........ going from a $3B
loss in 1992 to a $4B profit in 1997.
Manufacturers, too, have benefited from near record orders for
1,348 new jets in 1997 (a 14% increase over the 1,186 ordered in
1996) bringing the firm order backlog up to 3,117.
In the leasing sector, the growing aircraft shortage showed up in
terms of strong demand for most popular types of modem
narrow-body and wide-body aircraft with a commensurate
strengthening of lease rates.
_E
One would have to go back to 1989 to find an equivalent state of
euphoria to that which prevailed in 1997; at least until the last
quarter of the year when the Asian economic crisis began to
significantly impact growth in Asia.
A Ten Year Retrospective.
Coincidentally, 1989 was also the first year in which I contributed
the Industry Overview for the Airfinance Annual. The forecast for
Jet Aircraft supply and demand through 2000 summarized therein
included the following explicit projections for 1997 with which the
actual 1997 outcome (excluding 50 seat regional jets) can now be
compared:
I_
• 1997 RPMs:
• Traffic Growth Rate:
• 1989-1997 Deliveries:
Forecast
1,774B
6.1% pa
5,230
Actual/Variance
1,716B/-3.3%
5.7% pa
5,437/+207
• 1989-1997 Retirals: 1,809 1,237/-572
• Net Fleet Increase: 3,421 4,200/+779
• 1997 Fleet:
• 1997 Average Aircraft Size:
• 1997 Seats (w 1988):
• Peak Aircraft Surplus:
/
• 1997 Aircraft Surplus:
11,300 12,061/+6.7%
+9.5% +2.0%
+57.1% +56.5%
10.6% in 1993 11.2% in 1993
1.0% 2.0%
Operating Lease Fleet: 2,400 aircraft/23% of fleet in 1995
(versus actual 2,700 aircraft/22.5% of
fleet in 1997)
Several conclusions can be drawn from this. On the positive side,
traffic growth, total capacity (seat) growth and cyclicality were all
pretty accurately forecast, with the 1993 aircraft surplus in
particular having been almost precisely predicted. The forecast for
operating lease market growth was also accurate. On the negative
side, like most other forecasters I grossly over-estimated both
retirals and the rate of increase of average aircraft size. The
obvious lesson is that this is an industry where medium term
macro forecasts are a reliable basis for future planning in terms of
both the overall requirement for aircraft seats and the play-out of
the cycle, whereas they are much less reliable when it comes to
predicting the precise way in which thai demand wilI be satisfied
in terms of specific aircraft types and also in terms of adding new
aircraft versus keeping old ones in service as long as possible.
Demand for Aircraft:
This analysis confirms that we are fortunate to participate in what
is fundamentally a very predictable business taking a 10 to 15 year
view. The need for aircraft and finance ...... which is of course
what most interests aircraft financiers ....... is fundamentally
underpinned by passenger traffic growth and the only real
uncertainty, as always, seems to be the degree to which this driver
might exceed 5% pa with only a very few forecasters predicting
anything less. Though, having said that, the current economic
turmoil in Asia is perhaps for the first time ever causing people to
question the magnitude of the Asian part of the growth equation
on which most forecasts are premised, at least in the short term.
While still too early to tell precisely, it seems likely that the impact
of recent events in Asia will be to reduce global aircraft demand
over the next five years by some 300 units relative to that
previously predicted with wide-body demand being the most
affected segment.
Based on this, and taking into account the output of the last two
Transportation Research Board Workshops, in Fall 1995 and Fall
1997 [Fig 1], it still seems reasonable to rely for planning purposes
on the following broad assumptions as to the likely demand for
100+ seat commercial jets over the next ten to fifteen years'
• 5%+ pa Traffic Growth
• 300-400 pa Increase in the World Fleet
• 250-300 pa Retirements
• 550-650 pa Aircraft Required
• $35-40B Annual Cost (in 1997 dollars)
Again in very round terms, and taking the upper end of this
demand spectrum, some 400 of the required aircraft will probably
be narrow-bodies and 250 will be wide-bodies. The immediate
problem of course is that Boeing is alone set to build 370 narrow-
bodies in 1999, while Airbus, although set to build only 205 in
1999, is publicly committed to capturing at least 50% of the self-
same market [Fig 2]. As a result, short-term narrow-body
production rates are likely to exceed long-run demand by
approximately 50%.
Simply because production rates this close in are substantially
underpirmed by firm orders, and because this high level of
demand for narrow-bodies is a direct reflection of the industry's
need to operate totally Stage 3 fleets in the US by 2000 and in
Europe by 2002, this is not a concern for 1999, nor indeed possibly
for 2000 depending on how well traffic growth holds up. It will,
though, be a matter of increasing concern from 2001 on as with the
hushkitting issue by then out of the way, this will be a period of
below average narrow-body retirais. The key issue here will be the
way in which the manufacturers individually and collectively
react to the inevitable fall-off in narrow-body demand post-2000.
This brings me neatly to cyclicality.
/
Cyclicality:
I have in previous contributions to the Airfinance Annual referred
to the inherently predictable nature of cyclicality in this industry,
and nothing better illustrates this than Fig 3 which tracks key
events through the last three complete cycles. This is further
supported by the retroactive accuracy of my 1989 forecast in this
respect. Without focusing on the numbers in detail, it is evident
that these three cycles were remarkably similar, not only in terms
of their timing and duration, but also in terms of peak/valley
ratios of orders and deliveries. And the current cycle looks to be
playing out in a very similar fashion, albeit in a shorter time-scale.
My personal belief is that cycles in our industry are driven
primarily by internal industry characteristics rather than by
external events ........ though external events frequently act as the
trigger that starts the industry on its next down cycle. In this
regard, the Asian economic crisis will probably be seen
retrospectively as having been the key downside trigger for the
current cycle.
The length of time taken to build aircraft and the related speed at
which production can be increased or decreased in response to
demand is in my view the underlying cause of cyclicality. With
these times having recently been cut in half relative to the '70s and
"80s, it seems to me likely that cycles will generally be somewhat
shorter than in the past, and the speed at which narrow-body
production has been ramped up since the 1995 low virtually
guarantees that this will be the case in the current cycle [Fig 4].
The critical issue, which I alluded to earlier, is the way in which
the industry generally, and the airframe manufacturers in
particular, react when narrow-body demand peaks and starts
falling off. Will they learn from experience and pro-actively match
production to demand thus helping us achieve a soft landing this
time around? ....... or will they instead maintain excessive
production levels for too long and thus exacerbate the next down-
cycle as happened in 1991? And equally important, will the
pattern of external events help smooth out the cycle or will they
exacerbate it? Particular!y important here will be the timing of the
next US or European economic slow-down and the as yet
unknown economic and business impact of the Year 2000
computer problem.
Financing Trends.
One of the most dramatic changes in the last 15 or so years has
been the growth in the number of airlines that lease some or all of
their aircraft with the number leasing all of their aircraft up from
46 in 1986 to 214 in 1996 [Fig 5]. This is matched on the other side
by a decline in the number of airlines that own all of their aircraft
..... down from 127 in 1986 to 83 in 1996. This suggests to me that
more and more airlines are recognizing the benefits of using all
three forms of financing ........ that is a balance sheet optimized
combination of outright ownership and tax based finance leasing
for core assets, and operating leasing for developmental and non-
core assets. While many different factors are involved, I believe
that one factor is a growing realization that investing in aircraft is
at least in the short term a far from risk free proposition if new
aircraft price escalation is low. Given its reputation as one of the
world's best and most innovative large carriers, it is highly
significant that British Airways decided to go the operating lease
route in setting up its low cost IGo' subsidiary.
r
Turning to financing trends, recently up-dated figures show
continuing growth in the number of aircraft on operating lease
with this form of financing today being used for some 22.5% of all
aircraft in the world jet fleet or 2,700 in total. While the overall
mix between ownership, finance leasing and operating leasing for
modern aircraft is much the same as it was five years ago, namely
21% on operating lease, 30% on finance lease and 49% owned,
there con_ue to be significant variations around the world [Fig
6]. Outside of the US, however, there is some evidence of a
progressive shift towards more balanced financing solutions along
the lines of the European model which suggests that a degree of
maturity is now emerging in global financing patterns.
This will of course be greatly influenced by airline profitability
and cash flow and this will in turn depend on the play-out of the
cycle. Ed Greenslet's comprehensive forecast of world-wide airline
profitability and financing requirements in last November's issue
of the Airline Monitor shows that outside the US, the airline
industry is likely to need large amounts of external financing over
the next five years as they struggle to pay for new aircraft being
bought primarily for growth [Fig 7]. Conversely, the larger US
airlines are likely to have little or no need for external financing
over the next ten years [Fig 8].
Aircra_ Prices and Values:
Leasing maths is not particularly complex with profits being a
function of just four variables; Original Cost, Lease Rate and Lease
Term, Cost of Money, and Residual Value at the end of the lease
term. With the market determining lease rates and terms, and
with money increasingly a commodity, profit is in practice
determined almost entirely by the prices at which lessors and
financiers buy and sell their aircraft.
On the buy side, it is a fact that for large buyers, new aircraft today
cost little more than they did in the early 1990s and this is reflected
in the fact that lease rates in today's tight market are in many
instances not hugely greater than those that were achieved in the
late 1980s at the peak of the last cycle. With list prices escalating
steadily due to the automatic application of the manufacturers'
standard escalation formula which takes acCoSt of increases in
labor and materials cost only with no offset for _in_eased
productivity, there is a growing disparity between list prices and
net prices that is an increasing source of confusion and
uncertainty. Based on an analysis of three popular models, _e 737
and 767 from Boeing and the A320 from Airbus, it seems that
average appraised values for new aircraft are today around 85 % of
list price including the cost of funding progress payments while
distress values are around 70%.
In _S environment, what looked like a bargain yesterday may
well not be so attractive today, and with deflation an additional
threat, there is little reason other than slot availability to firmly
order large numbers of aircraft many years ahead. This is one of
the reasons why GECAS aims to maintain as much flexibility as
possible in our new aircraft orders, both through the use of
options and by incorporating as many model conversion rights as
possible, so as to position ourselves to give our customers what
they want, when they want it.
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On the sell side, the science of appraiser forecasting of future
values remains as much a black art as ever. Take the case of a
1992 Boeing 737-300 with'C_-56-B2 engines, a new one of which
nominally listed for somewhere around $36.5mm last summer.
Appraisers generally agree that such an aircraft was last year at
age five worth around $27mm or 74% of the list price of a new
aircraft of the same type. Going out to 2008, six well known
appraisers quote inflation inclusive future values ranging from a
:_ low of $11.3mm to a high of $24.9mm [Fig 9] .......... an over 2:1
uncertainty factor ten years hence as to the value of one of the
_ world's most popular investment aircraft.
BK's comprehensive analysis of historic transaction data suggests
that future values ought not to be as unpredictable as that since
the long-run average]s pretty stable at around 70% of replacement
cost at age 5; 50% at age 10 and 35% at age 15. What this masks of
course is a huge variation in residual value retention between
different types and at different points in the supply/demand
cycle. Historically, aircraft built in 1986 were ten years later worth
between a low of just under 30% of original sticker price and a
- high of just under 80% taking inflation into account [Fig 10]. No
prizes here for guessing which were the winners and which were
the losers! Similarly, values of all types tend to fluctuate by at
least plus or minus 10% around their long-run levels through the
cycle depending on supply versus demand. Armed with this
wealth of historical evidence, it is surely not too much to ask that
'_ appraisers should be required to declare more explicitly their
methodology and assumptions so that we can understand
_ ;_precisely why their forecasts are so different. If this was done, it is
my person_fbe|ief that the range of future value estimates would
_ " become distinctly narrower and therefore be of more value to
investors. Meanwhile, _ose asset managers that truly understand
- the drivers of aircraft value will do better for themselves and their
aircraft owners than those that don't.
=
Manufacturer Competition and Prices:
I will close by commenting briefly on the linked issues of
manufacturer competition and building aircraft more efficiently.
It is probably true to say that despite the fact that the
manufacturers' order books are now pretty well full through 1999
and 2000, competition has rarely ever been fiercer on both the
airframe and engine fronts. Why is this? The root cause in my
view is that with only two significant airframe manufacturers left,
the fight for market share is being driven by conflicting and
ultimately irreconcilable objectives. Thus Boeing has an
essentially 70% market share and wants to keep it, while Airbus is
strongly committed to achieving a 50 % market share. This is most
vividly apparent in the narrow-body sector where _bus already
claims parity with Boeing, yet will in 1999 be delivering only a
shade over half as many narrow-bodies as its competitor. In this
situation, almost every campaign now becomes a no holds barred
'shoot-out' regardless of the size of the order.
£
Logically, this fierce competition should ease as more and more
customers are won by one side or the o_er, but this will depend
greatly on the degree to which current campaigns are or are not
being priced at or below long-run break-eyen cost Ievels and this
in turn depends critically on the extent to which production costs
can be further reduced.
This is the single greatest unknown in an industry which has
traditionally taken it for granted that new aircraft prices
automatically increase somewhat faster than consumer prices
generally. Is the recent experience of relatively flat aircraft prices
an anomaly, a one-time correction, or a portent of things to come?
If the latter, its a real 'game-changer' for aircraft financiers since
inflation can no longer be counted on to compensate for
inadequate lease rates. While none of us can know the answer to
this key question, the current difficulties being experienced by
Boeing suggest that the manufacturers have at the very least over-
estimated the pace at which production processes can be
simplified and speeded up.
Conclusions:
_7 V
As we head towards the millennium, our industry is overall in
pretty good shape, albeit probably soon approaching the top of the
current cycle, with strong players everywhere and with better
focus on completely satisfying the needs of its customers
profitably ......... a key GECAS goal.
If we are lucky, and if we apply the lessons learnt in the painful
recession in the early '90s, there is every reason to believe that the
industry can work its way through the next down-turn without
too much difficulty, though the winners will as always be those
businesses and individuals that combine an in-depth
understanding of the dynamics of this complex, but ultimately
relatively predictable, industry with deep-pocket financing.
K.J.Holden,
Executive Vice President, Business DeveIopment and Strategy,
GE Capital Aviation Services.
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An Empirical Analysis of Japan's Domestic Airline Markets
Part 1
Airfares under the Regulatory Regime: What will be expected after the revision of the current
charging system?
Part 2
Demand/Supply System and Operations Management
=
by
Hideki MURAK.MMI
Associate professor of Kobe (National) University, Graduate School of Business Administration
_._+ .. __-_..._-_---_=, :,L'_-_ _.Z. _=__- ,.. -_:_ - ....
Phone: +gl-78-803-032_ ....
E-ma_: hideki@rose.rokkodai.kobe-u.ac.jp
This paper statistica_y investigates the charging system of Japanese domestic airfares and
predictsthee_ Ofthe r_on of the c_t system_ the_mer's surplus. Using222
observations of cross-sectional data fi'om 1995, Part 1 of this paper empirically demonstrates that
(a) the airfares in the long haul mutes were set relatively high regardless of the number of
passengers, Co) in the outstandingly dense routes, the airfares were set higher than the predicted full
cost levels, and (c) in the-_ and shorter _ routes, airfares were a little loWer. Consid_g the
price elasticity of these three types of routes, this paper concludes that the reduction of airfares in the
°°
. . . °, • °
!
long haul routes (especially dense routes) to the "distance-proporfonal levels" would lead to a
substantial gain in consumer's surplus. Furthermore, this gain would surpass the loss of consumer's
surplus that might erise in shorter haul routes. There still remains substantial room for the Japanese
government to improve the consumer's benefit without worsening, and possibly even improving, the
status quo of the sirlines.
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Abstract (Part 2)
Part I uses the simultaneous equation model that is derived from the assumption that
Japanese airlines maximise their profits under the regulated fares. This model consists of
Marshall/an demand function, fleet size function and load factor function. Part I mainly uses the
demand function in order to discuss the expected change of co_er's surplus after the regulatory
reform. Part 2 discusses demand and supply balance and airlines' operations by highlighting on load
factor function and fleet size function. In fleet size function, the number of passengers, the number
of departures, and disumce-controUed sirfares determine the optimal fleet size. In addition,
distance-controlled airfares, consent ratio, the number of departures and fleet size determine the load
factor.
Using the same data set as Part 1, this paper finds these following results for three types of
markets ("long-haul & big", "short-haul & small" and "in between').
(1) Only in the short _ markets the decrease of a/flares (controlled by distance) tends to cause a
higher load factor. This result irnpfies that there are incentives for airlines to do yield
management by lowering the airfares, once airfares are deregulated. On the other hand, in the
groups of long haul routes, airl/nes don't have th/s kind of incentive. This is supported by the
fact that there were very few cases of discounting airfares especially in long hanl end thin
markets following the minor regulatory revision in June 1996.
(2) Flight frequency, together with Herfmdahl _mdex, has the positive effect on load factor. This is
similar to the US case prior to deregulation (S_ Douglas & Millar (1974b)). This implies that
there exists the po_bility that ah'l/nes will request the governments to excessively increase the
number of theft own departure especially for _ markets as the capacity of domestic markets
is enlarged or the domestic markem are more d_ated.
1Introduction
TheJapanesedomesticairrouteshave been tightly regulated in terms of charging airfare_
frequency, entry, and exit throughout the era of the so-called "Old Regime (1972-86)" and that of
the "New Domestic Policy (1986-Present) "I. Under both regulatory eras, the Japanese ,Ministry of
Transport (hereafter MoT) used annual passenger volume thresholds for dense mates to regulate the
number of carriers servicing a route. As part of the New Domestic Policy (1986-Present), these
2.
thresholds were gradually lowered. The thresholds were finally abolished completely in April 1997.
In contrast, the charging system of airfares had hardly been revised prior to 1996 except for the
slight changes in 1989 and 19902. However, in May 1996, the MoT allowed each airline to freely
choose to set its a/flare within a 25% range below a maximum airfare and expanded the availability
of discount airfares. However, a number of normal airfares of large routes were raised. Thus, it
seems as though this "nominal" policy revision has not necessarily evoked the desired effects in the
airline industry 3.
1 The Japanese domestic market for airline travel totaled 74.55 mill/on passengers in 1994 (6.1% of
the world air passengers). The domestic market shares for the Japanese-airlines, measured by
percentage of the number of passengers, were as follows: All Nippon Airways (ANA) 45.7%, Japan
Airlines (JAL) 22.9%, Japan Air System (JAg) 20.8%, Air Nippon (ANK, the subsidiary company
of ANA which mainly operates between small local routes) 6,I%, Japan Traas Ocean Air (JTA, the
subsidiary company of JAL which mainly between Okinawa islands and Okinawa to Honshu) and
the others 1.5 %. The data source is Ko_ 7okei Yoran (Aviation statistics Summary, annually
published)i Nihon Koku Kyokai, 1996.
In these revisions, the fares were slightly lowered in the across-the-board way because of the
change 0ftax system. The fares of north and-sou_b0imd routes, whichhad been set higher in order
to offset the loss of revenue due to the irregular climate change, were also reduced.
3 More de_ed inforniafion-about the _iic,/of Japanese domes_c anci int_onal aviation policy
is depicted in Yamauchi and Murakami (1995) and Yamauchi and Ito (1996). In 1998, being
allotted some slots in Sapporo, Tokyo (Haneda) and Osaka (Itami), the new entrants (Sk'ymark
_es and Hokkaido International Airlines) are supposed to operate in such a dense trunk route as
Tokyo-Sapporo (about eight million passengers carried per year) by charging a much lower price.
This may stimulate the fare competition among airlines, but the frequency of these airlines will be
!
!
i
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The primary purpose of the airfare regulation has been to cross-subsidize the deficit-ridden
local routes with trunk and other large local routes. This policy has enabled domestic airlines to
expand their route networks without cutthroat competition, protect profits for reinvestment, and
maintain stable management of growth 4.
Judging within this context, the airfares of large (i.e., dense) routes are set higher above the
commonly assumed levels, namely the "distance-proportional levels". As a result, the consumer's
surplus in these routes has been converted to compensation for the deficits that come about in thin
and/or small routes. This paper firstly focuses on the welfare analysis of Japanese domestic airline
markets by modeling nnd estimating the Marshallian demand functions for three groups of markets.
The regulatory circumstance stated above also affects the operations management
behavior. Under the circmns1_n_ in whi_ airfares and entry/exit are regulated, airlines ,cannot
choose airfares or flight frequency as su-ategic variables for profit maximization. Therefore, one of
the strategies which is left for Japanese airlines for profit maximization is to carefully choose their
fleet size in order to _e their operational cost. Assume that there is an airplane which serves
between point A and B. Japanese airlines flexibly place the airplanes depending on the demand and
supply balance. In addition, the behavior of placing optimal airplanes is, in a sense, regarded as the
supply behavior. Airlines are expected to locate a large airplane in a lucrative market, and at the
same time, sensitively sd._st the fleet size by referring to the number of flights in order to prevent
the excess capacity. .,.,_. .......
In addition, load factor is also an _dogenous variable. This idea was introduced by
Douglas and Miller who modeled and tested _e quality competition in the regulated US domestic
markets. This paper derives _e load factor function from the profit maximization model and
rearranged its explanatory variables. As a result, load factor is determined by distance-controlled
ah'fare, fleet size, _ght frequency and market concentration. Among these variables of the load
factor function, flight frequency and fleet size can be used to check whether there exists excess
/
capacity. In addition, the relationship between distance-controlled ah-fare and load factor can
explain airlines' mutual incentives for yield management.
This paper consists of Part 1 and Part_2:_ The remainder of this paper is organized as
much less than that of "Big 3 (JAL, ANA, and JAS)". It is not certain that these new entrants can
survive the competition in these routes.
::" o.
This paper consists of Part 1 and Part 2. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: both Section 2 and Section 3 are common analyses for Part 1 and Part 2. Section 2
provides a preliminary data analysis. Section 3 defines the relevant variables and develops both
theoretical and empirical models for the Japanese airline indusu-y. Section 4 and 5 belong to part 1.
Section 4 derives statistical tests for the part of the proposed models and does the welfare analyses
of Japanese domestic airline markets. Section 5 concludes with a_ of results for Part 1 and
comments regarding political implications of the findings.
Part 2 consists of Section 6 and 7. Section 6 expl-a/ns the patterns of airlines' supply
behaviors and analyses the existence of excess capacity for three groups of Japanese airl/ne markets
by using the same model and data introduced in Part 1. This section also try to analyze airlines'
incentives for yield management for three different types of markets. Section 7 is a summary of
results for Part 2 and refers to policy implications for further deregulated markets.
2 Preliminary Analyses
(1) The Structure and Variation of Japanese Domestic Airfares
Most Japanese domestic airfares, other than those charged by commuter airlines, are
determined such that the total revenue from them will cover the total cost for each firm s. This does
not guarantee that the revenue from each route will cover its total cost. In principle, the common
technique of pricing airfares would dictate that the airfare for each route be set such that it is
approximately proportional to the distance. This method has generally been accepted as the most
effective remedy for dealing with the consumer's feeling of inequality or discrimination in pricing
under the previous system of cross-subsidizing airfares. However, even under the new system, the
airfares per distance actually vary among the routes despite the fact that we, researchers, can
/
distinguish the factors that cause the cost differences (for example, whether the fleet consists of
turbo-prop aircraft or not).
'_Yamauchi and Ito, ibid., p.3g.
5 On the other hand, the fares of commuter routes are determined so that the revenue of each r6ute .....
will cover the cost of the route. Eventually, the fares per distance of commuter routes are set higher
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.... _ A regression ofthe airfare per distance versus the stage length may be used to illustrate the
extent to which airfares vary. This regression is performed below using the log linear form of the
dependent variable and employing dummy variables that reflect the differences among the routes.
The longer the stage length is, the lower the airfares per distance are expected to be, because the
operating, costs decrease, as the stage length is longer. As a result, the sign of the coefficient
estimated for the stage length variable is expected to be negative (i.e., the convex curve may be
expected). The function to be estimated may be regarded as an alternate form of the average cost
curve. This airfare per distance function is also an alternate the quasi-marginal cost curve of the
domestic, since the marginal cost curve of operation slopes downward as the stage length grows
longer. If the statistics of the estimated function are found to be substantially significant, it can be
said that the domestic alrfares are set at "relatively" reasonable levels. The reason is that they me
interpreted as being charged as though they were determined by qu_i-marginsl cost pricing (which
covers the total cost of operation because here we assume marginal cost curve almost overlaps with
average cost curve).
The original form of the equation to be estimated is as follows (hereafter, Model I):
Ln( P/D )=a+b *DOKINA WA +c* D ISLAND+d* DEXP+e* DN ARR + f* DTURBO+g* D Y S
+h*DTR+(i +j*DOKINAWA+k*DISLAND+I*DEXP+m*DNARR
+n*DTURBO+o*DYS+p*DTR)*Ln(D)+/_
where M is the error term, D is the stage length of each route, and P/D is the round trip normal
airfare per D. All the following variables are dummy variables, all of which are likely to affect the
cost structure.
DOKINAWA: 1 for the routes serving Naha International Airport/11 Okinawa Island, and zero for
the others. For example, the landing fees charged°:at the airport in Oldnawa Prefecture are set lower
than other landing fees in Japan _ order to promote the tourism for Oldnawa, the prefecture of the
lowest income.
DISLAND: 1 for the routes serving the isolated islands other than Okinawa Island, and z_.o for the
others. In these routes, commuter aircr_ ofless than 20 _eats (DFIC-6) me employed. :These
smaller jets are exempted from the usual jet airplane taxes.
DEXP: I for the routes which can be regarded as competing with Shinkansen Express, (namely, for
than those of think and local routes.
the routes along which Shinkansen serves direct service: Tokyo-Osaka, Tokyo-Fukuoka, Osaka-
Fukuoka, Nagoya-Fukuoka, Tokyo-Hiroshima, Tokyo-Okayama, Tokyo-Yamaguchi-Ube, Tokyo-
Kitakyushu, and Tokyo-Yamagata), and the others zero s. They are assumed to compete with
Shinkansen Express. The airfares of these routes are expected to be lower than those of the others.
DNARR: 1-forthe routes where such narrow-bodied aircraft as DC-9, MD-80S, B737, and A320
(128-166 seat configuration) are operated, and zero for all other routes. In these routes, the
economy of density is expected to be greater than in other routes. That is, the average cost curve is
expected to slope downward more steeply.
DTURBO: 1 for the routes where commuter aircraft (SAAB 340B, 36 seat configuration) are
operated, and zero for ati other routes• The tax for jet aircraft is not applicable to turboprop aircraft.
Furthermore, the economy of density for YS-11 flown routes_s expected to be greater than the
economy of density in the routes where full sized jet akcraft are used. The routes included in
DISLAND are excluded from DTURBO 7.
DYS: 1 for the routes where YS-11 (64 seat configuration turboprop aircraft) is operated, and zero
for all other routes. Similar to the case for DTURBO, input cost saving and strong economies of
densityare How er,  e  S-il is an agedt of a/rcraft 0t them
have already been retired. The two cost adv_es Stated "ab0_e _ be Offset bythe cost
inefficiency (e.g., extra maintenance cost) of operating with older aviation technology.
DTR (trunk dummy variable): 1 for Tokyo (Haneda)-Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka (Itami and Kansai),
Tokyo-rukuoka, Tokyo-Naha, _ (it_mfi an d _)-Sapparo, 0s_a-rukuoka, Osaka-Naha,
Fukuoka=Sapporo, Fukuoka=Naha, and zero for all others. In these dense routes, relatively larger
aircraft (B747-400D or B747StL 528-569 seat configuration) are operated than in the other routes
of about the same stage length where B767s (234-288 seat configuration) are used. The cost per
passenger of the trunk route is expected to be lower than that of the other routes of the same stage
length. However, if the airlines abuse the power of the oligopoly and elect to collude when they
apply for airfare approval from MoT, P/D could turn out to be relatively higher than the model
would predict. Clearly, this dummy variable wilI affect the Ln(P/D) function, but the above
6 Non-direct routes of Shinkansen Express are assumed not to compete with the airl/nes. For
example, the Osaka to Sendal route entails an inconvenient stop and change of trains in Tokyo.
The reason why this dummy variable is separated from DISLAND is that the airplanes operating
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mentioned offsetting factors will mask the net effect for DTR.
The estimated results for Model 1 are shown in Table-1.
Table-1 The regression results )fModel 1 (Ln(P,/D, ) function)
Pafa-
meter
Para-
meter
Note:
Intercept vo_^w^ D[SLND DEXP DNARR _ DYS DTR
5.310
 5S.105)
-.180
(9.292)
-.100
9.9o6/
/.,¢D)*
DO_qAWA
-.060
_3.073 I
t.(D)
*DISLAND
-.105
_3.452)
*DEXP
.642
15.406) _6.]_) ,
_) _)
*DNARR "DTURBO
-.129 -.170
(4.969) (3.924)
t,03:
*DYS
-.051
(6.585)
-.039
0.255)
/.,I(/))
*DTR
O)EstimatedbyOLS. _2 =.857 SE =.094 N= 222
(2)"Backward _-pwise method" is used for the choice of statistically significant variables. As a result, the _-gression
stalislics are a little improved comparing with the case in which all the dummy variables are introdo_ (see Table-12 in
Appendix 1). This implies that the model above capttm:s the nature of each variable more precL_ely than "full variables
model". Forexample, thetruenatureof DYS is thatitmakesaveragecostcurveslope downmoresteeply, withthe intercept
unchanged.
(3)t-statistics arein parentheses.
(4)Several routes are excluded fi'omthe data. Commuter routesare excluded due to thedifferentpr/cingsystem used for
theseroutes,The routesto and from Naritamust be omittedbemuse theseroutesare normany mgard_i as "intonational
routes".Allthepassengersofthcseroutescomeandgofi_xnabroadbywayofN_ta ahix__Finally,routesthatarenotin
service thr(mghout the year are not appropriate because the obse_rval_ons fi'cnn these routes don't state the aranud statistics.
(5)The data set used is composed of cross-sccticmal airfarc and distan_ data points for domes_ airline_'avelin Japan
during1995. The datasources are.Rkokuhyo, (timetablewithtar_ monthlypublished_" JapanTravelBureau),1995.10
and Koku Yuso Tolce_ Nempo (Data Summary for each a_r route, annually published),_ of Transport, 1996.
As expected, the parameter estimate for Ln(D) (i.e., "i ") is negative and the airfares of the
Okinawa-bound and the isolatedisland-boundroutes r_£ low_ J _ _0 _ m _e 0_ routes. In
addition, Shinkansen Express (represented by DEXP) plays an impocmnt role as a competitor with
the airlines, for it keeps the _'fares lower. In the routes where narrow-bMied and turbo prop
airfraR are operatec_the airfares per distance _fo_t_'routes" _ decrease more substantially than
:_ :_ _ ;" - ,_, "i:__- _-_.
thoseforotherroutesas the distance is longer. As forthe statistics,_2 isnotoverlylarge, even
though this model introduces all the variables that reflect the cost difference. This means that there
must exist other factors which affect the pricing practices of the industry. Each positive residual in
this estimated function may be regarded as the extra n_r_-up charged for the corresponding routes,
while each negative residual may be interpreted to represent an extra discount fi'om the average cost
levels.
betweenOkinawa islandsareobviouslysmallerthanthoseoperatingon "D_O routes".
In addition, another regression of Ln(P_/D, ) function is performed (hereai_er, Model 2).
To capture the relationship of density to cost, this model replaces various dummy variables in Model
1 with two continuous variables which also reflect airline costs. The econometric form oftlds model
follows:
Ln(P/D)=a+bLn(D)+cLn(q)+dLn(n)+ !-_
where "q" is the number of passengers and "n" is the number of departures per year. The data set
used to _e Model 2 is the _me as _ used to estimate Model i. The estimated resulm by
OLS for Model 2 are as follows,
Ln(P/D) = 5.745- .267 Ln(D) -. 106 Ln(q) + 0.094 Ln(n)
(41.117) (16.116) ($.731) (:].557)
_2 = 1796 SE =. 1i2 N = 222
Here we can observeevidenceof theeconomiesof densityfrom thenegafi_,eparameter
estimateforLn(q). As withtheregressionforModel I,the _2 isnotverylarge.Thislow _2
impliesthattherelikelyexistsome factorswhich driveairfaresaway from theaveragecostlevels.
(2) _e_ C_ssificafion of Dom_ficRouLes _
As is shown in section 2(1), the airfares per distance vary around the average cost. Thus
as long as airlines can control the airfares, they may choose to charge them as functions of the __ [
factors of the market st_cture of each route such as the vol_e of d_d (q), the price elastidty of
demand, load factor ( _ ), and distance (D) s.
This part of section 2 classifies 222 Japanese domestic routes into three groups. Each
group consists of the collection of similax routes in terms of q, _, and D as established by the Ward
method ofclusteranalysis9. ,
t From the vi_0int Of the tradit/onal _d_ organization theory, the number of competitors
affects the mark-up of the price. However, even though there are more _an two airlines, they
charged the same price under the regulatory regime prior to May 1996 (namely, at the time when the
data to be used in the following analysis was coflected), so this case doesn't consider this factor.
9 The information of the price elasticity of each route is hard to obtain, so this factor is excluded
fi'om this cluster analysis.
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Figured
summarizes the character of each cluster within the set of the three largest clusters.
shows the results for the cluster analysis (the tree of clusters), and Table-2
Figure-1 The result of cluster analysis
Route
No.1-222
12. 2t.
o. ft. 16.
The s_red sum of _e redduds
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Table-2 The Chara_er of each cluster
Average Number of
Passengers (* 1000)
1"clusm- (N=114)
2"_cluster (N=50)
34 duster (N=58)
99.1
(69.1)
1136.8
(1292.3)
148.0
Average Load Factor
(%)
56.6
(10.0)
60.5
(5.4)
63.2
Average Distance
(Km)
989.4
(414.3)
861.1
(296.7)
276.3
TouflNumber of
P_sscngcts
(*iooo)
11294.3
56839.2
8586.6
(167.2) (10.3) (95.6)
Note: Each cell shows the average value of each variable in 1995 and its standard deviation which is in parenthesis. The
data somu: is Kolm rusO Tokei Nempo), Mifftstzy of Tramqxa't, 1996.
Here it is worthwhile to explain why japan,s domestic routes may be classified into three
groups and why cluster analy-_is is an <................appropriate method for determining these groupings. As a
_'dQg point/it is instructive to review the _t_on of_e US _-line markets before deregulation in
1978. In the US, it was very easy to distinguish one route's character from the other mutes. For
example, long haul rouies were sure to have a large number of passengers (ustmlly, big routes),
while shorter-haul routes Were relatively- _ ..... -_ - ............. :' _ "- '_ ..... -- -==small. However, in Japan, there exist very complex
geographical features for many routes (e.g., high mountains around the center of each island or the
separation of origin and destination by water). As a result, it doesn't necessarily mean that short-
:. . . , ".
haul routes are small in passenger number. For example, although both Osaka-Miyazaki (567km)
and Osaka-Oka (455km) are relatively short haul routes 1°, the number of passengers in 1995 were
806,000 and 475,000 respectively. Since air transportationhas absolute _lvantage over railways in
terms of both time and monetary cost _, these routes do not necessarily compete with surface
(xansportation modes even though one might intuitively expect them to due to their short distances.
Figure-2 visually illustrates the lack of correlation between the distan_ and the number of
passengers in Japan's domestic airline rouxes.
. >
Figure-2 The rel_ionship between distance and the number of passengers
t
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kilometers (kin). Tae routes for Tokyo-Sapporo (897km and 7.63 million passengers), Tokyo-Fukuoka (1035km and 6.19
million passengers), Tokyo.Okinawa (1692km and 2.45 million passe_gers), and Tokyo-Kagoahima (li04km and 2.12
millio_ passengers)areexcluded fromthe fi_, . - ....
z
Ca_ner_ speaking, it is appropriate to _-gregate Japan's domestic airline _outcs into
groups: _I'ype A (short haul & small)', "_rype B (medium or long haul & big), _nd _I'ype C
(m_or iong _ _&_lj£ _ _e'cl_Q _s in'Figu_l above derives very _ar results
_oOsaka isinHonshu Islandand bothMiyazakiand OitaarcinKyushu Island.
z_For example.,ifthepassengersmoving from thecitycenterofOsaka tothatof_ use
tnmsportatiofi _ad -of-c-h_o-s_ngthe combination ofrailv,_y express services, they c_saye not,
only 3_O'_utcs but_] :3USdo liars'(_g _ 1:$f_S=-IOOY en),_en thoughwe
consider the access-time to both of the airports. In this caseair transportationhas the absolute
[;
to the visual analysis in Figure-2. To illustrate this correspondence, Table-2 provides summap/
statistics for the three clusters. This ;ab__[¢demonstrates that Type A corresponds closely to the 3 _
cluster, Type B to the 2_a cluster, and Type C to the I t cluster.
In the analysis that follows, the data will be analyzed as classified by the set of these three
l_rgest clusters. This level of aggregation has also been chosen to kccp as many observations in each
cluster as possible while still enabling appropriate witl_ cluster comparisons.
.... As are repeated, the routes in the first cl_ may be described as long haul, but thin in
density and therefore not lucrativel These routes are characterized as "local to local" markets end
note that many vacation routes wkich, for example, serve Okinawa, are included. Thus the price
elasticity of this cluster is expected to be relatively larger than the price elasticity of the other
clusters.
The second cluster contains long haul and by far the densest routes of all, despke the fact
that the market size of each route varies widely. This cluster contains many business routes (e.g.,
Tokyo-Osaka and Tokyo-Fukuoka). Thus the price elasticity is expected to be relatively small on
balance.
Finally, the third cluster contains thin, short haul, and relatively lucrative routes. Although
many of the routes in this cluster are characterized as "short haul", many of them do not necessarily
face competition with surface transportation modes due to the geographical complexities which were
discussed above. Thus the price elasticity is expected to be small due to the lack of substitute
transportation. .......... :_:== _
3 The Effect of the Revision of Current Airfarm: Empirical Analysis
(1) The Procedure ....
Using the cross-sectional dam introd_ in _on 2(1), the latter half of this section
estimates the demand:function of each cluster, and then derives the approximate changes of
consumer's surplus ffthe art of charging domestic airfares is revised.
In advance of the empirical analysis, this part of the paper explains how the results of the
preliminary analyses of the last section are _ated _th the empirical analyses. The factors
advantage over railway service.
necessary here are:
(a) the demand elasticity of cash cluster (the actual parameters are tO be estimated in section 3(2)
with results in Appendix 3),
(b) the residuals obtained from estimating the Ln(P_/D i) function,
(e) the data of passengers and airfares.
It is convenient to complementarily use the designated definitions outlined below in Table-
3 to simplify the explanation of the procedure in the subsequent analyses.
j_
• p
Table-3 The designated marks used in the procedure of the anatysis
(A) the name (C) the sum of the (D)the total
of the group residuals obtained number of
(cluster) from Ln(_ /D, ) passengers
function
ca SRo(>o) q.
03) the price
elasticityofdemand
(absolute value)
fl s/_ SRp(<O) q,
e. >c a q. >q#
9
SR,, + SRp = 0
For example, suppose that there are two groups (clusters) of routes, or and ./7 (_ column
(A)), ana_th_:_e _i_ute va]u_co_e __ted'demand elasticity of the routes in cluster a and fl
are ¢,_ and np respectively (column (13)). Also suppose that the sum of the residuals from the
ro.t bclo,, g tocl er a, SR.. is positive(thism '/h t' e es of theroutesin
cluster or are set relatively higher than the distance-proportional levels), while SRp is negative (See
column (C)). Assume that the total number of passengers for each cluster are termedq,, and q,s,
respectively (row 03)). The conditions shown inrow (E)effectively require that the price elasticity
of demand of or be larger than that of fl, that total number of passengers carried of cluster or be
larger than those of p, and that the sum of _e residuals be zero. If these conditions are satisfied,
then the potential gain in the consumer's surplus resulting from a one percent airfare reduction in
cluster or is expected to su_ass the loss of consumer's surplus that would occur in ,8 as a result of
a one percent airfare rise in that cluster.
Using the three different estimates for demand elasticity (one for each cluster stated in the
last section) and the data of q j and Pz, the next part of this paper predicts how much the
consumer's surplus of each route would change by the revision of airfares to the distance-
proportionalevels.Additionally,an estimateforhow much _e totalamount ofconsumer'ssurplus
of Japanese dome_c air markets would change is derived by summing the amount of change in
consumer's surplus for each route. As an intermediate step, it is necess_y to define the levels at
which the aid'ares should be set and by what percentage they should be changed. This paper
assumes the case in which the current airfares are matched with the levels of the est/ma_ curve of
Ln(Pj/Dt) in'section 2(1), namely, the es'dmated average cost levels. The method of calculating
itsratioisasfollows:
CR t = lzi
LnCP, ID,)
where CP_ is the required ratio of change for the sirfar_ of route i, and/.t, is the residual of route
i in the Ln(P,/Dj ) function TM. The method of charging airfares assumed here still guarantees that
the _fines can earn profits greater than or equal to zero in the domestic operation, and may give the
passengers the feelings of equality of pricing.
The demand function to be estimated in the following part is one of the three simultaneous
equa_ons. The others two shnultaneous equations are the load factor and the fleet size fimction,
respectively.
(2) The Simultaneous Equation Model and their Empirical Results
!
l
l
I
|
i
|
|
I
In this sect/on, a simultaneous equation model will be constructed ,rod then empirical
analysis will be used to parameterize the model. Tae models to be conslnmted heae explain the
carriers' behavior under the condition where both airfares and _equency are regulated in the short
run. Takingthisregulatoryregimeintoconsideration,this.P_ choosesthepassengerscarried(q),
theloadfactor(_), and the fleetsize(S)astheendogenousvariablesinthesimultaneousequation
model. The hat on top denotestheseendogenous variables.Thus the mode! consistsof three
equations,and theprocessofderivingthetheoreticalmo_[ _ shown inAppendix 2. ........
The econometric model is as follows. Since the aiffares werenot _ very often and
were set according to the same accounting formulae _throughout all the routes _g the Old
12 For example, CR of Tokyo-Osaka ('Itaml) is about .017, so in this case, it is predicted how the
1.7%'s discount of the fare will increase the consumer surplus of this route.
Regime, they are naturally assumed to be exogenous. The bar on the variable P is intended to
denote that airfares are fixed. This means that aLl the equations are over-identified, but meet both
order and rank condition. The variables and their explanations are shown in Table-4.
(1) Demand function
Ln( _ , ) = a, + b, Ln_ _--- l + c, Ln( INC, ) + d, Ln( P OP_ ) + eaLn( n, ) + Au,(_, )
kl.,,)
(bl<0, c t>0, di>0, et>0, ft>0)
(2) Fleet size function
Ln(S,) = a2+ b2L_-_ 1 +¢2Ln(n,)+d2Ln(_,) {or Ln(q,)}"" .... -
(b2>0, c_<0, d_ > O)
(3) Load factor function
LnC¢,)=a 3+b3Ln +c3Ln(Hl,)+d3Ln(n,)+e 3 Ln(S,)
(b 3<0, c s>0, d 3>0, e 3>0)
(Note: 1 't cluster (i = 1,.--,114), 2*dcluster (i = 1, .--,50), and 3'a cluster(/= 1,-.-,58) )
Table-4 The
Name I S,_.eq, (a)
D, (a)
POP, (c)
/NC, (¢)
)lanationofthevariablesinlroduc_inthe simultaneousequation
De.rio.
The num_ of round-tripgmssengene_ried in route i
Normalroundtrip_'fnteofroutei
Stagelmgth ofrotaei
Tte square root oftheprodm'tofthegrmter-areapopulationfeachoriginmd destination e/ty
s_ved_.'routei
The squ_ rootof theproductof'the disposable per-cap_ incomeof _ originanddestinationcity
s=ved _.'rotae i
Thenumber of themud departuresin route i
The avu-_ numberof seats fortheaircraft_ramt in route J
_ (a) The averse round-trip load fsc_r of roum i
/-//j (a) TheHerfindlmlind_ of cachroute i
Note: Thedata sauces am:(a) Koku FuaoTokeiNempo, b/fufis_ of Transport,1996 (b) ./#ko/nahyo,JapanTravelBureau
March 1996, (¢) Chi#a Ketzai Soran (tl_ datasummmyfor urbanandregionalstatistics),ToyoKeizaiShimposha,1996.
/
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In the demand function, n and S represent the service quality variables. The more the
flight fxequency increases for a given route, the more opportunity the passengers will have to choose
the flight times that they prefer. This will cause the frequency delay to decrease 13. In addition, S is
expected to play the same role as n in the demand function for the same reason.
The fleet size function explains the carriers' behavior of organizing their fleet in order to
optimize the efficiency. Here, P/D, n, and q are expected to affect a carrier's choice of which
aircraft to operate in a given mute. The load factor, according to Douglas md Miller (1974) 14,
shows how the quality competition affects the demand and supply balance. The parameters for the
load factor and fleet size functions were also estimated and their results are shown in Table-14 and
Table- 15 respectively, in Appendix 4.
Part I
4 A Welfare Analysis of Japan's Domestic Airline Markets
The summary of the price elastidty of demand of each cluster as well as the sum of the
residuals of Ln(Pt/D_) function is shown in Table-5. The two stage least squares (2SLS)
regression results of each demand function are shown in Table-13 in the Appendix 3.
Table-5 The price elasticity of each cluster
The,,sure'of the residuals of._.h dust_ _Modd 1)
Price Elasticity of demaad( £j )
1j cluster :2" duster 3_ ¢lm',er
.1546 -.2183 .0637
,,L
-.8017 -.5409 -.5727
Similar to the case of the US airline industry prior to deregulation, the airfares of longer
haul routes in Japan (i.e., the routes in the !_.clgst_) have been set higher than airfares for shorter
haul routes. This is shown in the analysis by the fact that the _ of _e residuals of the I" cluster is
substantially positive. In addition, since many popular tourist routes are included in the 1'z cluster,
the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand of this cluster is relatively larger than those of .......
the other clusters. As a result, the consumer's surplus is expected, on average, to be substantially
, _:" ' G _
_:3See Douglas and Miller (1974,,), pp.82-83, (1974b), pp.658-659, and P_r (19"/9), pp.92-95.
amelioratedby changingthecurrentaiffareof the1* cluster to the levels of estimat_aver_age cost
of each route.
On the other hand, the sum of the residuals of the 2 _ cluster is negative. The mutes in this
cluster are much larger than the routes in the others clusters, on average. Thus, the revision of
airfares might lead to a substantial reduction of consumer's surplus for this cluster, even though the
price elasticity for this cluster is the smallest of all 15. However, twenty one of the fifty routes in the
2 "a cluster have positive residuals, and many of them are large routes such as Tokyo-Sapporo or
Tokyo-Fukuoka, it is not necessarily determined whether or not the-revision ofairfares_0uldt'educe
the consumer's surplus of this cluster. These results reveal the opacity and inconsistency of the
charging system of aiffares under the current regulatory regime. For some routes, the observed
airfares are often set higher or lower than would be predicted by the models presented in this paper.
This occurs despite the fact that the price elasticity of demand is the same for all routes within the
cluster and the number of passengers, distance, and the load factor don't differ significantly within
the cluster.
The price elasticity of demand for the routes in the 3 _ cluster is as small as that of the 2_
cluster, and the sum of residuals in the 3'd cluster is barely positive. This means that the tension of
airfares in this cluster may not have much influence on the change in the consumer's surplus.
The change in the consumer's surplus for each route (CCSj) may be derived using
MarshaUian manner of calculation:
ccs, =CR, 1- CR,
Then the total change of consumer's surplus ( TCCS ) may be desen'bed as:
222
TCCS = _ CCSI
f°i
Table-6 lists the top twenty routes ordered by CCS, where the CCS t would increase as a
result of a revision of airfares to their predicted levels.
C
_' Douglas and-_r (1974a), pp.50-54, and (1974b), pp.660-663.
15 Many large business routes (e.g., Tokyo-Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka, Tokyo-Fukuoka, etc.) are
included in the 2 _ cluster. This fact may cause the smaller price dasticiv of demand for this
cluster.
V=_E-
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The most interesting feature of Table-6 is that seventeen of the twenty routes belong to the
2 "_ cluster. This means that each airline exploits the consumer's surplus of long haul end dense
tomes, deriving its highest margin from these mutes. In addition, Table-7 shows the change in
consumer's surplus in each cluster and TCCS. _ ........
. "2 .... • "
Table-6 The list of top 20 routes for which the CC__ would increase as a result of a revision in
airfares
, . ., .,
tripeirfare dmge CCS, (_SnOOO)
(sus, ]995) (_s)
IFi._'UOKATOKYO
"toKYo Ix-_os_m_
TOKYO
ITOk'YO
FtY_UOKA
ITAMI
s_poRo
lVfiYAZAKI
458.0 -3.76 (-3.53)
390.6 -5.70 (-3.94)
265.0 -4.43 .(_.88)
431.0
227.6
5i5.6
TOKYO TOK_SHI2VL_
NAGOYA SAPPORO
TOKYO AOMORI 3{7.0
TOKYO OKAYAMA 382.4 -13.35 (-5.45)
TOKYO TAKAMATSU 384.2 -4.8'7 (-7,.!2)
- 380.6
"384.2
-5.55 (-6.40);
-9.53 (-8.53)
528.2 -7.35 (-1 L32)i
526.01
573.0
227.6
TOKYO MISAWA
TOKYO KUSHIR0
IT/uM] ' SENDAl
KANSAI OKINAWA
ITAMI SAPPORO
KAGOSHIMA FUKUOKA
TOKYO ITOTTOIU
rFUKUOKA 'SAPPORO
-5.15 (-6.58)
-4.05 (+0.47)
388.8 -10.58 (-9.62)
721.0 -5147 (-18.18)
23287.67 (2i848149)1
9787.84 (6752.751
9446.ol (t876.53)
7531.36 (47108.58)
7302.31 (3249.92)
7022.30 (11423.64) _
6321.99 (7472.00)
5199.41 (2112.43)
4746.22 (6955.79)
3846.66 (4441.21)
3586.74 (3_205.33)
3538.84 (5461.71)
3527.98.. (4506.71)
333,5.43 (-384.40) ,
3113.12 (4089.58)
3080.83 (3940.68) i
2897.72 (2632.44)i
243257 (8126.84)4
i
I
2
I
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
J •
2
2
2
3
I
2
TOKYO _,, ASAHIKAWA 522.0 -327 (-8.00) 2367.83 (5805.82)1 2
TOKYO OBIHIRO 510.2 --5.19 (-9:!4) . 20_'5_'70 (3627.03)t 21
Note:
(I) In orde_ to a._ist both the Japane_ and othe_ reade_ in mder_mdin8 these fi_ _ _, _ _ _
values lmve been presented in US dollars assuming that l US dollar is equivalent to 100 Yen.
(2) The values are cad_xtlatedby using the estimated results of Model 1. (The value_ in parentheses are derived fi'om
Model 2).
Table-7 The change in conmtmers surplus in each cluster end TCCS (US dolla_ *1000)
j I  'ccs .... I
3324.49 [ 4606.14 -976.841 6953.79 I
Note: 1USdoIlar- 1_ Yen. "I_sevnlmmsrecalculatedbyminStimestim_dn_tofMo_l - ,L :.
In general, ff the airfares are revised to the levels predicted by Model 1, the consumer's
surplus of the 3 '_ clustermay decrease, but this decrease may be offset by the increase of the
consumer's surpluses of the 1" and 2 _ cluster. On balance, the TCCS is expected to increase by
more than6.95millionUS dollars.Iftheairfaresarerevisedtothelevelspredictedby Model 2,the
TCCSmay increase by about 150 million US dollars, on balance !_.
However, it appears as though the new regulatory policy, initiated in May 1996, governing
fare-c.harging practices of the domestic airlines has not necessarily improved the shortfall in
consumer's surplus. For instance, airfares for routes in the 2_ cluster type were primarily increased
except for the local mutes that serve the points in Hokkaido and Okinawa where airfares were
lowered. Although each airline was permitted, by new regulation, to discount airfares by a
maximum of 25% off the prevailing airfareg the airlines were actu_y raised in those routes where
the residual in Ln(P_/D t ) function is positive 17. This policy change may have reduced consumer's
surplus for those consnners who typically paid the normal airfares prior to regulatory change. This
contrasts with the consumer's impression that the surplus would universally improve foLlowing the
regulatory changes of 1996 Is.
E
w
16As the statistics for the regression ofModel 2 is less fitted than that of Model 1, it is natural that
the change in consumer's surplus derived from Model 2 be greater than that which is derived from
Model 1.
17Speaking of the trunk mutes except for those which serve Narita, six of thirteen routes (Tokyo-
Sapporo, Tokyo-Osaka (Itami and Kansai), Tokyo-Fukuoka, and Osaka-Fukuoka) experienced a rise
in fares of 5.56%, while the other routes (Tokyo-Okinawa, Osaka-Sapporo, Osaka-Okinawa,
Fukuoka-Sapporo, Fukuoka-Okinawa) benefited from the revision of air fares (the reduction ratio is
2.55%). Generally speaking, the long distance routes that serve Okinawa and Hokkaido (except for
Sapporo) experienced a reduction in airfares. However, it is apparent that the revision in airfares has
been orchestrated primarily to benefit the airlines, not the consumer. This is evidenced by the fact
the change in regulation was followed by an increase in the fares for "already lucrative" routes. For
example, the correlation coefficient between the residuals in Ln(P_/D t ) function and the rising
percentage of the fares after the policy change in 1996 is r = .3615 (t--6.710, N--222)_ _ implies
that the airline can generate greater profits under the new regime.
z8 However, since discount ticket fares for advanced purchase and frequent flyer programs have
become more and more readily available compared with the era prior to 1996, the well-informed
consumers have increasingly come to capitalize on the opportunity to benefit from the purchase of
discounted tickets. In order to more precisely analyze the issue of the change in consumer's surplus
5 Concluding Remarks for Part 1
J
The analyses of this paper reveal the character of the charging system of Japanese
domestic airfares and assess the effect of the revision of the cmz_t airfares on the consumer's
surplus.
Under the past and the current regulatory regime, the charging system used by carriers to
set airfares has not been clear, particularly for airfares set in dense long haul mutes. As well, it is
not obvious why kigher airfares were observed in many thin long haul routes. Speaking of dense
long haul routes, it doesn't follow that changing the airfares to the d/stance-proportional levels
would diminish the consumer's surplus in the 1_ cluster because the sum of the residuals is positive.
The airfares of such outstandingly large routes as Tokyo-Sapporo, Tokyo-Fulmoka, and Tokyo-
Osaka, the three biggest mutes in Japan, are charged higher than the average. Airfare reduction for
these routesmightsignificantlyincrease theconsumer'ssurplusforthis 1_ cluster.
As theah'faresof thinlong haulroutesarealso higher and the priceelasticity of demandis
relatively larger in these routes, the airfare reduction in these routes might lead to the amelioration of
consumer's surplus. On the other hand, the airfares of shorter haul routes are set lower on average,
so the change of airfares to the d/stance-proportional levels would reduce the consumer's surplus for
these types of routes. However, bo_ the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand and the
number of passengers travelling these rout_ are So small that the reduction in consumer's surplus is
expected to be very subtle. In total, the potential increase in consumer's surplus is large. The
consumer surplus increase in dense routes would offset the wdfare loss that might arise in shorter
and thin routes. This empirical analyses suggest that the total gain in consmner surplus would be
more than 6.95 million US dollars (for Model 1) or 150 million US dollars (for Model 2) per year.
Judging by the empirical results, the domestic airfare regulatory policy managed by the
Japanese Ministry of Transport prior to 1996 has _ favorable for the industry in that it guaranteed
the airlinespositive profits. However, this reg_l__og/redo _ nOtnecessarilybeen optimalfor
consumers in that there likely existed opportu_'ti_ f___ improvement in the consumer's surplus.
To make the matter worse, the consumer's st_vlus may have decreased all the more under the
re'vised regime in 1996, because many of the ng_±_ of long haul dense routes were raised
following the aforementioned policy change, k is a necessary to give proper consideration to the
andairlineshavesoughtto exploit more profits from long and dense mutes. As stated in section 1,
the most significant change in this minor policy revision was that Minismy of Transport allowed
each airline to freely choose to set the airfares within a 25% range below maximum airfares.
Regrettably, this has not had any meaningful impact because the airlines (especially JAL and ANA)
have succeeded in rai_g the airfares in an "across the board" way in those routes where the
competition is supposed to take place, namely, in double and triple track routes '9. Indeed, this
negative welfare effect on consmner's surplus may have to be discounted to some extent, because
the availability of discount tickets has been expanded. Examples-ofthefi: _inclucie_the_advanced
purchase (maximum 35-36% off in 1996 and 50% off in 1998)" ticket that has the restrictions
simi]ar to those on US discount tickets :° and the "domestic frequent flyer program" that has the
meaning equivalent to the discount ticket. The problem regulatory regime might be less significant
than this paper predicts as long as consumers find these discount tickets readily accessible. More
specificatly, this would require that the Japanese experience mirror, to some extmt, the case of the
deregulation in the US. In this US case, an increasing number of passengers came to purchase
varieties of discount tickets, although the inflation-adjusted normal aiffare levels increased more
than the pre-deregulation levels. However, the availability of discount tickets in Japan is sti11 limited
in that the discounts, in percentages, are much smaller than those for the comparable airfares in the
US 2t. There still remains substantial room for the Japanese goverament to imp/ove the consumer's
benefit without worsening, and possibly even improving, the status quo of the aMines.
Part2
ratio of discount ticket using passengers to total passengers.
19However, it is interesting that the JAg has_o_,6s.Car_ followed the pricing strategy of JAL or
ANA. For example, JAS set the fare of Tokyo-Sapporo at 24050 yen, which is cheaper than those
r _ •
of JAL and ANA by 200 yen. The reason why JAS did so is _ it has tO compensate for the
disadvantage of departure time and the number of frequency. Although the difference of fare may
be too small to attract consumers, this behavior is expected to promote the competition among
airlines.
2o See Yamanchi and Ito, op.cit., p.41.
21 See Morrison and Winston (1995), pp.l 1-19.
_._ _-_
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This section focuses on the analysis of the rest two equation developed in Section 3. As is
shown in section 3(2), the "behavior of choosing optimal airplane size (that is, supply behavior) is
= =. .
explained by distaace-controU_ price, flight frequcacy, and market demand. In addition, load
factor is determined by distance-controlled price, fleet size, flight frequency, and market
concentration. To help the reade_ understand this complex system more easily, this section uses the
foUo,,  for eanaly sin
2
Figure-3 The Mechanism of Japan's Domestic Airline Markets
_' P/D "1
In this diagram, the variables in ovals stan d for_ _dog_aous variables while those in
rectangles are exogenous variables. In the fleet size function, the effect of flight frequ_a_ (n) on
tim size (S) and the effect of dlstaace-contrgOed price (P/D) on flight frequency can be
decomposed into two flows. As for the rdationship_ fleet size and flight frequency, these
two flows can be explained as follows:
(1) The increase of flight fi_luency will cause the increase of the numberof passengers (q) because
theincr_ of flightfrequencyimpliestheimprovem_mt of_ce quality.Itisnaturalthatfleet
size ¢xpan& as the number of passengers ,increases. _ flow is the indirect effect of flight
frequency on fleet size. , _ ...... :. : : - .....
(2) Airlines always my to reduce the number of empty _eets .. As flight frequency increases, the
number of empty seats could also increase. In this case, airline likely adjust the fleet size to
preveat the total number of seats from being excess_ Taisprocess is regarded as the direct effect
of flight frequency on fleet size. -_= _
In addition, the two flows from distance-controlled aiffa_e to fleet size are explained as
c-O
of flight frequency on fleet size.
In addition, the two flows from distance-controlled airfare to fleet size are explained as
follows: +
(1) One flow starts with distance-controlled airfare, passes the number of passengers, and reaches
fleet size. Of course, the effect of airfare on the number of passengers is negative. In addition,
airlines likely expands the fleet size as the number of passengers increase. Comb_g these two
effects, distance-controlled airfare may have indirect negative effect on fleet size.
(2) Another flow is the normal relationship between output and airfare in supply f_onl This flow
is the direct effect of airfare on fleet size.
Distance-controlled airfare and frequency have also indirect and direct effects on load factor. Load
factor is one of the indices that represents the airline's performance. In order to improve the
performance, airlines may lower the distance-controlled airfare in such a specific situation as the
load factor always remains low_ This behavior may be more likely performed in more liberalized
markets taking a form oi_ for example, yield management. If we call this behavior the direct effect
of airfare on load factor, we can find another flow that has indirect effect on load factor. This
indirect effect comes via the effect of distance-controlled airfare on fleet size. The expansion of
fleet size can have the meaning of the improvement of service quality. Therefore, the relationship
between fleet size and load factor can be positive. Since the total effect of distan_ntrolled
airfare on fleet size is cannot be specified a priori, the effect of distance-controlled airfare on load
favorisalsothe pinc 
Similar to the effect of distance-controlled airfare on i0ad factor, the effect of fli_f ....
frequency is also decomposed into three flows. One is the direct effect, another indirectly comes via " .......
fleet size, and the other also indirectly comes via the number of passenger and fleet size. Like the "
expansion of fleet size, the increase of flight frequency implies the upgrade of service, so the direct
effect of flight frequency on load factor _ be positive. On the other hand, two indirect flows
from flight frequency to load factor contains 13oth positive and negative effects, the total effect of
flight frequency can only be revealed through empirical analysis.
The supply behavior is expected to _+ Among large and small markets because wide-
bodied akcrafl is not compatibly used in small markets. For example, B747 type airplane serves
only in those large markets which has more than one million passengers per year. Therefore, the
empirical analyses in this section are performed for each cluster defined in Section 2(2).
iThis section only shows the diagrams of Japan's domestic market systems. Statistically
insignificant effects are all omitted from the diagrams. The empirical statistics are shown in
Appendix4.
Figure-4 The Market Mechanism of Cluster I
Figure-5 The Market Mechanism of Cluster 2
O"659,1 _ Ii136_ "_"- _ _
The total effects of flight 1_equency on fl_eetsize is shown in Table-8.
Tabl_.8 The total ©ffects of flight frequency on fleet _
Indir_ eff_ . Vi_. effect
I" cluster -1.1471.041'1_145"1.1,91
1.136'1.045"1.187 -1.129
., 3_ cluster .., !.140"1.126"1284 -1.245 .
Tot_ e_
0.045
0.058
0.039
All the sisns of coe_cients ate the same as the model expects, and as a result the total
effects of flight frequency on fleet size is weakly positive. This result implies that the indirect effect
(flight frequency T ---,the number of passengers T --*fleet size T ) is monger than the direct effect.
The effects of distance-controlled airfare on fleet size are summarized in Table.& In the
large and medium markets, the normal relationship between airfare and output for supply function is
not recognized. Eventually, the total effects are all negative, despite the fact tha_the elasticity varies
among the route types.
Figure-6 The Market Mechanism of Cluster 3
----V- ' /\
0.079 _r _ 0.2_/ "N_.216
Per-capita INC
Table-9 The total effects of dlstance-controlled airfare on fl_
Im cluster -.801"1.145_-.917 _ Not sigxdficant_.
cl - 'r , ..541,L045--.565
3_ cluster " -._73' I. 1,26-=-.645., ..2.19
-.917
-.565
-.426
The total effects of flight frequency on load factor are shown in Table-10.
Table-10 The totaleffects of flight frequency on loadfactor
l'ch_ 1.041". I. 145"(-. 140)ffi-. 167
' 1.[3@1.045._0.os1:..096
3_ cluster NotSignificamt
_ect (2)
-[.147'(-. 140_=.161
-1.129'.081ffi-..091
•Not dgnifi_ .126 .I26
In this case, there are two flows for indirect effects. One comes from flight frequency via
the numb.er of passengers and fleet size, and the other comes from only via flight frequency.
:i:L
However, these two indirect effects offset each other for large and medium markets, and neither of
the indirect effects are significant for small markets. As a result, only direct effects of flight
frequency work on load factor, and the sign of coefficients are the same as the model anticipates.
This results imply that there exists the possibility that ah'lines have good incentives to request the
governments to increase the number of their own departure especially for small markets, and this
also implies that the capacity could be excessive.
Finally, tl_ total effects of distance-controlled airfares on load factor are shown in Table.
II.
Table- I 1 The total effects of distance-conerolled airfares on load factor
m_ctcu_O)
1%mst_- -.8oI: .14_*(-.24o_-J:?,
2" cm.¢_ .._],i._5.*o.o81-,-.o46
3_ ©lus_ :;otsignificant
_,_.t.dr_ (2) i _ca'e_
Notsiip_m_t, i ..m
Not significant ! Not si_nificant
Not significant [ -.216
Total eft.cot
,, -.009
-.046
-.216
In this case the indirect effects are also divided into two flows, but one of them (the flow
from airfare to load factor via fleet size) is insignificant for all the clusters. For cluster 1, both
indirect and direct effects works on load factor, but these two effects offset each other, and as a
result the total effect becomes very close to zero. This fact may imply that airlines have at least the
incentive to improve the load factor by lowering airfar_ for long haul and thin markets, but they
may feel that this effort is not worthwhile bexau.se it is offse: by the indirect effect. As a result,
airlines may abandon the incentive to lower the _ for this kind of markets when the domestic
markets are deregulated in future. . ........... _-
For cluster 2, only an indirect effect wo__._ load fi_tor. This fact may imply that
ah.lines will not improve the load factor at least by adjusting the airfares for large markets. On the
other hand, airline may have incentives to improve the load faaur by lowering airlines for short haul
markets.
Here is the evidence that _pport the facts found in the estimated load factor function
After the m/nor regulatory change in 1996, airlines have been allowed to set the aid'ares 25% off the
full fares. However, airl/nes raised the airfares by 117.38 yen on average for the routes that belong
to the cluster 1. The a/flares of other routes were also raised, but much smaller increases were
observed for the rest two clusters on average.
7 Concluding Remarks for Part 2
In summary, the estimated results for the fleet size function and the load factor suggest the
following implications for more liberalized domestic airline markets.
(3)
(4)
Only in the short haul markets the decrease of airfares (controlled by distance) tends to cause a
higher load factor. This result implies that there are incentives for airlines to do yield
management by lowering the airfares, once airfares are deregulated. On the other hand, in the
groups of long haul routes, airlines don't have this kind of incentive. This is supported by the
fact that there were very few cases of discounting airfares especially in long haul and thin
markets following the minor regulatory revision in June 1996 .............
Flight _Uency, together with Herfindahl index, has the positive effect on load--fa_0r. This is
s_filar to the US case prior to deregulation (SeeDo_-_as & _ Cl_4b)ii_-_piics :i _
there exists the possibilitythat airlines will requestthe governments to excessively increase the
number of their own departure especially for small markets as the capacity of domestic markets
is enlarged or the domestic markets are more deregulated.
Appendix 1
Table-12 The regression results of Modal 1 (full variable model'
Intercept
Pant- 5.374
meter , _40.585_
Para- -.194
meter (6.884)
ca_^w^ DISLIsrD
(.017) (.774)
I
L_v_- /.n(D)
_^w^ *DISLAND
-.021 .008
(.237) (.283)
Note: Estimated by OLS. _2 = .855
DEXP DNARR
.23] .585-
 .399)  3.uo)
zn_) za(o)
*DEX_ *DNARR
.033 -.I15
(.259) (3.537)
1.007
 4.?19
_na_j
-.163
(3.088)
DYS
"'-.097
_.451
*DY$
.074
(1.395)
DTR
-.212
, (4s51
Zn(D)
*DTR
.036
(.405)_
SE = .095 N = 222
Appendix 2
This paper assumes that the number of passengers, fleet size, and load factor are
determined by the profit-maximizing behavior of the airlines. The definitions for all the variables
are shown in Table-3,
The profit function is writtexl as follows.
i .
I
I
.=, =._ ,_,=P,-q,.c@,S:_,)=T,q,-q'
where c is a constant and represents the cost per unit distance. An airline's cost is supposed to reflect
the losses which arise _om carrying empty seats. The load factor _ is a function of q_. This is
_>0.
derived by the manipulation of the common definition q: = q_jnjS_. Thus, &]t
The first order condition with regard to q_ yields
-L_Xq,)F-t,¢,_q,)F
Dividing all the terms by n, yields
cD, cq,D,
t
n, n#,(q,) n,¢=,(q,)
- (= cDiSi qlP cD, i. = 0 "."St =n, n#,(q,) ¢,(q,)
Manipulating this yields
and
- _O-T,_,(,.q,)s,-_, oz,,
= _,=_O-.,s,)
O)
Hcr¢
_o_ (2)itisobdo._thato__#_<1_thn,.s,--o .and_',/D,>o.
Then this condition can be applied to _e marginal cost(MC) function.
written as
c should be equal to zero or negative around the neighborhood of zero, because in
MC fimctionis
arc,_Mc
%-7- '=_,t _,)
and since Dj qj> O, and _ > O, the condition that c is negative around the neighborhood of zero
impliesWeakly decreasingreturntoscale.When c-_,obviouslyMC=0.
Adding a Marshalliandemand functionto equations(I) and (2)yieldsthe following
s/mttltancousequationsystemthatconsistsofthreequations.
(a)Demand function q, = q (-) , (+)INC,. (+)POP_, (+)v,
where vj d_notcs the sin-vice vector.
(b)Fi_sizefunctionS, = (+) ,(-)n,,(+)_,
The signofeachparameterisderivedby assumingthatc < O.
OS, OS, <0, OS, >0
Sincethefleet_ functionisregardedasan alternativeform of thcsupplyfunction,thesign
of _/D, is positive.
(c) Load factor function
,(q,)=_(-)_,(+)HI,,(+)n z, (+)S,(q,)]
Here we assume that#_ isan indirectfunctionof q_. HI a istheconcentrationratio,a
variableof market muctme, which affectsthe airline'sperformance accordingto the traditional
theoryof industrialorganization.The signof thisvariableisassumed tobe positive,followingthe
empiricalresultsof Douglas & Miller(1974b). The signsof theothervariablesarederivedunder
theconditionthatc < 0.
.,, >:--. ,-.,,, O, O_, >0) a,,, aS,(q,)
c'
ii =<--
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Appendix 3
Table-13 The regression results of the demand function
IntercePt
ILnI'PIDJ
I
Ln(POP)
o,(Lvc)
Ln(n)
Ln(S)
SE
N
Note: Es_mated b
1a cluster
5.7907
(14.1510)
-.8017
(,22.4513=)
.1855
_ (20.3.286)
-1.0388
(23.3854)
1.0408
(280.2741)
.2578
(8.8966)
.9991
.o2oo
114
2_dcluster
-3,8521
.(86.8399)
-.5409
(110.3277)
.0612
(48.0536)
.6586
(75.1975)
1.1360
(1266.0292)
.4520
(140.88.09)
1.000
3_ clusier
2.1142
(2.4057)
-.5727
(8.0_..928)
.0790
i" (5-6!,46)
-.7204
(6.3031)
1.1396
(114.0907)
.5516
(9.2450)
.9981
.0026
50 58
f 2SLS, and t-statistics are in parenthesis.
.0462
Since air transportation service is unlikely to be the inferior good, itisnecessary to explain
why the parameters of Ln(INC) of the first and the third cluster are negative. The reasons are:
(1) in the first cluster, the airline has absolute advantage +ov_ any other stwface transportation mode:
the average distance of the _ fluster is so long that the surface transportation modes are more
costly than air transportation in terms of money and time. Therefore, passengers inevitably
choose the air Wansporta_on even though their per-capita income levels are relatively lower.
(2) the third cluster includes the routes between isolat___ _ds, and the rouIes which cross over
mountainous area (if passengers use surface wansPo_0n modes, the time cost and sometimes
even the monetary cost may be higher than the_ cost for using the air Wansportafion). Thus
passengers inevitably use air transportation, despite the fact that the average per-capka income
levels of this cluster are relatively lower ...............
In summary, passengers have few alternative __on modes for airlines and thus this
prevents passengers from shifting to another transportafionmode. Additionally, the fares for surface
transportation modes are also regulated and sometimes set so high, or the service for these
alternative transportation modes are so inconvenient (that is, very infrequent or too time consuming),
that passengers don't feel these surface transportation alternatives are worth shifting to the airlines.
These seem to cause the estimated results for the parameters of per capita income, i.e., passengers
choose airlines regardless of their par-capita income.
Appendix 4
Table-14 The regression results of the fleet size function
1"cluster 2 c.! er
Intercept
, , , ,,, r
L,,(,D
SE
N
4.7612
(19.8331)
.0636
(1.o51s)
-i.1476
(28.2189)
1.1454
(_31.3053) ....
.9618
.0594
114
5.2155
(8:5066)
.0292
.(.2034)
-1.1291
(12.7402)
.0355
,, (15.2552)
.9091
.0781
5O
Note: Estimated by 2SLS, and t-statisticsare in parenthesis.
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Table-15 The regression results of the load factor function
" 1" cl_ter 2'_cluster
3 '_buster
4.3733
(13.7324)
.2186
(2..8536)
-1.2452
(22.9755)
1.1261
,,,(25.s529)
.9723
0.713
58
3 'dcluster
Intercept 4.2372
(44.8839)
I,n_/D, ) -.1366
(12.8530)
Ln(HI,) .3032
(33.4070)
Ln(n,) .0333
(17.38.55)
"Ln_, ) -.1400
(24.0583.)
_= .9663
,,i | ,
3.4607
(13.5!76)
-.0392
(1.0693).
.1421
00.8523)
.0644
(8.9.170)
.0807
(4.0813_)
.7561
.0021
3.4332
,. (10.0295)
-.2159
(6.8820)
.3826
(9.9427)
.1259
(2 L3_979)
-.0151
¢8144)
.9205
.o3oo "SE .0105
N 114 50 58 "
=. --.
No_: Esfimmed by 2SLS, and _statisticsareinparenthe_s.
i::__
r-
_r
J
References
Douglas, G. W., and Miller, J.C., Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport, Brookings
Institution, 1974.
, and , "Quality Competition, Industry Equih'brium, _mdEfficiency in the Price-
Constrained Airline Market', American E conomicR_t.¢w Voi.64, No.4, 1974.
• i ....
Morrison, S., and Winston_ C., The Evolution of the Airline Industry, Brookings Institution, 1995.
Panzar, J.C., "Equilibrium and Welfare in Unregulated Airline Markets', American Economic
Review Vol.69 No.2, 1979.
Yamauchi, H., and Ito, T., "Air Transport Policy in Japan", in Hufoauer, G.C., and Findley, C.,
(eds.), Flying High: Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Paco'ic, Washington DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1996.
Yemauchi, H. and Murakami, H., "Air Transportation in Japan: Policy Changes and its Evaluation",
in Morrison, $., Yarrow, G., Lawton-Smith, H., Yamanchi, H., and Murakami, H., International
Comparison of Privatization and Deregulation among the UK, the US, and Japan - Volumem:
Airline and Trucking", Kelzai BunseM (The Economic Analysis,) No.143, Economic Planning
Agency, 1995.
I P#  OYso 
3_5 3 _
A TALE OF TWO AIRLINES:
THE POST PRIVATISATION PERFORMANCE
OF TWO CARIBBEAN AIRLINES
Dr. Juliet A Melville
(Lecturer)
Department of Economics
University of the West Indies
St. Augustine, TRINIDAD I
Email: melvilj@caribank.org ....
Tel: i_24r6_3i_]_7 _
- r
_Dr Melville is currently on secondment and all communication should be forwarded to Economic and
Programming Unit, Caribbean Development Bank, P.O. Box 406, Wildey, St Michael Barbados.
iz
A TALE OF TWO AIRLINES:
THE POST PRIVATISATION PERFORMANCE
OF TWO C_BEAN AIRL_ES _
Dr. Juliet A Melville
(Lecturer)
Department of Economics
University of the West Indies
St. Augustine, TRINIDAD 2
Email: melvilj@caribank.org
Tel: 1-246-431-1787
Under severe fiscal pressure, and in the wake of continuing poor performance of
their airlines, the governments of Jamaica and T_dad and Tobago were forced
to privatise their flag carrier. Privatisation was expected to lead to much improved
performance in an increasingly competitive environment. Three years after
privatisation and despite the governments taking over all of the airlines' debt, the
two privatised airlines have once more acenmulated huge losses, with one airline
almost on the verge of bankruptcy. This paper takes a comparative look at the
post-privatisation performance of both airlines. The paper examines the strategies
adopted by these privatised airlines in the face of intense competition from their
much larger rivals. Finally the paper considers whether small, unsupported
airlines can survive in the new competitive environment.
PRIVATISATION: A PANACEA?
The competitive forces unleashed by the United States (US) deregulation of its domestic
industry in 1978, and the US attempt to export its liberal philosophy to the rest of the world have
drastically altered the face of the international airline industry. The moves to create a more
liberal international airline industry, and the attendant developments in the operating
enviror_, e_nt (mergers and alliances, route re-configuration, development of computer reservation
-- . ................... . .......... _ , , - -
systems (CRSs), frequent flyers programmes, etc.) have generated upheavals in the industry. This
I wish to acknowledge the assistance received from Mr C. Zacca, Chief Operating Officer and Mr T Hill, General Manager of Eastern Caribbean O_tions of
Air Jamaica.
2Dr Melville is currently on secondment and all communication should be forwarded tO Economic and
Programmhg Unit,Carlbbean Development Bank; PiO. Box 406, Wiidey, St Michael Barbados.
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is largelythe result of airlines around the world attempting to align their corporate strategies with
the new operating environment in a bid to ensure their survival.
One dimension of the restructuring that is taking place is the substitution of private
ownership for state ownership. A wave ofprivatisation has swept an industry once dominated by
state-owned firms. On the surface, it appears as if privatisation is being pursued as a panacea for
problems plaguing the industry, irrespective of the peculiar circumstances of individual airlines.
Airlines from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean
have been privatised, all with the expectation that this would launch these airlines on a more
profitable path that would ensure their long run survival and provide the respective countries
with a reliable and efficient air transportation network. Privatisation is seen as a means through
which airlines can attract much needed financial resources and achieve greater efficiency and
profitability for shareholders. It is also expected to lead to improved quality of service for
passengers and to ease the financial burden on the national treasury. British Airways presents the
classic example of a former moribund state airline which has been transformed into one of the
most efficient and profitable international carders.
But privatisation means the loss of control over the entity, particularly if foreign interests
are involved. A privatised airline, motivated by the bottom-line may eliminate unprofitable
routes or reduce service on thin routes in a bid to maximise profits. This can, not only, disrupt
transport links but may adversely affect other industries dependent on the service provided by the
airline (for example the tourist industry).
Another fundamental issue is that underlying the decision to privatise airlines is the belief
that these can become profitable entities, and that it was the "un-business" like practices of the
state owners which prevented this. While the airline industry as a whole may not be inherently
unprofitable, given the nature of demand on certain routes and the cost of providing regular
scheduled service such routes, the market may fail to provide an adequate supply. This implies
that for airlines operating such routes privatisation is not necessarily going to result in improved
profitability.
This paper examines the performance of two recently privatised Caribbean carders:
Trinidad and Tobago (BWIA) Limited of Trinidad and Tobago, and Air Jamaica (A J) of Jamaica.
II
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The airlines were privatised with the expectations that they transformed into profitable entities.
Unfortunately, the performance of the airlines in the post privatisation period belied expectations.
Despite pursuing divergent strategies both airlines have accumulated huge losses once more and
their survival appears even more precarious than before privatisation. Given the continuing poor
performance of the two carders, this paper raises the question as to whether it is possible for
these small privately owned carders to provide a profitable, reliable and credible air service
without some kind of financial support. This paper argues that privatisation does not
automatically mean improved performance. The terms and conditions of privatisation together
with demand and supply conditions facing an airline are likely to determine how successful
privatisation is. Previous work have focussed on the role of competitive conditions (barriers to
entry, actual competitors, etc) faced by the privatised entity in determining success of
privatisation efforts.
The paper first reviews the performance of the two carders, paying attention to their post
privatisation strategies and the impact on the airlines. The paper then considers the thorny
question of whether or not it is possible for these small carders to operate profitably.
OVERVIEW OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (BVbrlA) INTERNATIONAL
Salient Features of BV_rlA's Operation
BWIA was originally founded as a private venture under the auspices of the British
government in 1940. The carrier was established to provide a service between the British
Caribbean islands (mainly Trinidad and Barbados) and between the islands and the rest of the
world. BWIA was acquired by the Trinidad and Tobago (TT) government in 1961 when the
British based British Overseas Airways Corporations (BOAC), the parent company of the then
BWIA, took a decision to abaadon the service it provided to the region because it could no
longer cover the operational losses recurred by tts su_sldlary. To ensure continued air access and
to protect the jobs of those involved in the indusiry, the government of TT took over the
operations of the airline.
awig is a very small airline by internation_st_iards, carrying just over one million
4
passengersannually(Table1).BWIA currentlylinkstheEasternCaribbeanandGuyanawith the
internationalcommunity.BWIA is popularlyreferredto asthe"regionalcartier".Although
BWIA was"substantiallyownedand controlled" by the TT government, for a number of
countries in the subregion the airline has served as their de facto national carrier _. Some countries
have formally designated BWIA as their national carrier in their air services agreement (ASA).
BWIA has a very limited route network consisting of four major international gateways:
Miami and New York in the United States (US), Toronto in Canada and London in the United
Kingdom (UK). Prior to privatisation, BWIA provided service to points in mainland Europe,
namely Zurich, Stockholm and Frankfurt. BWIA's passengers are concentrated in the gateway
cities served by the airline: for example in 1994 33% of Miami traffic were resident in Florida;
83% of traffic on the New York route were domiciled in that city and 88% of Canadian traffic
resided in Ontario. The airline reaches very little beyond gateway traffic. BWIA's main
scheduled competitor on the London route is British Airways, while AA has been the main rival
on the Unites States routes since the demise of Pan Am and Eastern Airlines. On the Toronto
route BWIA competes with Air Canada. BWIA is a minor player in the market except for its
home market and a few of the thinner routes. Its main rivals account for most of the capacity on
the routes.
BWIA also provides an intra-Caribbean service covering the Eastern Caribbean, Jamaica,
the Dutch Antilles, and Georgetown and Caracas on the South American mainland. Service on
these routes varies over time !rt response to demand conditions. On the intra-Caribbean routes,
until recently, BWIA's main rival was Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) _. Within the last
few years, other regional based carriers have began serving the intra-Caribbean routes - Helen
In 1983 countries belonging to the Caribbean Community won the approval of the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) of the "Community of Interest" principle which allowed member states of the community to designate the airline of
another member state as its national ean'ier. Th!s allows other CARICOM states to designate BWlA as their national carrier. This
principle received support from the US, but the UK has been reluctant to adhere to this.
This airline was owned by twelve regional governments. In 1996 LIAT was privatised. The airline's network covers
the English speaking Caribbean, as well as the Dutch and French speaking Caribbean.
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Air, Air Caribbean and the now defunct Carib Express 3.
Most of the airline's traffic originates from its Northern gateways. Traffic on the
European and Canadian routes is made up primarily of holiday and tourist traffic (approximately
60%). The US routes also have a significant share of tourist traffic, but a somewhat larger share
of VFR traffic. The profile of the airline's passengers suggests that the airline is operating in the
price sensitive end of the market. Much of the air travel in the Caribbean is associated with the
vital tourist industry that dominates the economies of many of these countries. Some charter
service is present on BWIA's main routes.
BWIA operated unprofitably, and suffered from serious internal inefficiencies. The
airline had a record of poor on time performance, delays and cancellations and as a result a very
high poor service cost. BWIA has a history of loss making. Losses for the period 1983 to 1992
amounted to US$ 220.3 million. BWIA owes its survival to the generous subsidies it received
from the government. In 1986 the airline was mandated to achieve financial independence, and
subsidies were drastically cut. This culminated in the privatisation of the airline in 1995.
Post Privatisation Reorganisation
Privatisation was intended to put the airline on a sound financial footing. The airline
suffered from a chronic lack of working capital and it was argued that privatisation in
conjunction with a joint venture with an international carrier would secure the future of the
airline. A joint venture was considered necessary to enable the carrier to widen its market access
to beyond gateway traffic, and to overcome some of the disadvantages associated with its small
size. The TT government envisioned the privatisation of BWIA in the context of the
rationalisation of the airline industry in the Caribbean and the creation of a single regional
airline. By 1994 discussions were held with eleven (11) major airlines without any notable
progress in finding a suitable partner: Similarly, little progress was made in establishing a
regional airline. As a lead up to privatisation, several initiatives were undertaken to improve the
/
Carib Express was formed in February, 1995, partiallyowned by British Airways and investors from the Caribbean
private sector. The airline went bankruptone year later.
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airline's operation but all proved ineffective. This internal restructuring consisted of major cost
cuts including staff reduction, route rationalisation, the discontinuation of first class service and
its replacement with a business service 4.
TT (BWIA) International Limited was divested in February, 1995 to a group of private
investors headed by the Acker Group and Loeb Partners of the United States. The Acker Group
was originally hired to locate a buyer for the airline. Fifty-one percent (51%) of the shares were
sold to foreign and domestic investors for US$20 million, and the government retained a 33.5%
share together with a golden share. The rest of the shares went to employees of the company. The
golden share gave the government veto powers over certain decisions considered vital to
preserving the national interest. Nevertheless, effective control of the airline passed to Acker and
Loeb partners, minority shareilolders. The agreement provided for the private sector to vote as a
block. For an investment that represented less than five percent of the total value of shares this
group gained effective control of BWIA. The new carrier was designated as the sole national
carrier for 15 years. The agreement also provided for the government to absorb losses up to a
limit of US$20 million.
The primary focus of the new management was on consolidating and streamlining the
existing operation. This was to be attempted through a combination of internal reorganisation
and formation of number of critical strategic alliances. Internal reorganisation efforts
concentrated on service enhancement and route restructuring.
Service Enhancement ....
This entailed a "repackaging" of the service offered to upgrade quality. This included
schedule revisions to have more consistent departure and _arfi_'va!t_imes in line with dema_t_d and to
improve on time performance. The plan envisaged keeping two aircraft in back up service to :
improve on time performance and cancellations, and the placing of the larger aircraft (L 1011 s)
exclusively on the New York and Toronto routes. BWIA also attempted to consolidate its traffic
base through building customer loyalty rather than simply relying on the goodwill of Caribbean
This was referred to by the management as right-sizing.
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nationals. To this end the airline introduced its frequent flyer programme and the BWIA/Royal
Bank Mastercard, the Sky Pass (a card which allowed customers to purchase tickets on credit).
Finally, there were plans to reorganise the way in which the airline delivered its service through
the formation of strategic alliances (discussed below).
The route rationalisation/re_ta'uctufing
The plan called for the elimination of marginal routes, replacing these where viable with
an indirect service in conjunction with a partner airline and the expansion of service on more
promising routes. Service on some European routes was earmarked to be cut, whilst service to
the Caribbean and South America, where it was expected the yield would be higher, was to be
expanded. In 1996, unprofitable direct service to Frankfurt and Zurich was dropped in the hope
of replacing this with indirect service via London 5. The success of this strategy revolved around
the airline's ability to enter into partnership with other carders.
z
Fqrmation of strategic alliances
A major concern was with improving the flow of traffic within BWIA's network. The
existing bilateral agreements have limited BWIA to gateway traffic. To overcome restricted
market access, the strategy envisaged BWIA entering into a network of alliances involving at
least one major international airline and a number of smaller regional carriers in each of its major
markets to tap beyond gateway traffic 6. Such a network of alliances would permit the new BWIA
to replace unprofitable direct service with indirect service via a hub and to increase the traffic on
its network through the additional feed provided by these alliances.
For example it was proposed that London could be developed as the airline's European
hub in conjunction with a strategic partner. In this way traffic beyond London would be
5The abandonment of some routes by the airlines led to some governments expressing dissatisfaction with this.
The business plan put forward by the Aeker Group cited an alliance with American Airlines and American Eagle, BWIA's
main competitor for _c on the US routes, for feed into JFK and Miami in the US; Air Canada for feed into Toronto; British
Midland forfeed into London Heathr0w from the UK and Europe; LIAT for feed to Barbados, Antigua and Port-of-Spain from
other Caribbean countries; ACERA for feed into Caracas; and TABA in Brazil.
accommodated via indirect service through London. A similar sort of strategy was proposed for
the airline's North American loutes. So far BWIA has failed to find a suitable partner, and no
significant agreement has been entered into with another airline. One of the sticking points is that
BWIA as a stand alone proposition, without control of intra-regional feed, is not seen by foreign
carriers as an attractive partnerL Foreign carders that have expressed an interest, have linked
their involvement to the merger of BWIA and the intra-regional carder, LIAT. Some of the offers
required BWIA to reduce its international service which it was not prepared to do. In a move to
control its intra-regional feed, BWIA acquired a 29% stake in the privatised intra-regional
carrier, LIAT, in 1995. This has allowed the two airlines to engage in some low level
cooperation.
Fleet Reolacement
An essential element of the post privatisation reorganisation, according to the new
management was the replacement of BWIA's aging fleet. Its four L 1011 aircraft were
approaching twenty years old. The plan provided for the replacement of_eairline's MD83s_with
Boeing 757-200 by the sununer of 1995, and the four L1011-500 with Boeing 767-300 ER on a 2
for 1 basis by September 1995. The fleet replacement programme ran into difficulty because of, i
among other things, questionable management decisions. Two Airbus aircraft were purchased
instead of the Boeing jets. These were subsequently found to be unsuitable for BWIA's routes, as
they could not fly nonstop between Barbados/Trinidad and North America. The first aircraft
which was purchased in July 1996 had to remain grounded while the airline incurred significant
lease cost. The decision to purchase the Airbus was made at the expense of major engine repairs.
The failure to renew the fleet as planned impacted negatively on BWIA's performance in
1996/97. Multiple engine failures disrupted service, severely affecting on time performance and
schedule integrity. This resulted in a serious deterioration in the quality of service provided by
the airline. On time performance and cancellations reached record unfavourable levels. The
7in 1997 Virgin Atlantic offered US$20 million for a 20% stake in the carrier. This offer was refused by the management,
but the deal was favoured by the government
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frequentcancellationsanddelaysdid enormousdamageto theattemptsto enhance the image of
the airline and its finances. Unplanned expenses associated with engine repairs, lease of
replacement engines, and poor service totalled US$15 million in 1996.
Other Elements in Strategy
Other elements in the business plan included proposals to enhance yield management, to
introduce a state of the art CRS, and to expand non-core revenue activities: such as duty free
sales, catering, ground handling, maintenance, freight and charter service s. Immediately upon
privatisation, BWIA entered into an agreement with its main rival, AA, for the use of its Sabre
computer reservation system and for ground handling service at JFK. Cost reduction was another
important dimension of the corporate strategy. Cost reductions were expected to come mainly
from the out-sourcing of service to strategic partners, and by reductions in personnel costs, route
expense and ground handling charges. The airline has achieved limited success in most of the
above areas.
=--
Assessment
Some of the difficulty encountered by the airline seems to have been self inflieted. The
US based executives appeared to have pursued objectives at odds with those of the other
shareholders and with the business plan. The lease of the unsuitable Airbus aircraft from a
subsidiary of BWIA's largest foreign shareholder raised questions about conflict of interest. The
foreign based executives were accused of not spending enough time in Trinidad managing the
affairs of the airline, and of uncontrolled expenditure. A former Chief Operation Officer
complained that the lack of focus by mar_agement on the core business plan that called for "rigid
cost control and reduction" was at the root of the airline's trouble. The Government's agreement
to fund up to 0S$20 million worth of losses may have encouraged a degree of laxness.
BWIA made losses totalling US$21 million and US$10.2 in 1996 and 1997 respectively.
/
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To earn inerem_n_l revenue BWIA atti_mpted to re-enter the domestic market. Limited access was granted but this was
eventually stopped by a court order.
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Theshareholders'equitywasrapidlyeroded.In thefaceof mountinglossesandthegrowing
dissatisfactionby theTT government,anewmanagementteamwashiredin February1998.
Between1995and1998,theairlinehashadfour managementchanges.Theimmediateconcern
of thenewteamwasoncrisismanagementandforestallingacollapseof theairline.The
governmentpeevedover its lackof influenceontheprivatisedairlinehasrefusedto cometo the
rescueof theairline9.
Thefailure to find astrategicpartner,acentralelementof thebusinessplan,meantthat
thecostreductionsandrevenueopportunitiesprojectedto comefrom this sourcenever
materialised.This should have led to a rethink of the approach. This did not seem to have
occurred. The rapid deterioration of the finances of the new airline left little room for strategic
long term planning. Little attention was given to developments in its environment such as the
emergence of Air Caribbean and AJ as threats on its intra-Caribbean routes and possibly on its
international routes. No policies were articulated to confront the threat posed by the airline's _
major rivals. There was really no move by the new management to carve out a niche for itself in
the increasingly competitive market place.
One of the lessons of the BWIA experience is that without proper incentives and or
sanctions, private sector managers can pursue goals at odds with that of profit maximisation just
like public sectors managers. It is clear that the private sector managers pursued objectives which
were in conflict with those of the majority of the shareholders - a classic case of moral hazard.
The terms of privatisation allowed a group with very little to lose financially take effective
control of the airline.
L
OVERVIEW OF AIR JAMAICA
With the assistance of BWIA, and in partnership with Air Canada, AJ was established as
the national carrier of Jamaica in 1969. The government of Jamaica was the majority shareholder
while Air Canada had a minority interest. The latter provided technical assistance and managerial
/
The Minister of Finance complained publicly that despite being the largest single share holder (owning 33.5% of the
shares) it had no say in the running of the airline.
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!expertise. Air Canada gradually reduced its 40% share holding and by 1979 the Jamaican
government wholly controlled the airline. The growing concern for the need to provide safe,
reliable and sustainable air transportation, especially for the vital tourist industry was cited as the
reason for the state's interest in starting a new airline controlled by Jamaicans. Jamaica has had
the experience of foreign carriers withdrawing their services when profitability declined and
expanding service when the market improved. In the 1970s Pan Am, Lutthansa, Air Florida and
Challenge withdrew from Jamaica. This made policy makers wary of foreign carriers. To provide
a steady and reliable air service to support the vital tourist was eentral in the minds of planners.
Salient Features of Air Jamaica's Operations
Air Jamaica is a small carrier by international standards (Table 2). The airline initially
provided air links between Jamaica and gateways in the United States, eventually service was
added to Canada and London. Some service was established to the Northern Caribbean, namely,
Cayman Islands and the Bahamas. The airline began offering service to the Bahamas in 1991..
Prior to privatisation the carder wa.; in the main a Jamaican airline, servicing traffic beginning or
terminating there. The airline was established to serve primarily the interest of the Jamaican
travelling public and its tourist industry. The airline operated from two points within Jamaica,
Kingston and Montego Bay. The route network consisted of a series of point to point service.
Like BWIA, AJ has a very limited route network, flying to the United States, London and
some Caribbean territories. Up to 1977, the USA-Jamaica air services agreement (ASA) allowed
the airline to operate to five points in the US: New York I°, Miami, Philadelphia, Detroit and
Chicago. In 1978, a new open skies' ASA, gave Jamaica five additional points in the United
States. These points were not specified, and this gave A.f some flexibility in its service to the
United States. The airline provided service to Los Angeles on a contractual basis for Jamaica
Vacations Ltd. The US routes tended to be more competitive with at least two scheduled US
carders competing with the Jamaican airline. With the 1978 open skies agreement, competition
intensified sharply as the number of US carders designated to provide scheduled service and the
The recent BASA considers Newark, New Jersey and New York as a single point.
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numberof availableseatincreased(Rattray,1988;p.22)__.The growing presence of charter
airlines on prime routes such as New York, Miami and Philadelphia made these routes more
competitive.
The London route was a closed duopoly shared between AJ and British Airways. AJ
entered into a commercial agreement with British Airways for the latter to operate the route on
its behalf. A similar type of arrangement existed with Air Canada for the Toronto route. The
history of AJ is closely intertwined with the Jamaican tourist industry and the airline's traffic is
dominated by tourists out of the United States. The airline is heavily used by Jamaicans resident
both at home and abroad.
Fortune has not favoured the carder. The airline broke even in 1971, made a small profit
in 1972 and 1973, and since then have incurred losses every year. By March 1994, the airline had
accumulated losses of US$1,628 million. The government was unable to continue funding these
losses. Lack of sufficient capital resources to fuel growth was a problem that plagued the airline.
In May 1994 agreement was reached on the privatisation of AJ. A new company, AJ Holdings
Limited was formed and 100% of the old AJ shares were transferred to this Company. The
government retained a 25% interest in the new AJ, whilst 70% of the company was sold to the
AJ Acquisition Group, a consortium of local investors, for US$52 million. The other 5 percent of
the shares were held for an employee stock ownership programme. AJ remained the national
carder of Jamaica and control of the airline passed to the private sector interest in November
1994. Controlling interest in the airline is held by the owner of the Sandals chain of hotels, Mr
Gordon 'Butch' Stewart. This marks the first comprehensive alliance between tourist industry
and air travel industry in the Caribbean region. AJ was expected to benefit greatly from the
resources controlled by this group.
Post Privatisation Reorganisation
At the privatised AJ a foreign team of experts was brought in to run the affairs of the
i
company. The new management adopted an aggressive expansion programme involving its
A moratorium on additional capacity on the M_ami and New York was implemented for one year in 1984.
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routes and capacity. The airline's business plan identified the main challenges as the need to
implement cost savings and increase aircraft utilisation; increased competition from US carriers;
lack of beyond gateway traffic; and unprofitable routes on which fixed cost outstripped revenue.
The airline was diagnosed as having too high operating cost relative to the passengers carded.
The approach adopted by the new management was to attempt to grow the airline out of its
difficulties. The essential elements of this approach are detailed below.
_7
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Route Expansion
The new AJ embarked on an ambitious expansion of its routes. This included expanding
its extra-regional network, as well as, its intra-Cadbbean one. The carder began service to new
points in the United States, and restarted abandoned ones: AJ started service to Chicago, Ft
Lauderdale, Los Angeles and Newark. Service to London was restarted. An interesting
development was the aggressive thrust of AJ into the Eastern Caribbean - namely to Antigua,
Barbados and St Lucia - in direct competitionwith BWIA. The airline was successful in getting
designated as the national carder for these countries on its US routes. This expansion was into
the main tourist destinations in the Eastern Caribbean region. AJ offers a choice of direct service
from these points to the US, or a one stop service via Montego Bay. Upon privatisation, the new
management sought to reorganise the airline's network around a new hub in Montego Bay.
Previously the airline's operations were concentrated at Kingston.
Establishment of the Montego B_lv hub
The Montego Bay hub is being promoted as the "New Gateway to the Caribbean". It is
intended to link points in the Eastern Caribbean Mth AJ's US gateways. The hub offers
connections to some northern Caribbean destinations as well. The incorporation of the Eastern
Caribbean {nto the airline's roUte nefwork i_elf represented a radical development. The old AJ
had shown no interest in developing service to the _tem Caribbean. This new focus was an
attempt to capitalise on a niche identified in the market, and to combat AA's dominance. AJ,
through its Montego Bay hub aims at offering US passengers an alternative route for travelling
between the Caribbean and the United Statesl _ Wi_ its extensive domestic and international
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networkchannelstraffic to theCaribbeanthroughits Miami andSanJuanhubs.FromMiami,
AA offersjet serviceto a limited numberof Caribbeanpoints.TheSanJuanhubwhichcatersfor
thethinnerroutesin theEasternCaribbeanoffersaturbopropservicevia its subsidiary,
AmericanEagle_2.BWIA offersdirectservicefrom only twoUS gatewaysto theEastem
Caribbean.TheMontegoBayhubprovidesa one-stopconnectionfrom mainlandUSA to the
EasternCaribbean.Theattractionof this service,accordingto AJ managementis thatAJ is
providing"jet to jet" servicevia its hub,andanearlyarrivaltime in theCaribbean(11.00am)
unlike theserviceof its main rival, AA _3.
The improved access through Montego Bay was expected to increase tourist arrivals
which would lead to improved aircraft utilisation rate. Finally it was anticipated that the Montego
Bay hub would enhance the quality of the airline's product by offering tourists multiple
destination vacations. The hub had limited success initially. During the first year of operation,
passenger volume remained low. The hub which was intended to accommodate tourist traffic
originating in the United States attracted mainly Caribbean residents. The under-utilisation of the
hub was attributed to the lack of familiarity of US residents with the Montego Bay connection,
inadequate marketing in North America and certain operational difficulties - such as lack of
automation at out-stations which caused inconvenience to passengers who had to re-check on
getting to Montego Bay intransit to their final destination, and insufficient check-in facilities and
staffwhich led to an inefficient handling of passengers (Tharkur, 1998 p; 35). AJ was forced to
scale back its operations. The airline's rapid expansion of capacity on the new Eastern Caribbean
routes in the face of fiat traffic growth led to low load factors TM. In February, 1998, AJ was forced
to withdraw services from two of its Caribbean destinations (Antigua and Turks and Caicos
American Airlines withdrew its jet service from San Juan to the Eastern Caribbean in April 1998. In order for the
islands to continue offering a direct jet service from Miami American Airlines requested some payments from the
governments of Grenada and St Luei_,.
13With cennections via AA' San Juan hub passengers transfer to turboprop aircraft on American Eagle.
The Eastern Caribbean service was initially started with six (6) flights per week. This was increased to eight (8) six months
later and then to twelve (12). In February 1998 the service was reduced to six flights per week, three direct flights and the others
via Montego Bay.
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Islands) and reduce its flight offer to Barbados and St Lucia to cut losses.
The airline subsequently undertook an extensive advertising campaign and this is
beginning to bear fruit. According to AJ's manager of Eastern Caribbean Operations, the hub is
now more heavily utilised by US based travellers. Some 73% of the traffic through the hub now
originates in the US, most of this being tourist traffic. The success of the hub is intimately linked
to the airline's success in getting holiday makers to route their Eastern Caribbean vacation
through Montego Bay. This is where the AJ's link with the holiday group is likely to reap
benefits. The hub concept is being vigorously promoted and the airline's latest policy is to allow
en-route stops on this service. The pattern of service offer is intended to develop the multiple
destination tourist clientele benefitting both the airline and the tourist industry.
Strategic alliance
Initially not much attention was given to entering into strategic alliances, but
subsequently this assumed some importance. Once of the problems identified was lack of
sufficient feed on AJ's routes. At first, management attempted to increase the traffic within AJ's
network by extending its route coverage, and through the re-imaging of the carder as an
international carder of high quality. Subsequently it sought to increase feed through partnership
with other carriers, in November 1995, the AJ Acquisition Group acquired majority ownership in
the domestic airline, Trans Jamaica. This was established as AJ Express to link domestic traffic
with the airline's international network. AJ in 1997 signed a major commercial arrangement with
Delta Airlines which came into effect in 1998. This is a complementary arrangement as it permits
AJ to access much needed beyond gateway traffic and Delta to gain entry into the Caribbean
market. The alliance provides for the airlines to code-share on service between the United States,
Jamaieffand the Eastern Caribbean islands. The agreement also covers Delta providing code
share/blocked spaced flights with AJ. Delta code share on flights from Atlanta, Miami and New
York, JFK to Montego Bay, Kingston, Barbados, St Lucia and Antigua (AJ's south bound
/
flights). AJ code-share on Delta's daily service to Boston, Hartford, CT/Springfield, MA,
Cincinnati, Memphis and San Francisco. The agreement allows AJ access to Delta's extensive
domestic network, and gives Delta access to AJ's service throughout the Caribbean. It is too early
I6
to tell howtherecentannouncementby Deltato launch26daily flights into theCaribbeanand
CentralAmerica will affect this agreement.
Re-imaging of the carrier
The new management has expended significant effort building up the image of the airline.
This thrust focused on enhancing the product offered by the carder. It involved the introduction
of red carpet treatment for all passengers, improved in-flight service - for example champagne
flight with full meal, the reintroduction of fashion shows on US routes featuring resort fashions,
and an on-board chef. To build customer loyalty, the airline's Seventh Heaven Frequent Flyer
Programme was introduced - this allowed the passenger to travel free on the seventh trip; an
agreement was reached with United Airlines which allowed AYs passengers to participate in that
airline's FFP and vice versa. On time performance was also improved to ensure the credibility
and reliability of service. The re-imaging of the carder was backed up with the introduction of a
new fleet.
Fleet Re.newal and Fleet Expansion ..... _
Upon privatisation a decision was taken to retire the old and inefficient units in the fleet.
The airline acquired six A310s through operation leases and purchased four new aircraft (A320s)
by finance lease. The fleet was expanded from 9 to 14 aircraft. The modernisation of the fleet
was expected to yield cost savings in the areas of labour, fuel and maintenance, improve fleet
reliability and enhance customer satisfaction and ultimately impact on revenue. The expansion
was also thought necessary to accommodate AJ's growing route network. The first two A320s
were delivered in December 1996 and the other two in the second quarter of 1997. The new fleet
had to remain grounded for over 12 months because of technical difficulties associated with
Jamaica receiving a Category II rating from the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA).
1
External Developments
AJ's expansion plans were derailed by the US FAA awarding Jamaica a Category II rating
in 1995. This reflected the FAA's dissatisfaction with the operations of the Jamaican civil
17
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aviation authority. This rating impcsed serious restrictions on the national airline: countries that
are rated Category II have their level of servic_ to the US and the number of aircraft in _ervice
frozen as at the time of categorisation. With such a rating, expansion can only come through the
wet leasing of aircraft from a country with a Category I status to operate more flights or new
routes. The Category II rating prevented AJ from introducing its new wide-bodied plane; it
halted the expansion on old routes and the startup of new routes to the US. In order to operate
new services, AJ had to wet lease planes to honour its new schedule. The planned expansion into
the US was effectively stymied. Equally important, the decision raised the airline's cost
substantially and adversely affected revenue and this helped to erode its equity base. Apart from
having to fund the expansion programme, additional cost was incurred to wet lease aircraft, while
the two recently purchased Airbus aircraft remained idle. The airline's management estimated
that the restrictions cost the airline US$22 million. Jamaica's Category I rating was restored this
year.
= ..
=
Assessment
Unlike BWIA, AJ attempted to strengthen and consolidate its competitive position by
adopting an expansionary stance. In response to AA dominance on US routes, AJ tried to create a
niche for itself in the tourist market between the US and the Eastern Caribbean by offering
unique routing via Montego Bay. This was supplemented with a strong marketing/customer
orientated strategy which aimed at creating a strong brand image, improving the quality of
customer service, and binding customers to the airline. To some extent this proved successful. AJ
reported that it increased the number of passenger carded yearly by 62%. Unfortunately the
increase in uplift was not reflected in the airline's accounts. At the end of 1997, AJ had incurred
significant losses in spite of its attempt to grow itself out of its financial problems. The
expansion plan required large capital outlays. Apart from this, the airline incurred sizeable
extraordinary expenses associated with the Category II rating. The airline reported losses for
/
each of the years since privatisation. In 1996, the operating loss was US$47 million, in 1997 this
was US$60 million and for 1998 this has been projected at US$35 million. A report by the
Ministry of Finance noted that all routes returned losses and no significant advance was made in
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reducingcostwhilepassengeryield remainedunchangedover1995-1997.In 1997the
governmentwascalleduponto provideguaranteedsupportto thetuneof US$1O0million. In
January1998theairlineagainsoughtimmediatecashinjectionof US$80million, with arequest
for anadditionalUS$30million for 1999.
In light of the huge losses suffered conflict arose among the shareholders about the
appropriate strategy for the airline. Questions were raised about the decision to expand intra-
Caribbean routes and to establish the Montego Bay hub. Both ventures were considered a drain
on the airline's finances. One side favoured a continuation with the planned expansion, whilst the
other, including the Chief Exeeutiv*, Officer (CEO) and the government, felt the airline should
downsize and restructure its activities. The former side won with the departure of the CEO. Like
BWIA, AJ has changed its CEO four times since privatisation.
It would appear that AJ's management adopted a more strategic approach to
reorganisation than BWIA. The moral hazard problem which affected BWIA was not present,
even though there was some conflict among shareholders about the appropriate way forward. The
AJ's experience also demonstrates the ease with which well conceived planscan be undermined
by circumstances over which managers have little control.
IS PROFITABILITY POSSIBLE?
Despite pursuing very divergent paths, both BWIA and AJ have incurred huge losses and
their equity eroded. In both cases there was minimal government involvement. Yet the
experience of the privatised a_dines closely mirrored their performance as state-owned entities.
From the above account, it is clear that external factors as well as poor management decisions
adversely affected the performance of the privatised carders. Nevertheless, the similar experience
under public and private ownership, irrespective of corporate strategy pursued and despite the
many changes in management, lead one to question whether the routes operated by these carders
are of themselves inherently unprofitable. Is the cost of operating these routes too high compared
with the revenue generated on the routes? Detailed information on cost and demand is needed to
come to a definitive conclusion. Nevertheless, an examination of available evidence may help to
provide a partial answer.
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Caribbeanairlinesaregenerallyperceivedasinefficientandhighcost,but arecentstudy
(Melville; 1995)foundthatin 1992,BWIA achievedunit operatingcostscomparableto the
industry'slowestcostoperatorssuchasAmerican,Delta,SingaporeAirlines andUnited.This
samestudyfoundthatdespitehavingsimilarcoststructure,BWIA's yield wasmuchlower than
theotherairlines'.This finding seemsto suggest_at BWIA's inability to achieveprofitability
maynot beduesolelyto costinefficiency,butmayberelatedto thenatureof demandwhich the
airline faces.Thestructureof demandmaybesuchthatit notpossibleto generateadequate
revenueto coverthecostof providinga regularscheduledserviceon theseroutes.
By internationalstandards,thevolumeof traffic onCaribbeanroutesis very thin andthis
is dominatedby tourist traffic. AA's directorof marketingfor theAtlantic andtheCaribbean
alludedto theproblemfacingCaribbeanair transportbecauseof thesefeatures.Heobservedthat:
"...tourists are travelling to the region at discounted fares and that does not
translate into large profit margins .... [While] there is a high demand for the
Caribbean as a tourist destination, international airlines were reluctant to expand
service based on the small profits realised. "(Express March 28 1998; p.4)
He also noted that:
".... The Caribbean war promoted through tour organisers and the all inclusive
resorts and because of this airlines were not realising full fares and full profits on
the routes" (Express March 28 1998; p.4).
The basic problem that is being articulated is that the yield associated with the carriage of
passenger traffic on Caribbean routes is too low. Given the nature of the major users of air
transport on these routes (mainly tourist traffic), it would seem the fare that can be extracted from
them is very low, and as a result the margin of profitability minimal. The withdrawal of British
Airways and United Airlines from the Trinidad market in 1994, and the recent decision of AA to
terminate its jet service to the Eastern Caribbean and its subsequent request for payment from the
government of Grenada and St. Lucia in order to provide a direct jet service from Miami may be
indicative of the problem. Upon privatisati0ntBW!A terminated . semite on som e clearly
unprofitable routes, so too has AJ. Over th e y e_s, foreign carders have entered and exited the
market as the profit opportunities dictated, the regional carders acting as swing "producers".
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Caribbeanairlinesareinvol,,edin providing a scheduled service with all that implies for
cost, but the markets served bear strong characteristics of a charter market. The revenue on the
routes may allow carriers to recover only their marginal cost and a fraction of their fixed cost.
For the Caribbean airlines, these relatively thin tourist routes are the significant part of their
operation in most cases accounting more than 90 percent of total revenue. This has to carry all
the cost. The foreign carriers serving the region, such as AA and BA, have significant domestic
and international network. Their operation in the Caribbean is merely a marginal add on (Rattray,
1988; p.23). Such airlines may be able to engage in marginal cost pricing to the Caribbean and
still earn a return. In the ease of the Caribbean carriers marginal cost pricing may lead to
significant losses.
If the above is an accurate analysis of the situation then privatisation is not going to result
in any improvement in the financial viability of the carriers. The airlines will continue to operate
unprofitably (whether private or public) unless a subsidy is provided for some routes. To the
extent it is deemed essential the region have guaranteed airlift, then the provision of regular
scheduled service by Caribbean carriers may be in the nature of a "merit good" requiring
financial support. This does not mean the treasury must bear the burden, but those that benefit
most can be required t0mee t some of this cost (forexample the tourist: ind_try).
CONCLUSION
Although under certain circumstances, privatistion of poorly performing airlines Can lead
to major improvements, privatisation may vitiate the very rationale for the state's involvement in
the industry in the first place. A widely held belief is that many countries, especially developing
countries, desired to own _eir airline for reasons having to d0-with prestlgeor national pride.
This may indeed be so, but in many cases, the decision to establish a national airline was related
to the pursuit and preservation of tl,e what was perceived as the national interest: the desire to
have a stable, reliable, and adequate air service. Very simply, some governments felt that their
transport security depended on national control of the supply of air services. Foreign carriers are
in the main "footloose" responding rapidly to changed profit opportunities and their own
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Tcorporate objectives. For larger countries with an abundance of air access this is not necessarily a
problem. For the Caribbean where one or two carriers operate a route, the decision of one carder
to withdraw can result in severe economic disruptions. Over 90% of the Caribbean's transport
needs are met by air transport. Further for many of these islands, tourism is the lifeblood of their
economies, and any disruption of air service can deal a telling blow to these economies.
Transport security and the preservation of uplift for the vital tourist industry are critical concerns
among Caribbean policy makers. As Rattray (1988) observed "[n]ational pride should not in
itself serve to justify the creation of a national airline; but national needs and objectives may
render a national airline indispensaole".
The review has shown that privatisation does not put carders automatically on the track to
profitability. The terms and conditions ofprivatisation are important. Those who have effective
control must be made to act in ways consistent with the pursuit of profitability. Similarly
privatisation, with accompanying cost control strategies by themselves are not sufficient to
enable the airlines to survive in an increasingly competitive industry. Some attention must be
given to the demand side and to addressing the deficiencies there. The small volumes of traffic
and the price sensitive nature of the majority of this traffic may be undermining the viability of
providing dedicated scheduled service on some of these routes.
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Table 1: BWIA's Operating Statistics, 1992-97
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 I
Passengers ('000). 999 936 897 947 902 626
Available Seat Miles (Mn) 3,002 2,927 2,573 2,797 2,580 1,834
Revenue Passenger Miles (Mn) 2,044 1,972 1,723 1,658 1,266
Load Factor (%) 68 67 67 64 69
Passenger yield per RPM (US cents) 10.5 9.7 10.4 11.5 11.4
Employees 2,605 2,345 2,221 2,464 2,484
naRPM per employee ('000)
1Data for Jan- Sept
Source: BWlA International
785 841 776
1,807
65
9.4
2,357
767 703
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Table 2: Air Jamaica's Operating Statistics, 1994-96
1994 1995
Passengers ('000) 935 1,078
Available Seat Miles (Mn) 1,144 1,617
Revenue Passenger Miles (Mn) 660 987
Load Factor (%) 58 61
Employees 1,239 1,573
RMP per employee ('000) 533 627
1996
1,258
2,218
1,333
69
1,753
760
Source: Air Jamaica
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Abstract
British Aii-ways _A) was pdvatised in 1987, but its financial recovery occurred
-a number of years earlier. This recovery was sustained throughout the early
-1990s economic recession, a period when few major airlines were operating
profitably. This paper examines the role of productivity developments at British
Airways from the early 1980s through to 1996. The emphasis is on capital
productivity and investment, but changes in capital intensity and labour
" productivity are also evaluated.
Various measures are considered for both capital and labour productivity:
outputs are measured in available tonne-kms (ATKs) and revenue tonne-kms
(RTKs), with the former preferred over the latter two measures, after adjustment
for work performed by BA for others. Capital inputs are measured in equivalent
lease costs adjusted to constant prices, with a different treatment of flight and
ground equipment or assets• Labour inputs are derived from total payroll costs
deflated by a UK wage price index.
The airline made considerable capital investments over the period, and at the
same time went through two major processes of labour restructuring. This
resulted in a gradual increase in capital intensity, relative high labour productivity
growth, but poor capital productivity performance. However, capital investment
played an important role in the airline's sustained labour and total factor
producti_ty over the whole period
I Introduction
Considerable attention has been given to airline labour productivity, both by
researchers a_n_dmariagement (see for example Alamdafi & Morrell, 1997). Often, the
word productivity is used to describe labour productivity, with _no recognition of the
role played by capital and total factor productivityk At the same time, airlines
generally emphasise: their prowess in technological developments, even though these
might not compare as well with other industries as they have in the past.
The airline industry has often been described as capital intensive, although this is
somewhat misleadingl since labour Costs account for up to 35-40% of total costs for
some_akllnes, compared to capital costs of i0'15%. The capital intensive label is
probably derived from the fact that 'airlines operate aircraft costing as much as $150
i For example. Air Canada in its 1997 Annual Report. p.33
°°
million each. These aircraft, together with spares and related flight equipment, account
for a very large proportion of an airlines' fixed assets.
Given the importance of aircraft to an airline's success, much research has been
undertaken in the area of technical aircraft efficiency, and some analysis has taken
place of aircraft utilisation. However, little work has been published on the
relationship between technical efficiency and the intensity of aircraft use on the one
hand, and the cost of aircraft and related finance on the other. Some studies have
examined total factor productivity, and by implication capital productivity (see for
example, Forsythe, 1985 and Oum & Yu, 1995). But most focus on labour
productivity, partly because of trends in the 1970s and 1980s towards overmanning
and labour ineffiency, and partly because simple measures can be used with readily
available data.
While much attention has recently been applied to labour, there are signs that the
airline industry !s becoming more capital intensive. In aircraft maintenance, expensive
test and monitoring equipment is replacing more labour intensive component repair,
while at airports self-service check-in and ticketing machines are becoming more
common. In the air, two pilot operations are fast becoming thenorm. Capital charges
(depreciation, rentals and net interest) increased from 5.6% 0(t0tal costs in 1980 to
11.8% in 1995 for British Airways. Capacity costs (depreciation and lease) per ATK
for the same airline increased at a compound average growth rate of 8.2% a year
between 1979 and 1994, compared with 3.1% for labour costs per ATK, 1.2% for fuel
and oil costs, and 3.6% for other operating costs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine capital productivity trends for BA pre- and
post-privatisation. The analysis covers a period from 1982/832 through the
privatisation in February 1987 to the early 1990s major economic recession and
subsequent recovery to 1996/97. It is of note that BA were one of the few airlines to
continue to be profitable throughout the post Gulf War recession (Figure 1).
Sustainable airline profitability can only be achieved in the long-term by growth in total
factor productivity, which is in turn driven by investment and technical innovation, and
it is their achievements in these areas that this paper addresses.
lnsert FigTtre 1
Thus, while the focus of this paper is on the efficiency with which capital is used, this
will be considered in the context of total factor productivity, as well as the efficiency
with which other inputs were used, notably labour. Just as labour productivity can
increase because of the amount of capital equipment used per employee, so will capital
productivity depend on the amount of labour employed, staff skills and organisation, as
well as technical improvements.
By limiting the analysis to one airline, with a reasonably consistent accounting system
over the period adopted, and based largely in one country, problems of comparability
are minimised. Furthermore, a time series approach also enables money value to be
converted to volume or quantity estimates by means of price deflators or indexes.
: The second complete financial year following the appointment of Lord King as Chairman i
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The questions to be addressed in this paper are:
• What was the role of capital investment both in BA's pre-privatisation turnround,
and their subsequent strong profit growth?
• How did the airline's capital productivity growth compare with labour and total
factor productivity growth?
To answer thesequestions, a consistent set of data was needed from the early 1980s to
the present. These were available from the airline's annual reports, which gave
reasonably consistent data for revenues, expenses, assets, the fleet and employees, and
where policy changes were made (eg in the treatment of leased assets), these were
clearly identified in the published accounts.
There have been numerous studies that have evaluated partial productivity measures,
and many of these have also considered total productivity in terms of aggregate
measures such as operating cost per ATK There have been some more interesting
attempts to provide a meaningful analysis of productivity. An earlier study examined
airline managerial efficiency using data for 16 European scheduled airlines, regressing
labour productivity against five explanatory variables (Pearson, 1976). One of the
variables included in the model was aircrat_ productivity, defined as average aircraft
utilisation. Another equation explained unit costs in terms of four explanatory
variables including labour but not capital productivity. Managerial efficiency was then
measured by each airline's standardised residuals from the two models. Apart from the
lack of rigorous statistical testing of the regression models, this work failed to address
marketing efficiency, revenues or quality of output, although this weakness was
pointed out by the author.
Another earlier study focused entirely on labour productivity, examining partial
measures for the various airline staff categories for 10 European and North American
airlines (McKinsey, 1977). The study concluded that North American carriers had
much higher labour productivity in all staff categories, because of their generally
greater sizeand network density. This was one of the few studies that adjusted the
data for contracting out and contracting in, by converting third part amounts paid or
received into rnan,years, although the precise method for doing this was not revealed.
The previous weakness of the omission of marketing efficiency in the Pearson
productivity study was rectified in a Study 0f26 airlines from Europe, North America
andthe Asia/Pacific regions (Doganis and others, 1995). However, lack of data
prevented any adjustments to be made for third party work. The study allows a useful
time series and cross-sectional comparison of the world's major airlines, both across
and within regions, and includes some disaggregate measures such as pilot
productivity.
International differences in capital productivity have been very little studied, according
tO a recent stUdy (McKinsey Global 'Institute, 1996), and 'even less is known about
what causes capital pr_,v,luctivity differences'. This study's main objective was to
identify reasons for capital productivity differences between Germany, Japan and the
United States It followed on from earlier research into labour productivity and
employmentperformance. The study combineda top-down macroanalysiswith a
micro study of five industries: automobiles, food processing, retailing,
telecommunications and electric utilities.
The McKinsey researchers defined capital input as the flow of services generated from
a given stock of capital, rather than the stock itself This they measured by identifying
each type and age of asset, and diving the cost by the useful life in years. In some
cases they also added financing costs to the original purchase cost of the investment
goods. Output was measured where possible in physical units (eg kilowatt hours for
electric utilities),-and value added for industries with more heterogeneous outputs.
Inputs and outputs were denominated in local currencies, and convened into a
common currency by using purchasing power parities (PPPs).
o _
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2 Measurement of Productivity
2. I Definition of Airline Output._
Airline output can be defined in physical or money terms. Physical units most ot_en
used in aggregate measures are available torme-kms (ATKs) or revenue tonne-kms
(RTKs). The first describes production or capacity, and is relevant to those inputs
such as flight operations whose effort is related to this, while the second is a measure
of traffic, of greater relevance to sales and handling personnel. Monetary measures of
output include total revenue, and gross or net value added.
Financial performance measures would clearly relate profit to capital invested in the
business. This is not a productivity measure but a measure of financial rather than
economic success in meeting the firm's objectives. Its relevance here, however, is the
common need to define capital stock or investment.
McKinsey (1996) have a preference for physical measures, but this is not always
feasible due both to the difficulty of adding units of a variety of types of output, and
also because of quality differences. They also suggest value added or gross output,
which overcome both of these difficulties: different types of output can be summed,
and higher quality tends to be reflected in higher prices and thus higher reve_nu_es or
value added. They used value added for all industries except telecommunications (call
minutes) and electric utilities (kilowatt hours), where outputs are relatively
homogeneous and of constant quality. Value added was defined as factory-gate gross
output less purchases of materials and energy. Gross output (also in money terms)
was also considered. But both these measures require conversion to a common
currency, and this was done using PPPs. .
The advantage of monetary measures is that they allow aggregation of both an airline's
own services and work performed for others, such as handling and maintenance (see
Oum & Yu, 1998). On the other hand, appropriate deflators need to be found for a
variety of outputs to accommodate price and exchange rate changes. Physical
measures such as ATKs and RTKs record only an airline's own air services, but other
services can be converted to equivalent traffic units, as suggested below.
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2.2 Definition of Airline Inputs
Airlines require inputs of capital, labour, and materials in order to offer flights and
associated booking, ground and other services. Inputs, such as airport and air traffic
control services purchased from others are themselves the product of capital, labour
and materials managed by other agencies.
2.2.1 Labour
The simplest measure of labour is average annual employee numbers. This should be
adjusted for part-time staff and many airlines publish annual equivalent levels of
staffing. Actual man-hours per annum worked would be a better measure, to take into
account differences in holiday entitlement, Sickness and absenteeism, but this number is
not usually available.
The major problem in using equivalent annual employee numbers on the payroll is in its
relationship to output. Employees may work on contracts for other airlines, and this
will not appear in physical measures of output, although it will appear in total revenues
under third party work. Conversely, part of ATK output may be produced by
employees of other firms, where part of the production is outsourced. This would
show up in the cost of services provided by other firms. Both these could be
converted into equivalent staff numbers. A recent paper avoided this problem by
including incidental revenues in outputs (third party work for other airlines), and
material and other services bought in as inputs (Oum and Yu, 1995 and 1998).
Here total payroll costs have been deflated by the UK index of average earnings.
Output from BA staff working on services to other airlines has been taken into account
above. However, the problem of any significant move towards outsourcing has not
been addressed. The only major examples of this over the period studied has been the
sale of the engine overhaul business to GE in December 1991. The loss of the third
party work provided by this unit Would result in a reduction in both outputs and inputs.
The distortion arises from a shift of the staff and capital employed in overhauling BA's
engines to an outside company, which Would t:educ-e_only inputs (or transfer them to
goods and services bought in), and artificially raise productivity.
2.2.2 Capital
_t.......
The measurement and definition of_:apitai is more complex than labour. The main
question is how much capital has actually been consumed over a given period of time?
• : - . • _:_ :.,_ -_ _ _,_;.'-_ ¢; _.._.i_ _ _. _ -_; :_'. • _ "
The stock of capital assets produces a fl0_,v or consumption of capital over its useful
life. This flow is more appropriate to u_ as an input of capital, but depreciation is
likely to be misleading as a proxy for this, since depreciation allowances are often
much greater than the decline in an asset's" output producing capacity (Kendrick,
1991). The 1996 McKinsey study highlighted the need to consider monetary values of
various capital assets (because of the difficulty in adding physical units of diverse and
heterogeneous assets), but converted these to comparable physical units by deflating
expenditure-based estimates by the investment goods PPP.
.°_
McKinsey considered the flow of service from an asset to be the payments that would
be made as if the asset were leased. This would therefore include both depreciation
and interest payments. They used this approach for some industries, and for others
they divided the capital stock by the useful life for each type of asset, and aggregated
these costs to arrive at the total flow of capital services. McKinsey estimated capital
stock using the perpetual inventory method. This infers the capital stock from the
gross fixed capital formation expenditures and presumed depreciation schedules for
each type of asset.
Many authors agree on the inclusion of both depreciation and interest in any measure
of capital consumption (see Deakin and Seward, 1969). Some go further to suggest
that both dividends and .retained earnings should also be included, on the basis that, if
the return on loan capital investment (eg interest) is considered, so should the return
on equity capital (Kendrick and Creamar, 1961).
One study converted capital (defined in some way) into equivalent man-years of
labour, so that labour and capital could be combined to obtain total factor inputs
(Smith and Beeching, 1948) _ _ .......
Another study distin_iShedbetween the cost of flight equiPment and ground property :_
and equipment°(Oum _d Yu, 1995). An index of flight equipment input quantity was _
constructed by multiplying the annual lease cost by the number of each aircraft in the
fleet, and then weightirig the result by the lease price of each aircraft type. The
weighting was performed using the translog multilateral index procedure. The real
stock of ground property and equipment was estimated using the perpetual inventory
method. The annual cost was then computed by multiplying this real stock by a service
price. The latter was estimated using the method proposed by Christensen and
Jorgenson (1969). This accounts for interest, depreciation, corporate income and
property taxes and capital gains. The flight equipment an__dground property indexes
were then combined into one]ndex, again using the translog procedure.
3 British Airways' Capital Productivity _
3.1 Output measurement
Available tonne-kms (ATK) were initially used as a measure of output, reflecting the
total airline production. However, the cartier increased its average load factor
consistently over the period, the gains from which would be better reflected in revenue
tonne-kms (RTK). The second of the two problems referred to above, namely quality,
was not considered to introduce any major distortion. Quality of service has many
dimensions, but aircraft types used were broadly similar in terms and increasing length
of haul is reflected in ATKs and RTKs. On the other hand some increases in average
frequencies per route may have occurred, and executive lounges in airport became
more common.
The first problem, namely the combination of different types of output, was more
significant: in 1996/97, non-RTK generating revenues amounted to £751 million, or
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9% of total turnover. These revenues were converted into equivalent RTKs by
applying the average yields in each year on BA's own scheduled and charter air
services (eg 53.1 pence in 1996/97).
Output growth was relatively modest in the earlier pan of the I980s, especially in the
restructuring period which was largely completed by 1983/84 (see Figure 2). This
involved the deletion of some routes. Faster growth occurred in the period 1986/87 to
1989/90, when the recession set in. This probably finished a year or so earlier in the
UK and US compared to other European countries, and growth was resumed in
1992/93 at around 10% a year.
blsert FigTtre 2
3.2 blput measurement
It was shown above that there is no entirely consistent and satisfactory way to measure
capital inputs. It was decided, however, that the flow of capital consumed in each
year, rather than the stock of capital, would be the best indicator of what was available
to provide airline and related services in that year. Similarly, labour wages and salaries
provide better indicators of what was available,, reflecting hours actually worked rather
than numbers of employees which represent the stock of labour.
Airline capital available consists principally of aircraft, but also of ground equipment,
buildings and land. Those that are owned or on finance leases are depreciated over
various service lives in the accounts to give some measure of capital consumed.
Capital is also available through shorter term or operating leases, which appear in the
accounts as an operating expense, combining depreciation and interest charges.
Capital input needs to combine both owned and]eased assets into an annual estimate
of consumption. This money amount then needs to be deflated to take out any price
effects to give a volume indicator of input.
Off-balance sheet aircraft operating leases for BA currently account for just under 30°/,
of the total fleet numbers. Rental expenditure frr these aircraft gives a good estimate
of capital consumption in any year. For owned aircraft, the equivalent lease amount
needed to bedetermined so that total capital input from aircraft could be estimated.
This was done by taking the average gross valUe of the fleet in each year (ie before
depreciation) and calculating the lease equivalent using the following standard lease
formula:
Periodic Rental Payment = PV + a
where: the presen(value, or equipment cost.... PV _ --
a
the rental facfor, Which is:
1-(1+i) _._(,-x)
+ x
i
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where: X
n =
i =
number of rentals payable in advance
number of payments in lease term
interest rate per period
The gross fleet value is based on historical costs, updated each year following aircraft
withdrawals and additions. For 1996/97, the average gross fleet value was £8.7 billion.
These aircraft costs were largely incurred in US dollars and converted to sterling at
end year exchange rates. The lease calculation requires inputs of both remaining
service or economic life and interest rate. The former was initially set at 25 years less
the average age of the fleet in each year, with the interest rate for each year varying at
50 basis points over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate), or for 1996/97 6.0%.
This rate of interest is considered the level at which BA would have borrowed, and a
variable or floating rate. reflected more realistic in relation to both owned and leased
aircraft. For lease payments in arrears (x = 0), the lease equivalent of the on-balance
sheet aircraft amounted to £910 million in 1996/97, to which the off-balance sheet
lease aircraft rentals of £119 million were added.
For capital inputs other than aircraft, a lease equivalent was calculated in the same way
as for aircraft, but an average remaining life of 5 years was taken, applied to balance
sheet gross asset values. It is likely that the majority of these assets would have been
acquired in ster_ling, so that a UK capital goods deflator would be the most appropriate
way to convert value estimates to volumes.
The conversion-of these- aircraft value estimates to volumes would ideally use a US
aircraft manufacturing price index applied to the original US dollar capital costs 3, and.
then converted at PPP exchange rates. However, only sterling costs were given, so
that a £ deflator was constructed by converting a US$ index of aircraft prices to
sterling using_average £/$ rates of exchange actually applied by BA. _:
Figure 3 summarises the changes in real inputs over the period studied. It can be seen
that after the rationalisation in 1983/84, which continued from the previous year,
investment grew over the recovery period to the end of the decade. BA was no
exception to the prevailing industry tendency to over-order at the end of a cyclical
upswing. However, this was confined to the year 1990/91 when 11 Boeing 747-400s
were delivered, together with 5 B767-300s. This was partly financed by a sale and
leaseback on 20 B737-200s, a deal which captured a relatively good average price for
these aircraft before it declined.
lnsert Figure 3
Average aircraft prices expressed in £ sterling increased sharply up to 1985/86, mainly
as a result of sterling's depreciation (which would have boosted revenues). The
converse was true over the next period to 1988/89, when US$ aircraft prices hardened
as a result of increased demand. While prices turned down as a result of the industry's
cyclical downturn, by 1996/97 the index had climbed again to its 1990 high point.
3 The majority of BA's aircraft are US built, although some have UK manufactured engines. A price
index based on the manufacturer's labour and materials cost is normally used in the aircraft purchase
contract to escalate the agreed price to a delivery 3'ear value
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Changes in real labour inputs are also shown in Figure 3 for comparison. The large
1983/84 reflects the last year of the major downsizing from 55,000 to 37,000 staff,
with modest increases to match the traffic growth in the second half of the 1980s.
3.3 Capital productivity
An initial idea 0f capit.al productivity might be gained from examining trends in average
ATKs pe r aircraft. This ratio does not contain price or value data, but averages
efficiency over the whole fleet. A change in fleet mix towards more long haul
widebodies would increase the ratio without any underlying change in the true
productivity of capital used for supplying a specific city-pair of given stage length.
What Figure 4 shows is the tendency over the period of the average price of aircraft to
increase faster than average aircraft efficiency, particularly towards the end of cyclical
upturns.
lnsert FigTtre 4
In the 1960s and 1970s, new aircraft incorporated a larger number of seats, increased
lower deck cargo capacity and greater speed and range. This inevitably led to easily
identifiable and quantifiable efficiency increases delivered in return for some increases
in price. Over the past two decades, however, aircraft size has not grown much on
average, but many cost saving improvements have nevertheless been incorporated in
the aircraft (eg automated flight deck, modular design for lower maintenance costs).
The average payload per aircraft in the BA fleet rose from 29 tomes in 1982/83 to
only 35 tonnes in 1996/97.
The capital productivity measure described below was adjusted RTK output per total
lease equivalent input, deflated by a capital price index. It was concluded that this
ratio minimised the key problems discussed in the previous sections. Figure 5 shows
that after a rise in the first two years, capital iSroductivity on this basis subsequently
declined over the remaining part of the decade, after which it remained stable• The
early rise was principally due to an increa_se in the overall load factors from 61.9% in
1982/83 to 67.2% in 1984/85. At the same time there was a shift in emphasis from
passengers to cargo, the latter utilising spare lower deck capacity. A marked increase
occurred in charter flights, especially in I983/84, which are inherently more capital
efficieiitthi'ough high load factors _,fid higher seat density.
lnsert FigTtre 5
The more productive use of existing capital through more efficient organisation or
better trained staff is probably difficult to achieve in any sizeable way in the air
transport industry. Flying crew are already highly trained and improvements may show
up more in better quality service than higher output.
Aircraft accounted for around two thirds of the total annual capital consumption up to
1990/91, but this share subsequently declined to around 60%. The faster growth in
shorter life investments which are not directly related to aircraft would tend to depress
°°
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any measure of capital productivity which did not take into account the output quality
improvements that such investments tend to produce. This is likely to be the case here,
since it has been impossible to incorporate such qualitative changes in the output
variable, even though they would certainly have affected inputs, especially those of
capital.
3.4 Capital and labour price developments
Figure 6 shows developments in output and input prices expressed in £ sterling terms.
The output price index was based on total revenue per RTK. After an increase in the
first year, helped by sterling's marked depreciation, it remained stable or drifted down.
Airlines had traditionally reacted to a recession by raising fares and sustaining yield
increases; however, in .the early 1990s recession, competitive discounting led to a
decline in local currency yields. For BA this was offset by favourable exchange rate
developments, at least against the US dollar, between 1991/92 and 1993/94.
lnsert Figure 6
Dollar/sterling exchange rate fluctuations also helped dampen down BA's capital input
price index expressed in sterling (Figure 7). This was based on Avmark's estimates of
the new price, of a B757 aircraft. This was an aircrat_ type that was offered in
relatively standard form over the whole period, and was also an important aircraft in
the BA fleet. 4 The aircraft price index was combined with LIBOR interest rates, upon
which the majority of BA's loans and leases are based, to form an overall capital price
index. _ _ . _:
Insert Figure 7
The UK index of average earnings was taken as the labour price index, given the
largely LrK based composition of BA's employees. This rose by an average Of 6.6%
over the period, compared with BA's average staff remuneration per employee of
6.5%. Average UK prices rose by ;4.9% over flae period sU-rvlv_! for BA therefore
depended on producing labour productivity gains to allow real pay increases and
generate adequate returns to capital and shareholders.
3.5 Labour capital ratio
The capital/labour ratio was around 1.7:1 in 1982/83, but experienced a marked
reduction to 1.3:1 by the date of privatisation. This was due to the shake out of
labour, rather than any planned move towards increasing capital per employee. Once
this had occurred, capital inputs tended to rise somewhat faster than labour inputs,
with this ratio declining to 1.1:1 by 1996/97.
This suggests that BA, as with many other state-owned carders, was overstaffed prior
to the recovery measures initiated in the early 1980s. This is less likely the case now,
although continued labour union power and restrictions in competition (eg BA's slot
holdings at Heathrow Airport) suggests that some inefficiencies may remain.
4 BA's B757s increased from 4 in April 1993 to 41 in April 1997
A further lay-off of staff in early 1991 as a result of the Gulf War recession might have
led to greater capital intensity, but capital was reduced more markedly in that year.
This was the result of the withdrawal from all Irish and a number of other routes, and
the retirement of seven BAC 1-t ls and five Tristar 200s.
What emerges from this analysis is the fact that BA did not achieve any further
substitution of capital for labour post-privatisation, even though labour wage rates
increased very significantly in relation to capital prices. The extent to which this was
possible in any large way in a service industry may have been limited, if the airline were
to retain its reputation for high service standards. Some investment in automation led
to reduced labour requirements. Examples of this were:
* The replacement of B747-100/200 aircraft which required a flight engineer with
B747-400s which did not (from Summer 1989)
* Computerisation in areas such as accounts and management information which
reduced staff needs
It is noteworthy that BA's Information Technology budget increased from £35 million
in 1982/83, or 1.3% of turnover, to £130 million or 2.7% of turnover in 1989/90. This
was expected to reach 5% of turnover in 1995 (British Airways, 1990). However,
many IT or communications applications result in increased service quality rather than
greater efficiency. One example of this is issuing passenger service staff with hand-
held computers at check-in. It should be added that the air transport industry has been
slow to adopt automation in areas such as check-in and ticketing, whereas other
industries such as banking have developed faster. Some progress has been held up by
the need for industry wide standardisation to be agreed (eg the Automated Ticket and
Boarding pass, and electronic ticketing). This is because of the continued importance
of interline sales.
3. 6 Key factors m BA 's recovery and above average financial performance
From the discussion above it was evident that labour productivity was the principal
agent of BA's recovery, as well as its above average performance during the recession
in the first half of the 1990s. Sterling's large fall, at least against the US dollar, also
helped over the recovery period to 1984185.
For the period as a whole, capital productivity by itself only contributed to the
recovery between 1982/83 and 1984/85, and, for the rest of the period, growth in
capital inputs exceeded output growth. "l'his was partly because additions to capital
tended to be aircraft of similar capabilities and size to existing aircraft. The benefits
from these aircraft came from qualitative improvements, which could not be allowed
for in the output index used in this paper. For example, more overhead locker space,
improved seating, or lower cabin noise might have improved the yield from a similar
volume of traffic. Non-aircraft investments which grew faster than aircraft investment
after 1992 would also have given the airline a qualitative advantage.
However, capital investment also enables the airline's staff to be more productive.
BA's total lease equivalent capital per employee increased in real terms from £5,100 in
v1982/83 to £19,860 in 1996/97. This by itself would have been a major reason for the
airline's success in increasing labour productivity, as described in 3.5 above.
Total factor productivity (the weighted average of labour and capital productivity) was
shown in Figure 5 to have increased by just under 30% up to privatisation in early
1987. A further 30% advance occurred between 1991/92 and 1996/97, again driven
by labour productivity achievements. BA's total factor productivity based on the
above measures increased at an average rate of 3.4% a year between 1986 and 1995,
compared with other research which estimated an identical rate for seven of the largest
EU airlines over the same period (Oum & Yu, 1998). This is surprising, given that the
.same study reported a decline in TFP between 1990 and 1992 for the EU airlines,
whereas BA was shown here to have increased productivity by 20% over these three
years of recession.
The productivity of inputs other than labour and capital should also be mentioned,
although this paper has not focused on these. Fuel and airport/ATC services are
probably the two most important. The latter have increased in price substantially over
the period, with little scope for increased efficiency, except by using larger aircraft,
which was not the case. Fuel efficiency increased gradually over the period, as new
aircraft were introduced. However, the fuel price declined significantly over both the
first half'of tl_e-]-c)80s and the i990s largely taken as a whole. BA benefited from this
in its pre-privatisation period, even after taking into account the weaker US$ exchange
rate. The same was the case in the early 1990s, although the exchange rate did not
decline as much.
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AIRLINE PRIVATIZATION: DOES IT MATTER?
Martin Staniland
University of Pittsburgh
The classic political ar_ment over pub_-eenterprise has been w=hether the government .....
should own businesses at all. Yet what matters more than titular ownership is how the
enterprise is run, who makes the decisions, under what rules and subject to what political
pressures... Ownership does not necessarily give control; it may, in fact, affect the
character of'an industry very little (Corbett, 1965, p. 185).
This paper reviews some of the issues concerned with the privatization of airlines'within
the EU and especially the implications (if any) of privatization for liberalization of the EU air
transport market and for airline strategy. The questions broached include the following:
(1) What does privatization mean?
(2) What benefits are anticipated fi'om privatization, and to whom will these benefits
accn.le?
(3) What are the sources of pressure for and against privatization?
(4) What are the implications ofprivatization for competition and for corporate strategy?
To what extent are the anticipated benefits compatible with each other?
Much airline privatization is current and it is too soon to say what its effects will be. I have
therefore leaned heavily in one section on the best-known example - that of British Airways (BA)
- to illustrate one tension in Lhe privatization process. But the lessons of this case are limited,
given the changes in regulation that have occurred since 1987 (the date ofBA's privatization) as a
result of the implementation of the three EU liberalization packages.
(1) What does prlvatlzation mean?
A broadly acceptable definition of__tion_i_ that oi_'eled by E.S.Savas in his classlc _
book on the subject: 'Privatization is the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the
role ofthe private sector, in an activity or in the ownership ofassets'(Savas 1987, p.3). A key
issue, then, is whether selling airlines r_uces the role of government in air transport. Clearly, it
does so in the direct production of services, but it may not do so in respect ofoveraU
responsibility for providing transportation) 'Provision' continues and is even expanded in respect
t The distinction between "production" and "pro,dsion" is made in Kolderie (1990).
may be accompanied by close domestic and international regulation of routes and traffic.
Privatizing production of services involves several kinds of action. It might involve:
(a) an open offering of all or a majority of shares on the market without restriction as to
categories of possible purchasers (as happened with BA in 1987);
(b) sale of all or a majority of assets to a single private sector buyer (the closest to such a
case is the Belgian government's sale of 49 per cent of Sabena's shares to Swissair, with the
government retaining a controlling interest). Some management buyouts would fall into this
category, " " _
(c) the buying back of government-held shares by an airline, as was proposed by KLM and
the Dutch government in 1996 (Cramb, 1996).
(d) a process ofredudng, without eliminating, public stakeholding, usually to below 50°,4.
Such a process may occur in several stages and may (or may not) precede a complete sell-offof
the public shareholding. Several European airlines have Seen such a p_d reduction over a
number of years;
(e) a controlled, selective sale of shares to particular categories of buyers (such as financial
houses, employees, and other airlines), often with specified proportions reserved for each
category.
(2) What benefits are anticipated from privatization, and to whom will these
benefits accrue?
Arguments for the privatization of airlines have closely resembled those applied to other
industries. They involve both a critique of the performance, efficiency and accountability of state-
owned carriers and, conversely, claims about the benefits for taxpayers, consumers, and the
airlines expected to result, directly or indirectly, from privatization. The arguments for
privatization of the airlines have, however, been offered in a particularly strenuous way by those
who regard this industry (at least in Europe) as presenting an exceptionally egregious case of
protectionism (domestic and foreign) in the face of those (a decreasingly vocal minority) who
believe that airlines should stay under public ownership for reasons of national security and
prestige and/or who see provision of air transport as a form of public service.
Benefits claimed from privatization include:
/
(A) _: The end of responsibility for capital injections, subsidies and
accumulated debts, and a one-time windfall of revenue for the Exchequer from the sale of shares
in the airline (with consequent benefits for government debts);
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in the airline (with consequent benefits for government debts);
(B) Foi" the r.,onsumer: Greater choicebetween carriers and lower fares as the result of the
ending of state-mandated monopolies, better and possibly new services;
(C) For the airlines: (1) More efficient use of resources due tO the pressures of a
competitive environment and to their ability to pursue a commercially-based strategy, flee of
distracting and costly government requirements regarding such matters as routes, equipment
purchase and employment levels; (2) Greater access to capital markets; (3) Greater freedom in
purchasing equipment (including aircr_) and in controlling labor costs; (4) Greater scope for
entering and creating alliances with other carriers (including non-EU carriers) and the possibility
of selling their own equity and buying that of'other airlines; (5) Greater opportunities for
reorganizing management and hiring non-nationals.
These classes of possible beneficiaries demand further refinement. To whom and
what does the category 'airlines' refer? The shareholders? The managers? The cabin crew?. The
ground staff?. To what extent and how is each likely to benefit (if at all) from privatization? Does
the answer depend on how privatization is carried out? Further, does what the Exchequer want
differ from What some taxpayers want (and what other ministries want)? Finally, while not all
taxpayers are consumers and not all consumers are by any means domestic taxpayers, is there
some overlap between the categories and some scope therefore for both shared and conflicting
interests?
Beneath these is the fundamental question: in what circumstances and for what purposes
does ownership actually matter?
(3) what are the sources of pressure for and against privatization?.
The'whole political story of airline privatization in the airline is yet to be told. Both the
advent 0f'privatization and its widespread acceptance demand explanation, given the common
view of the industry a/a bastion of public ownership and protectionism)
In seeking ang-wers, we should distinguish three levels of economic and political pressure"
the domestic; the European Union level; and the external - fashionably, the 'global' - level.
(a) The domestic level: _
_: Thbugh few polls have_ked about airline ownership, early evidence from
the U_ suggested that voters 'regarded [public ownership] as a success' in the airline industry.
More revealing, however, was that the percentage taking this view was only 35%: nine per cent
I ii! I _-- ii ii = _
Tfi6u_of course_ private ownership of an industry and state protectionism are quite
commonly associated.
3
regardedpublicownership (of the-then BEA and BOAC) as "a failure" and a large majority
(50%) were 'don't know's (Corbett, 1965, p.64). 3 Party allegiance made surprisingly little
difference to evaluation of the state airlines. This survey was, of course, taken at a time when,
even more than now, air travel on scheduled services within Europe was almost exclusively the
preserve of businessmen and government o_cials. If any consumer pressure for liberalization and
privatization occurred, it was mostly to be found in the years aRer deregulation in the US and in
the columns of such publications as The Economist and ]he Fincazcial Times, both of which
frequently and consistently protested about the costliness and arrogance of EU state carriers,
drawing on a wealth of anecdotes from their suffering business (and political) readers.
However, while the need for pfivatization was a moral frequently drawn from such
anecdotes, the main campaign was for market liberalization and against indulgence of state-owned
carriers in such matters as subsidies, international route authorities and airport slots.
The attitudesofpartiesdirectlyconcernedwiththeindustry-labourunions,airline
managements,and ministersoftransportandfinance-havevariedaccordingtocountry,ideology
and economic interest: ......
_: The leR and labor unions have, predictably, been skeptical ofprivatization
and its consequences. The resignation of Christian Blanc as chairman of the Air France Group
arose directly from a disagreement with the Jospin government, elected in March 1997 (and
particularly with the commmunist Nf_misterof Transport, Jean-Claude Gayssot) over the
proportion of Air France's shares to be sold directly on the market (Owen, 1997A_ Jones, 1997A
and B).
Yet the readiness of labor unions to accept both privatization and the restructuring
invariably preceding it has varied significandy from one country to another. Compared to the
unions in France and Italy, those in the more 'corporatist' cultures of Germany and the
Netherlands (not to mention Portugal) have been relatively acquiescent. In 1992, the two major
unions representing Lufthansa's workers 'signalled their broad acceptance' of a plan involving the
elimination of 6,000 jobs (Fisher, 1992A). Airline officials _mmente, d_that _e_n_ssions
offered by the unions (notably the white-collar DAG) 'represented a marked change fi'om the high
wage demands' made even in the earlier months of the year ffisher, 1992B).
In the case of KLM, the labor unions actually took the initiative in 1993 to suggest that
the company expand its capital. A large number of meetings wer e held by management at KLM
stations in the Netherlands and abroad to explain company strategy, while consultations were held
with the Works Council on such items as 'investments and disinvestments....KLM's European
3 The survey, found that 'airlines, along with atomic energy, drew the largest percentage
of "don't know"responses'. The railways and the coal industry were generally judged as failures
ofpublic ownership.
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strategy...and the corporate culture. '_
Airline managers! The most imponantten_ons, and ambivalences, regarding pdvatJzatlon have
clearly occurred at the level of airline management, in transport ministries and in relations between
the two. Conflicts have occurred about the desirability of market liberalization and privatization.
Largely because of pressures created by the single market (and indirectly by the European
Commission), as weUasby liberalization and alliances in markets outside the EU, airline
managements have generally become favorable to (even anxious for) privatization, s What they
seek from privatization is greater flexibility in operations, procurement, hiring and firing, and
financing; But they are concerned about the vulnerability to competition and even bankruptcy
that go along with such flexibility.
The usual compromise has been to seek capital from the state to undertake
the reorganizing and re-equipment that will enable a carrier to face competition within and
outside Europe. But seeking such capital invariably attracts criticism of 'subsidies' from
competing private carriers and from politicians and commentators hostile to the privileges - and
even existence - of state-owned 'flag carriers.'
Airline managers also have to be sensitive about the terms on which pdvatization is
implemented and about the regulatory conditions accompanying privatization. Airline managers
resent the intervention of the state in policy matters such as equipment purchase and labor
relations. But they expect state support in obtaining funds for restructuring before privatization
and in various forms ofdebt relief(which may include low valuation of assets being transferred to
the privatized firm, direct write-offs, and - what comes to the same thing - an actual return of
some of the revenue from the sale). They may also hope that the terms of sale will not be affected
by regulatory conditions intended to create a more level playing field between the ex-state airline
and its private competitors.
The cases of Air France and British Airways illustrate some ofthe resulting ambiguities in
relations between governments and airline managements.
French governm_ts, of both the-ldt ,and the fight, have-expected Air France to support
various aspects of economic policy, notably preventing or reducing unemployment (including
' KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (1996), p.28. In fairness, it should be noted that many other
EU carriers have similar works councils, partly as a result of the relevant EU social policy
directives.
s Wright notes this as a general phenomenon: 'Perhaps the most serious dillon of
support for'the public sector is to be found among its managers. Indeed, by the mid-1980s they
were among the principal proponents of the privatization movement' (Wright, 1994, 27-8).
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unemployment in the French aerospace industry). _ When in 1991 Bernard Attali, as president of
Air France, proposed cutting 3,000 jobs, he was immediately summoned by the Prime ,Minister,
Edith Cresson (a Socialist, then facing an election campaign). According to Attali's vivid
description:
The Prime Minister, beside herself, received me in the strange boudoir that served her then
as an office. And [she] told me: 'This plan is stupid_ I wasn't told about it, I'm going to
have to stop all this. That's an order' (Attali, 1994, p. 110: my translation)
The subsequent conservative government ofEdouard Balladur initially supported Attali's
reforms, through its transport minister Bernard Bosson, and included Air France in its list of
companies for privatization. But it was facing 12.2% unemployment and (despite defiant public
rhetoric from Bosson), the Air France management was told privately tl_3 _ere shovel Re a
minimum of layoffs atAir France (as at other state corporations). _en the gdund staff carried
out a highly-publicized and damaging strike in October 1993, Bosson backed down, wiih-dr-awing
Attali's plan and subseque_ntly claiming to have done so onthe direct orders 0fBallad/ar, Who _
'would countenance only a "few dozen layoffs,"' rather than the 800 envisaged (Financial Times,
1993B).
Explaining his subsequent resignation, Att_ remarked"
The state [had] involved itself in a bungling fashion in the _agement of a large
enterprise. Through lack of_ it stopped point-blank, at the worst moment, a
process of modernization [which was] certainly painful, but indispensable (Attali,
1994,p.227: my translation).
Attali's successor, Christian Blanc, expressed similar thastrati0n _ J_uary 1997, some
months before his own resignation. In this case, one cause seems to have been pressure on Air
France to buy Airbus A340s rather than Boeing 777s. The transport minister, Bernard Pons, told
the National Assembly that the airline's choice would depend 'not only on the interests of.. Air
France but also [on] the interests of the other economic sectors of our country' (Owen, 1996).
Though his ministry subsequently denied any intention of pressing Air France to buy Airbus
aircraft, it commented that there might be 'a difficult reaction' if the airline bought only Boeings
(Owen, 1996). In his January speech, Blanc declared:
The state is the owner of Air France, SNCF, Aeroports de Paris and Aerospatiale. In
short, it is constantly judge and party to the case. It interferes in everything, seeking
compromises everywhere to minimize risks but having absolutely no strategy (Air
Transport World, 1997A).
For a good summary of relations between French governments and Air France, see
Kassim (1996), pp. 121-2.
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However, while critical of the government's 'meddling', Attali and other Air France
officials were at one with their politi_|superliJrs=in being skeptical abo_t fiE)'eralization. The Air
France m_/_agement, wl_i_-desiring g/ef,{eF o_e?afi0_ independence, does not seem to have
pressed }'orbpen s_es agreements and w_ _c_ca| of'both the =Eur0p_(:o_sslon and the
_5i_6 _ggressivelyliberal Member states _d-_,_n6s. it w_fed to m_nia_n state involvement in
_temationalreguiati0n (and thereby the airline'-s-pH_ieges as a flag-carrying_'national champion')
and stat_esponsorship in obtaining EU igreenientib subsidies. But it W_l-esg-_ whan it
came to exercising its manageriai'prc'iogat{ves.in theautumn of 1_96 ............
The pfivatization of British Airways in the mid-1980s revealed a similar tension between a
desire for. freedomfrom government control and a wish to keep the status of 'national
champion.' Responding to efforts by its domestic rivals (notably British Caledonian) to reduce
BA's m_ket dolce before privatL'.atior/,-BA's _agement, led feroci6usly by Lord King,
launched an intensive campaign asserting that Britain 'needed the strongest possible flag-cartier,
to make sure UK civil aviation went to the tOl_'OTthe World league and sta_ed'_dre _ (Campbell-
Smith, 1986, p. 152). The campaign claimed that 'every day British Airways compete[d] with
hundreds0_foreig n _lines'fi'om all 0ver die world' (Campbell-Smitig i986, 9.i56).
BA's critics retorted that such flag_waving was disingenuous and irrelevant. The real issue
was the _al absence of competition with other UK airlines on long-distance routes and BA's
efforts to resist erosion of its dolt position within Europe and the UK itsel£. BA might be
battling it out around the globe with foreign airlines; but no other UK airline was allowed to
compete with it at Heathrow.
r
Government officials: Undoubtedly, Leonard Hill was largely correct when he wrote in 1997 that
air fine privatization efforts continue, in direct proportion to the desperation of
government-f to replenish depfetedfiafional coffers. Wherever a cohntry's national identity
._ . isn't_mex_cably meshd _th=having_ _line as a pr0jecti0nof sovereign power ...
= == p01itid_ appear eagerto unload thdr pre_gious Crown (read 'airrme') jewels
(Hill, 1997).
What, apart fi'om the desire to oflload expensive state carriers, shaped the attitudes of
government officials to 9rivatization? Why had airlines, so long a traveUng symbol of nationhood
(and in some areas of modernity) become moi:e dubious assets in the eyes of their principal
shareholders? Why were the crown jewels so_tarnished?°,..
Much of the explanation certainly lay beyond the industry itself, in the broader ideological
movement that, starting in the seventies, expfds_-_sl/eiJticism ab0ut the efficacy and benefits of
statism and sought to enlist the dynamisn/of markets and entrepreneurship. As Vincent Wright
re_ks,..Privatizati°n was "part of a wider package ofreducing the size and reshaping the role of
the central state, ofa!locat'm__, resources andw _ealihd]_rently, and of providing collective goods
in a different fashion,' (Wright, 1994, p.6). ....
7
But the impact of this ideological movement has been greater in some Member States than
in others. The British case is the clearest example of ideology as a positive and basic source of
motivation (as distinct from budgetary retrenchment, pressures from airline managements, from
Brussels, and international liberalization and alliance-building). Yet under Thatcher, privatization
was not initially a priority ite m and a firm commitment to the sale of BA shares did not occur until
Janu_ 1986 _chardson, i994,_p.63, Caml_beil-S_th, 1986_ ppl 11-5-6)._ Moreover, the positive
philosophical virtues ofprivatizati0n were inextricably mixed with more practical concerns
regarding the government's finances. One motive for privatization arose from the Treasury's
unhappiness with a proposal to 'U_i_':_tio_ed industries from _ePublic Sector Borrowing
Requirement (PSBR),, allo_g them tO raise finance privately_ Gradu_y, the not|on Spread that
(in Campbell-Smith's words), 'the best solution wa s togo _ewhol e hog: if private capi_ _
__was so desirable, why not push the putative borrowers back into the private s_6t
altogetherT'(CampbeU-Smith, 1986, p. 117). 7 Proceeds from sales of state industries would also
provide one-time windfalls of money for the Exchequer.
Other benefits claimed for privatization in the UK included the more efficient use of
resources, the promotion of competition, and the creation of a share-owning democracy
(including ownership by employees). Not all the objectives ofprivatization were necessarily
consistent (for example, as discussed below, the objective of maximising revenue from the sale of
an industry might be in contradiction with the objective of encouraging competition - a relevant
concern in the sale of state airlines which were legal or de facto monopolies).
On the Continent, airline privatization had gone farthest in the Netherlands, but in few
countries did it attract the ideological fervor that surrounded it in Thatcher's Britain. In many
countries, the Christian Democratic tradition placed more importance on the concept of the
'social market" and was skeptical about its more ruthless Anglo-Saxon counterpart (Wright,
1994, p. 16). Even in France, where significant privatization occurred over more than a decade,
the socialist and statist tradition remained strong, including in policy toward Air France. Though
leaders of the French independent airlines called for the privatization of Air France, others (such
as Senator Ernest Cartigny, chair of a parliamentary committee on the airline industry) and
Bernard Bosson, the transport minister, opposed such a change. Bosson explicitly attacked
'ultrah'beralism':
The EU is not simply a zone of free trade, having for its only value the laws of the market.
The EU must also include a social vision, the values of regional development and public
service, which are ignored by considerations of profitability (Ridding and Betts, 1994).
Neve_ele%s, ihe French government Subsequently decided to move toward privatization. In this
/
' This sentiment seems to have been reciprocated by the 'putative borrowers': Richardson
notes that in Britain the 'tightening of financial control [by the government] had the effect of
edging the industries' managers towards a recognition that the only way to avoid the new irksome
burdens was to escape the public sector altogether'(Richardson, 1994, p.60).
E
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and other cases, the key question is how privatization is implemented. The formulas under
consideration reflect a range of political and economic objectives and constraints, some of which
have little to do directly with maximising returns from a sale. Their rationale will be clearer in the
context of pressures on the owners and managers of airlines from the creation of the single market
and from broader tre_nds in deregulation and corporate strategy in international air transport.
=
(b) _Ir,..F,,].LI.C_Y_:
In February 1994, a report by a group of European aviation experts, called the Committee
of Wise Men, recommended to the European Commission that approval of state aid for national
airlines 'should be contingent on a company being privatized'(Dixon, 1994). Commission
officials pointed out, correctly, that they could not 'formally tie aid to privatisation': Article 222
of the EC treaty speclflcally stipulates that the Treaty 'shall in no way prejudice the rules in
Member States governing the system of property ownership. 'S Commission officials are
sometimes careful to deny any wish to impose privatization on governments. 9Yet the fact is that
in some cases they have, as Hugo Dixon observed, applied 'a premium to pdvatisation'
because the fact that a company is being prepared for privatisation enhances the credibility
of its restructuring plan. It is also the best guarantee that subsidies are being provided for
the last time (Dixon, 1994). 1°
The philosophy of the single market and the impact ofspeclflc legislation did create a
climate in which the distancing ofgovemment from business was and is a premise or an
expectation. This climate strengthens those advocating privatization and puts those opposed to,
or skeptical about it, on the defensive. Basic EU law and specific directives 'logically prevent
g_vemments from tinilyexpl0itlrig thdr public enterprises as instruments of industrial,
regional policy or of purely politicalpatronage' (Wright, 1994, p.4). They also deprive state-
s Though David Allen, in a discussion of c0mpctition policy, notes that a policy review in
1989 'drew attention to the Commission's interest in using the treaty provisions both to police
and further to encourage the processes oflibe/allzati0_ _privatization" (Men, 1996, p. 178: my
italics). ...........
9. For example, in July 1994, it was rep6_edff_t a condition for the Commission's
approval ofa FF20 bn.aid package for Air France was that "the restructuring of the company
should be followed by privatization'(Tucker and Ridding, 1994). Shortly afterwards, the
Transport C0_ssioner, Marcelin00reja, i/_sueda Clarification stressing that the EU was "not
specifically requesting Air France's privatization ... This [he added] is the French government's
voluntary commitment" (Sparaco, 1994).
_oDixon pointed out that pledges to privatize (or to involve private capital) were
significant in the EU's agreement to subsidies for state-owned steel companies in G-trmany, Italy
and Spain.
9
ownedcompanies of virtually all the privileges they have previously enjoyed and, conversely,
draw unflattering attention to their costliness and lack of accountability. _
Public enterprises are expected to comply with all the rules that apply to comparable
private businesses. They potentially face challenges under Articles 85, 86 and 92--4 (dealing,-
respectively, with distortion ofcompetitiort, abuse of'dominant positi0n, and state aids). They may
not receive injections of capital from the state unless it can be shown that a private investor would
make a similar investment applying conventional business criteria. Other forms of state aid are
subject to specific criteria: subsidies for services wi/.hin the category of Public Service ObLigations
must be clearly separated from normal commercial operations, be-tiarifpgrent in their accounting,
and be subject to competitive bidding. Increasingly, state airlines have been denied monopoly or
preferential rights in use of airportserviees. - _ : •
The three liberalization packages have removed the other privileges of state carders, while
leaving Member States responsible for licensing of airlines and other regulatory functions. W'e,_h__
cabotage open to all Community carriers, state airlines can no longer enjoy domestic mofiopolies,
while the rights they held under bilateral agreements with other European states have disappeared.
So the question - for governments and managers alike - must be, 'What is the point of
state ownership now?'
Governments may still want the right to commandeer airliners in military and other
emergencies (and may fear such aircraft and their owners coming under foreign control). But (as
discussed below) licensing and aircrai_ registration procedures provide protection against control
by non-EU nationals. Moreover, during recent crises, obtaining civil airliners for military purposes
does not seem to have been difficult (and governments have, or can easily adopt, emergency
legislation to require private carriers to make aircr_ available).
Support of national aerospace industries - a traditional and much resented function of
state airlines - now has less political weight. Apart from Airbus Industrie, no European aerospace
company offers a significant challenge to Boeing, though ATR and British Aerospace build a
range of turboprops. British _ays _long since liberated itse_omgovenament influence in
selection of aircratL _ Frari_ and LUi_Kdnsahave cenainiy b6e_fiU_der _ressure to buy fi'om
Airbus and have done so extensively. Indeed, in the case of Luflhansa, further privatizationwas
opposed by the state of Bavaria in the mid-eighties, reportedly because the br-_misterPresident,
Franz Josef Strauss (who was at the time chairman of the board of Airbus Industrie) feared that
Bavaria's substantial stake in aerospace (including the Airbus consortium) might he.undated
if Lufthansa's management were free to order aircr_ soldya_,,o-rd'mg t_5t-K/_ir-_-/fimercia]
judgement (Esser, i994, pp. 113-4). -
m_The increasing cost of acquiring up-to-date aircraft is not the least important factor
motivating governments to privatize airlines.
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Where airlines do stay in public ownership, it will be because of a continuing belief that air
transport is best provided as a public service, for reasons of prestige or diplomacy, because of
direct political pressure by unions and others against privatization, or (not least) because
prospective buyers or shareholders are unlikely to be interested or are unwilling to pay what
governments regard as a reasonable price.
The financial and political pressures for privatization are, however, substantial, and have
been especially so in the run-up to establishment of the European Monetary Union. For example,
France's choices regarding privatization have depended to a great extent on what contribution a
particular sale would make to lowering the government's debts. The French government
preferred to sell 20 per cent of France Telecom rather than Air France because the former sale
was expected to bring in $6.6 billion:
Air France's privatization [an official noted] would have generated much less cash.
Politically, the carder's proposed privatization was not worth a serious political incident
_ (Sparaco, 1997.4,).
Indeed - so far fi'om being a source of revenue - Air France benefitted directly fi'om privatization
elsewhere in the economy. Thus in March 1994 the government announced that it would privatize
Assurances Generales de France because 'it needed the money to pump into Air France' (New
York Times, 1994)._2
Concern about EMU has affected other governments. Though the Netherlands was not
expected to face a serious problem meeting the convergence criteria, one of the reasons cited for
an early (and in some eyes premature) sell-back of KI2¢I shares by the Dutch government was that
the latter was "anxious to bring down debt ahead of European monetary union' (Cramb, 1996). _3
For Italy, which did have a serious deficit problem and was most anxious to be accepted
into EMU, the issue of admission became entangled diplomatically with the apparently more
commercial issues of privatization and strategic alliances. In 1996-97, it was well known that
KLM was looking for a European partner to strengthen its weak market share within the EU.
KLM decided that it needed a southern European hub and began negotiations with Alitalia, which
was emerging fi'om a very dif_cult period and was outside the major international alliances.
But in February 1997, Alitalia concluded a marketing alliance with Air France. One
correspondent speculated that 'gomano Prodi's government might opt for a "poUtical deal" with
i i i
_z The Minister for Industry, Gerard Longuet, remarked, 'We need a bit more money
because Christian Blanc's report shows that you can't get something for nothing. We're selling
one asset to rebuild another one'(New York Times, 1994).
_aUnder the convergence rules, revenue fi'om privatizafions was not supposed to be used
to reduce overall _defidts but it was very useful in reducing debt levels.
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Air France to underpin the Franco-ltalian relationship in the final stages ofltaly's bid to enter a
single currency' (Blitz, 1997B). But the very political character of such an alliance would weaken
prospects for privatization of Alitalia in 1998: 'If we are to start selling shares next year [a senior
official remarked], we need a deal that is perceived to be good sense on a technical and
commercial level, not a political one' (Blitz, 1997A).
While Air France's management wanted to end the carrier's isolation, Alitalia's
management clearly believed that an alliance with KLM would make better commercial and
technical sense and that prospective share-buyers would take the same view. Also, KLM was
already more than 60 per cent privately-owned, while Air France was still entirely government-
owned (and, moreover, had recently lost a much-respected chairman, Christian Blanc, precisely
over the issue ofprivatization)) _ Alitalia's management finally persuaded Prodi that an alliance
with Air France 'would undermine plans to privatize the Italian airline" and a deal was struck with
KLM, 'in spite of pressure from the French government" (Blitz, 1997B; Owen, 1997B).
To summarize the impact ofthe single market on state ownership: while nothing in EU
legislation requires or explicitly encourages privatization, the premise of the market is competition
to ensure the efficient use of resources. 'In principle [as ged0r notes], private and public
enterprises (in the competitive sector) are subject to the same rules and are supposed to behave in
the same way." The EU has adopted a notion of'neutrality' as between public and private firms
so that over time 'the difference between private and public firms in the competitive sector will
become increasingly less' (Redor, 1992, p. 162).
But - contrary tO the common view that the effects of the single market w_l be gradual
and evolutionary - the impact on publicly-owned firms may be immediate and dramatic. The
impact has certainly been dramatic in the case of air transport. The onus has shifted onto the
shoulders of the supporters of public ownership to defend its utility, against the default position
that, absent a positive case to the contrary, the norm is and should be private ownership.
To follow the actual change in discourse on this subject, the key group to study is
probably the airline managers (rather than government officials). They are the people most
directly affected by the dynamics of change and they find themselves caught between their
political masters and the pressures ofthe market. Shifts in discourse may occur under one
management team, but they more commonly occur with a change in leadership (as when Lord
King and Colin Marshall were appointed to head BA, possibly when Christian Blanc was
appointed as chairman of Air France, and by successive changes at Alitalia, Iberia, and TAP).
Equally significant is the trend toward the appointment of Americans to management positions in
t, The Fit_lcial Times reported that 'recent ructions over the [Air France] group's
privatisation, which culminated in Mr.Blanc's depama'e, may have handicapped its attempts to
forge a link with Alitalia by clouding aspects of long-term strategy' (Owen, 1997B).
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European airlines (and a general internationalization of managerial recruitment in the industry), j5
(e) The externa! or 'global' level:
Such changes in personnel reflect the changing nature &the industry. Despite an archaic
regulatory regime still formally governing international aviation, increasingly comprehensive
alliances have formed between major carriers. These alliances have the effect of by-passing some
of the restrictions imposed by the international regime and some aspects of domestic regulation.
i _{-; _:_--:_ : _ _.. i____-{
The internationalization of an industry that is itself a primary vehicle of internationalization
creates a special problem for publicly-owned carriers. As Stevens has said,
the dilemma facing state-owned enterprises is that the pressure to internationalise theft
activities is growing rapidly, but that the corporate strategies needed to respond
adequately are ultimately best pursued in a privatised context (Stevens, 1992, p. 17)
State-own_:@_es _e at a disadvantage in joining the new lances (even if they can do so
legally) because private firms may be reluctant t? a_ept-them. Public enterprises are apt to have
legally-mandated missions which may be at odds with the strategies of private firms. They are
subject to being tools of government employment and industrial policies and to being influenced
by political parties, labour unions, and regional pressure groups. In short, they can be awkward
partners, distracted by politics, over-bureaucratized, and lacking in flexibility, t*
Cert_y, those airlines which are entirely or almost entirely state-owned have been the
slowest to fo_,orto join international alliances. The pioneers in transatlantic alliance-making
were KLM, British Airways, and Luf_hansa (in Which the state held only 36% of shares in 1995
and which was scheduJed for complete privatization in 1997). SAS (50% state-owned) had a
range of overseas investments and eventually became a partner in the United-Luf_hansa-led Star
Alliance. De!ta's original European partners - S_ena and Swissair - have either a bare majority
or a minority government holding. By contrast, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, TAP, Olympic, and
have alliance Iberia hasAer Lingus _ been late to join the gameand only made significant foreign
investments (which have been critidzed as morepolitical than commercial in motivation).
In the case of Air France, a major reason for Christian Blanc's frustration and ultimate
_sOn the internationalization of airline management, see Flint and Donoghue, 1997, and
Jones, 1997C.
_ Another reason for the reluctance of privat e firms to become involved with public
companies arises from a concern that while state-owned companies may be allowed to buy equity
in private businesses abroad, such businesses cannot buy_uity in totally state-owned companies
or may be limited in the proportion they may buy. For this reason, state-owned companies may be
seen as predatory (Wright, 1994, p.4)
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resignation was that he saw serious privatization as essential to making the airline an acceptable
and attractive partner in alliances with privately-owned airlines (American or otherwise)
(Jones, 1997B). Without such alliances, Air France would, he predicted, quickly become isolated.
In his resignation statement, Blanc declared that privatization was necessary for the development
of Air France:
In the ruthlessly competitive battle among airlines worldwide, the clocks are ticking away.
There is no time to lose. It is precisely on this crucial point, the pace of our development,
that there is disagreement with the shareholder [i.e., the government] (Owen, 1997A).
Even when Air France subsequently signed marketing agreements with Delta and
Continental, the aviation media agreed that, as Airline Business remarked, neither American
carrier would 'feel comfortable getting closely involved with a state-owned airline unless they
[sic] know that privatization is around the comer' (Airline Business, 1997; Jones, 199713).
The managements of KLM, Alitalia, and Luithansa also saw further privatization as a
condition..............for external alliances. Regarding KL_M's 1996 proposal t0buy back shares _om the -
Dutch government, a Financial Times correspondent _mmented: 'A d_ea!could also aid KLM's
image in the eyes of potential industry partners which, in countries like the US, may be less keen
on an alliance with a carrier seen as a semi-state enterprise' (Cramb, 1996).
The German case was more complex. The German government v_anted to strengthen-
Lufthansa, through internal restructuring and creating an alliance with a US carrier. Although an
alliance with United was established in October 1993, its full benefits depended on anti-trust
immunity being granted by the US government, the price for which was an 'open skies' agreement
between Germany and the US. Lufthansa, under pressure to recover traffic lost to KLM aiter the
Dutch 'open skies' agreement with the US in 1992, lobbied strenuously for an 'open skies'
agreement, against some officials in the h,fmistry of Transport. Once such an agreement had been
signed, anti-trust immunity was granted: the alliance went ahead, and complete privatization was
approved. In this instance, then, privatization was indirectly linked to market liberalization
outside the EU, as a result of a government strategy to prepare an airline for privatization.
(4) What are the implications of privatization for competition and for corporate
strategy? To what extent are the anticipated benefits compatible with each other?
The formation of competing international airline alliances, accompanied by some
liberalization of global air transport, has thus compounded the pressure arising from liberalization
within the EU to encourage privatization. For airline managers, the balance of advantage for
competitiy e su_ ha s swung away from public toward private ownership. In arguing for
privatization, management is usually pushing against an oP_endoor. Mo_govemments are
anxious to reduce their debts and are happy to see the responsibility for raising capital transferred
to the market (and responsibility for dealing with unions transferred to private managers).
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For whom and for what, then, does privatization matter?
Clearly, it matters for most governments (and especially their finance ministers): for them,
its impact is positive, though (ironically) it may increase their regulatory responsibilities. It matters
for airline managers as a way of increasing access to capital markets, increasing commercial and
operational flexibility, and expanding opportunities for _ii_ces with, and takeovers of, other
airlines. It matters for the internal structures of companies and may lead to more efficient use of
resources. It matters for airline employees, who will be faced with the insecurities and
opportunities of working in organizations coping with the rigors of competitive markets and the
rhythms of the economy. It matters for individual and institutional shareholders and for the
financial institutions and suppliers on whom the airlines depend and with which they share risks.
But does it matter for the consumer? Will privatization necessarily lead to greater
competition, greater innovation, improvement in service, and lower fares? How will the impact of
privatization in this sector differ fi'om that in others?
In the concluding section of this paper, we examine three factors that may affect the
impact ofprivatization. They are, first, procedures for privatization; secondly, the existing level
and type of competition; and, thirdly, the regulatory framework.
(a) Procedures for privatization:
As noted above, 'privatization' covers a wide range of government divestment. It may
involve a reduction which still leaves the state with a substantial or even a majority shareholding
(as in the government's proposal for Air France, and the present situations of Sabena and
Alitalia). In several cases, however, (such as TAP and Finnair) the governments" intention is to
substantially reduce their holdings, retaining a 'golden share' of less than 30°4 (in TAP's case,
only 10-15%). Others envisage complete divestment (as occurred 1_ autumn with Luf_hansa).
ProcedureforprivatL',.ationmay "includer _g specifiedproportionsofsharesfor
airlineemployees.Itmay involvea mixedofferingtoidenti_edfinancialorindustrialinstitutions
and to the public (as seems to be intencl_ for Iberia). Privatizati0n may also allow for purchase of
equity by other airlines (subject to important restrictigns ). _'i'he be_-known case is Swissair's
purchase of 49.5% of Sabena, but more recently Iberia has announced that BA and American
Airlines will each buy five per cent of its stock, and _e Spanish government has reportedly
considered a plan that would give BA and AA a controlling interest in lberia (Bums, 1997). Such
a proposal raises a serious regulatory issue (discussed below) which has led many airlines to
restrict purchase of stock by foreign companies and individuals.
/
(b) Competition issues:
Although increased competition is often assumed io be one of the beneficial outcomes _0f
privatization, it may in fact have no impact on theievei Of competition. As Martin and Parker
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havenoted,
pdvatizationmayhave no effect on competition. Monopolies might be sold-off with their
monopoly powers wholly or largely intact while many state-owned firms have traditionally
operated in competitive markets.., conceptuagy, the impact of ownership and competition
(in the product market) are quite distinct, and while the positive effect of' competition on
performance is a relatively uncontroversial one in economic theory, the impact of
ownership _ is much less well-determined (Martin and Parker, 1997, p.8).
In the EU, both Commission competition policy and Member State pdvatization policies have Coy
contrast with deregulation in the US)been reticent about breaking up companies in dominant
positions or preventing mergers that might create monopolies ('Majone, 1996, p. 19). _7Moreover,
the promotion of competition may have lower priority with Member state gove_entS _ some
other benefits. Indeed, it may actually conflict with other objectives ofprivatization.,
In the European airline industry, the ear_e_st and best-documented case was that ofthe
privatization ot'Bn'-tish Airways. its motivation and implementation resemble current efforts,
although it occurred in a regulatory environment markedly different from that of the current
privatizations - that is, before the full establishment of the single market and the complete
liberalization of air transport.
As noted above, BA's rivals argued that to privatize the state airline without reducing its
network, or breaking it up into several companies ( ala AT&T), would simply turn a public near-
monopoly into a private real monopoly. The leading government spokesman on privatization had
said
The long term success of the privatisation programme wig stand or fall by the extent to
which it maximises competition. If competition cannot be achieved, an historic opportunity
will have been lost (John Moore, M.P., quoted in Campbell-Smith, 1986, p. 121).
But, as Campbell-Smith observes, the government had put itself in a difficult position by
announcing the sale of BA 'before so much as starting to think about the regulatory aspect'
(Campbell-Smith, 1986, p. 122). It could have used the prospect ofprivatization to enact
legislation protecting the competition it claimed to support. Instead, it became a hostage to those
(including the Treasury and the management of BA) who wanted a quick and profitable
privatization, which (they argued) depended on keeping BA as one unit with all the assets it
currently held,
/
_7_e it is-limited by Article 222 from questioning changes in property relations, the
Commission has required the dropping of routes in certain merger cases and could investigate at
any point charges of potential or actual abuse of dominant position by an airline, whether state-
owned or private.
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The financial interests of the government, those handling the sale, and BA itself were thus
at odds with those of a regulatory policy designed to promote competition. The independent
airlines pointed out that BA controlled roughly 83% of UK domestic services, a high proportion
of services to theContinent,.......... and all long-haul services by UK carriers from Heathrow. To allow it
to pass into priVa!_tion without reducing its competitive advantage would lead directly and
inevitably =to astif_ng of Competition. " ....
Bufi_caught I/etwc_n ihe advlce ofits own regulatory agency, the CAA (which
r_mmended heavy pruning of'BA'S network before sale), and those who on grounds of
nationalism and profit wanted BA sold intact, the government opted for a minimal reduction of
BA's network (Campbell-Smith, 1986, p. 168)._t Shortly afterwards, BA absorbed British
Caledonian and went on to take over or turn into franchisees a number of the independents,
notablyDan-Air} s
To what extent is the experience ofprivatization in the UK a precedent for what may
happen as a result of the present wave ofprivatizations in the EU? One similarity is that none of
the government's proposing privatization has indicated an intention to break up or reduce the
assets of a national airline before sale. The European Commission has questioned mergers,
alliances and:subsidies involving, one way or another, nearly all of the national carriers, but it has
not raised regulatory issues about privatizations The fact that privatization is a property issue and
does not direc_tly entail a change in markets across borders adequately explains its silence.
But it (in common with Member States) would presumably argue that creation of the
single market, with its accompanying liberalization of air transport, provides a radically different
context from that of the mid=eighties. All routes within the EU are in principle 'contestable',
which was certainly not true in 1987. Competitors can now invoke the entire apparatus of EU law
to challenge mergers or abuses of dominant positions, while the era of large government subsidies
to state carriers is clearly over. Many state airlines - even before privatization - are already being
faced with direct competition on both domestic and intra-EU routes.
Yet _ is _s 9 ¢le_r_: _t some=_lines undergoing privatization are seeking the kind of
consolidation in their domestic markets that BA sought and that is a normal defensivemove when
: : v
T i I i I I
i_ Specifically, the CAA recommended that BA be required to give up all its European
services from British provincial cities, all scheduled operations from Gatwick, and three long-
distance routes.
: _ British practice was generally 'to keep the industries with their present form of
organization: (that is, they'_ere gc/ierally not broken up), and essentially to turn public
monopolie6_to p/ivate m0nopolies, with occasionally more competition at the edges.' As
Pdchardsor_ no{eS, _'The short-_ beneilts-of getting the institutions out of the public sector and
getting the revenue into the Exchequer were more important than the long-term aim of increasing
competition and efficiency' (Richardson, 1994, p.67).
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faced with challenge from abroad (and/or preparing to expand abroad). Moreover, the creation of
global strategic alliances (in which virtually all EU national airlines are now involved) will lead to
further concentration at hubs in capitals, favoring carriers which have slots and gates at these
airports. To the extent that privatization enables major EU carriers to join alliances, it may
contribute to a concentration of the airline industry in Europe - especially if these carriers soucceed
in incorporating regional and domestic carriers into their networks.Tothis extent, Wright may be
correct when he concludes that 'privatization may be seen as a mechanism for facilitating
rationalization processes already at work in the national, European and international economies'
('Wright, 1994, p.34). Whether existing independent airlines and start-ups survive and prosper
will depend (as under US deregulation) on skill in identifying promising markets and self-restraint
in not over-expanding as well as on the ability of the larger carriers to reduce costs and match
prices.
(c) The regulatory framework:
Privatization does not imply by any means a withdrawal of the state from inv01vement in
commercial aviation. Indeed, as Majone has pointed Out-,g_dn_raYpar_-oXis that-_e retr_t of
public ownership has been accompanied by the advance of'the regulatory state.' The Euro_)ean
Commission has already produced a substantial body of rules intended to protect competition and
the interests of consumers in this industry. However, under the principle of subsidiarity, much of
the burden of regulation will fall on agencies in Member States, and the resources and experience
of these bodies vary considerably (Cameron, 1998).
Indeed, the degree of regulatory authority kept by Member States may impede the process
of'rationalization' or 'concentration' that Wright and others see as a probable and necessary
consequence of privatization. Although the EU market has been liberaliTed, international air
transport outside the EU is still regulated by the Chicago Convention of 1944, which provided for
regulation through bilateral agreements between states. These agreements designate routes and
capacity and enable governments to assign routes to carriers, nonnally their own national careers.
Although all bilaterals within the EU were annulled with _e advent_of:the single market,
each state still claims the authority to negotiate bilateral agreements with 'third countries" (such as
the US). Such agreements are exclusive in nature and normally contain a nationality clause under
which, say, Belgium could withdraw traflSc rights from a Canadian airline under the Belgian
bilateral with Canada if it was not satisfied that Canadian citizens had 'substantial ownership and
effective control' of the airline.'z°
While EU airlines are 'Community carriers' within the single market, their aircraft still
require national registration, and for purposes of operating outside of Europe, airlines must still
meet the requirements of nationality specified in their bilaterals. Indeed, the defL,_itionof a
'Community carrier' is itself exclusive in character, requiring that at least 50% of an airline be
2oOn the issue of airline nationality, see Genler (1982-3, 1994), and Staniland (1998).
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controlled by EU nationals tO quali_ for traffic rights within the single market.
The survival of the Chicago system explains why Member States still want to ensure that
'substantial ownership and effective control' of their airlines are in the hands of their own
r_ationals. Much of the revenue of major EU airlines is generated on intercontinental routes and
historically state-owned 'flag carriers' have been able to derive rents from the duopolies they
shared on specific routes with the flag carriersofotherbilateral iignatories.-
Privatization, while offering opportunities to national airlines, also contains a danger. As
state-owned airlines, they met, by definition, the test of national ownership. But privatization
creates the possibility of investment, even amounting to "substantial ownership and effective
control,' by non-nationals. Other parties to bilaterals might then invoke the nationality clauses in
their agreements to deny traffic rights.
The European Commission regards bilaterals containing exclusive nationality clauses as
incompat_le with the single market. But, because of their stakes in routes beyond Europe,
Member States have taken steps to monitor and limit foreign ownership of shares in national
airlines operating on such routes. Paradoxically, airline managers, while eager for access to
capital markets abroad, also want to stop purchase of shares by foreign nationals if it puts thei
airlines at risk of of'denationalization.'2_ One form of denationalization thus creates vulnerability
to another.
Current proposals for privatization deal with this problem in two ways. One way -
adopted by France, Belgium and others - involves the state keeping at least 50°,6 of the shares of a
national airline. Belgium thus allowed Swissair to buy 49.5% of Sabena, but not 50.5%. Swiss
purchase of the latter percentage would have ended Sabena's claim to be a Belgian airline and its
claim on any rights negotiated by Belgium."
The second way is for a state to give up its majority holding and either retain a 'golden
share' or (particularly if it is divesting completely) to create legal mechanisms that prevent non-
nationals from acquiring a proportion of shares in national airlines that will imperil their
nationality status. Germany, for example, recently enacted legislation coinciding with the full
privatizati0fiOf LtiP,.h_sa that enables-German _airlines to monitor the nationality of shareholders
and to block_further purchasd 0f-shares by+nou2_rmansif the total of foreign-held stock is
approac_g 5-0°)0_ind_, _ehw ena_b|eS-an_[ine tolF_'¢ there_e of'forelgn-owned stock.
• ! _ f¸ 2_ i
2_Portuguese critics of privatization use the term, desportugalizar (deportugalize), to
express the fear that it will lead to foreign control of important businesses (Corkill, 1994, p.222).
/ ......
" In this context, the report_ _ut app_ently _ortive) Spanish proposal to sell a majority
of Iberia's shares iJ_BA and AA is p_ slncg ffimplemer/ted it would have endangered
i= ::: : = =z:_ ::::: =T =: _ , , i , ,j
Iberia's bilateral rights and nught also have endangered Its status as a Commumty career,
depending On wha_ proportion of its stock was o_ied by'BA and other EU-nationals.
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EU airlines flying outside Europe thus find themselves in an anomalous situation. They
have to operate under two regulatory regimes: one requires them to have a clear and exclusive
national status, the other denies or discourages the attribution of rights on grounds of nationality.
This situation has almost certainly created corresponding legal anomalies, notably in apparently
restricting the fights of EU citizens and airlines to invest in airlines in other Member States,
regardless of EU law concerning (for example) the right of establishment.
Yet, anomalous as this situation is, it does present a barrier to the concentration of the
airline industry seen by Wright and others as a likely consequence ofprivatization. European
governments and airlines, even _er privatization, can prevent takeovers by other EU airlines in
order to protect external traffic rights. Indeed, the very existence ofthe bilaterals should
discourage any airline from even trying to take over another with long-distance routes, since a
victory would be Pyrrhic.
Returning to the original question, we may conclude that:
(1) privatization matters, but the purposes for which it matters (and the motives inspiring
it) may conflict with each other;
(2) governments' interest in privatization has little to do with its impact on the industry or
with the values of the single market;
(3) whether privatization encourages competition depends on how it is implemented and
on whether a regulatory regime exists that can prevent a public monopoly becoming a private
monopoly. The competitive environment, not ownership IZCL_, determines whether privatization
is likely to lead to greater competition or not,
(4) privatization is a necessary condition for involvement of EU carriers in international
alliances and a necessary but insufficient condition for a concentration of the EU airline industry;
(5) it is insufficient because the Chicago regime requires preservation of a nationality
status that seems at odds with EU law but does obstruct any EU airline trying to take over
another with significant intercontinental traffic. And the latter category contains all the airlines
subject to privatization, and all major national airlines in the ELI - except Luxah'.
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iINTRODUCTION
This paper considers developments which are occurring in international logistics and
the appropriate response of the air freight sector. Logistics is the term used to describe the
systematic management of freight (and, increasingly, passenger) movements in such a way that
disfunctionality along product value chains is reduced or eliminated. Disfunctionality is
manifest by high inventory levels (in the case of passenger transport, waiting times), notably at
break points in the value chain such as intermodal transfer nodes or the interfaces between
manufacturing activity and transport.
It is noted that all activities in the product chain, whether manufacturing or transport,
must add value. In the traditional perspective of business processes [Figure 1], each stage of
the value-adding sequence was seen as an independent economic activity. Exchanges of
materials and goods between stages of production occurred in an open market. Efficiency
optimisation was fragmented, singe it was constrained within the boundaries of the independent
firms. Scale was a key competitive variable, and 'horizontal' integration a favoured path
towards it. The value-adding chain involved multiple inventories, with stock used to cushion
against the uncertainties of action of other participants in the chain. Transport was a passive
agent in the production process, and pursued its own internal objectives which were usually
those of cost minimisation on the assumption that was what the user wanted.
The contemporary perspective is a contrasting one [Figure 2]: it is of the process of
production as an integrated chain of value-adding activity extending 'vertically', from the basic
extraction and processing of raw materials to the final distribution and sale of products at retail
outlets (Hines, 1993). Firms along the chain act as partners, with information flowing freely
between them to reduce uncertainty and the need for buffering between the production stages.
Operations along the chain, including transport, are tightly controlled, co-ordinated, and
synchronised. Value chains stretch around the globe, with multinational corporations placing
the various manufacturing elements in locations providing the greatest competitive advantage
and the_lbgistics sector providing the necessary c0finections 0Casarda and Rondinelli, 1998).
The tigia'tnesS of the c_ection df_y airfreight operators into the value chains of MNC
producers_s demons_atedbf_e-rapt_d c]'/ariges iil-air cargo traffic volume and composition in
Asia during the 1997/98 financial crisis in that region (Nelms, 1998).
Figure 1: The traditional perspective of business: fragmented value adding chain
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Figure 2: Contemporary perspective of business: vertically integrated value adding
chain
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Logistical integration driven by information feedback
Traditionally, inventory was used to buffer against incompatibilities of adjacent finks in
supply chains and against operational uncertainties. Now, due to the many advances in
information-communications technology (ICT), it has become =feasible--fd_r information=, to
substitute for inventory, since information is becoming increasingly cheap and inventory
increasingly costly, the trend towards this substitution seems likely to continue. Electronic
Data Interchange CEDI) is permitting inventory/information trade-off to be optimised along the
entire value chain. The advent of expert systems and artificial intelligence suggests that
logistical optimisation will become increasingly sophisticated and wider in scope.
Much has been written about the impact of transport on society, longitudinally over
time and latitudinally between regions. Historically, there has been a close relationship
between advances in communications and economic progress, in some cases involving leaps in
knowledge such as when it was discovered the world is round, or when aviation became a
mainstream mode of transport.
Modem society relies heavily on the availability of sophisticated levels of physical
mobility. Where transport supply is inadequate for the amount and pattern of demand,
adjustments must be made. When infrastructure is fixed, as it is in the short term, the
emphasis of adjustment falls on the demand side. Thus, the air commuter may have to depart
early to allow for expected ATC delays; the holiday maker may sleep overnight at an airport to
meet the requirements of cheap packages; the air freight company may operate through the
night and weekend to avoid peak-time congestion in complexing activity; the manufacturer
may use inventory to protect production against fluctuations in the supply chain caused by
uncertainties; and, at the end of the chain, the consumer may make do with frozen or tinned
food at the supermarket or more generally bear inventory costs to guarantee product
availability.
There is a limit to the acceptability of short term market compromise possibilities.
People attach a value to time wasted at ports or airports; the commercial market has a
iI
resistance to excessive inventory costs; there are environmental objections to transport
vehicles working at night and weekends. The longer term option is to expand transport supply
and capacity. .....
Traditionally policy makers have tended to follow-a cycle of: infrastructure supply -
transport service supply - traffic growth - traffic congestion - demand adjustment
infrastructure supply. In recent years doubts have arisen regarding the ability of this loop to
operate quickly enough and indeed about the long term sustainability of this cyclical approach
(ECMT, 1993). There are increasing concerns about whether infrastructure indefinitely can
meet the ever-growing demand for mobility (OECD, 1993), whether the environment can
absorb projected vehicular resource usage and emissions (CEC, 1992), and various other
aspects of transport growth (CEC, 1996). While much attention has been paid to land
transport, and the dichotomous problems of road and rail transport, increasingly there are
problems of congestion at airports and in air traffic control.
To the extent constraints in transport infrastructure supply act as a brake, demand must
be accommodated on existing networks through increased levels of operational inefficiency
(OECD, 1994). In principle the user may cope with network congestion by:
(a) absorbing delays on the routes chosen (i.e. accepting longer transit times)
(b) re-routing to less busy or more expensive routes (i.e. accepting higher costs)
(c) changing destinations (i.e. substituting inferior destination activity)
(d) postponing travel to off-peak times (i.e. increasing waiting/inventory times)
(e) not travelling at all.
The inability of the transport system to provide the vectors of mobility required by the
user forces the acceptance by the user of alternative vectors of mobility [Figure 3]. Ideally this
involves an allocation or rationing process which achieves the appropriate re-distributions in an
equitable manner. While it may be acceptable from the viewpoint of congestion control that
the marginal user who finds the compromise vector unacceptable may opt to postpone or
abandon the plan to travel, from the societal point of view this represents a failure, and an
overall loss against the goal of providing each community with its entitlement of physical
mobility. The magniiude of the loss depends on how the user subjectively values the
inconvenience of delays, re-routings or suppressed travel. At the macro level and from a
longer term perspective it is interesting to reflect, as the transport policy maker must, on the
level of transport infrastructure provision which would be necessary to ensure every
community and industry regularly received its desired envelope of mobility vectors. It could
be that the ideal transport system should provide services which are continuous, costless and
with no'a.d impactavailable in all directions verse on the en_,irb-ra'nent.
.... _ _ -_ ..... - _-:_FI_ _"_ _.--_ _" _.rL_._:.=C-_ _ _ _ _-_
Clearly the ideal does not exist. In pra'ct_ce _anspo_t _-t_ture tehds ti_ lie provided
where it is most likely to give the greatest number of users the greatest level ofsatisfaction, and
each commurtity or industry adjusts its required'm0bility veci0fsa little, in timing, cost or
direction, ultimately this may lead to re-location decisions or to variations in the pace of
development of communities. It may influence the overall configuration of industry in a
region. It may influence the degree of 'vertical integration' achievable between units of
production in different regions. It may influence the strength of inter-regional 'cohesion'
(Cecchini, 1988).
x..... .
Figure 3: Vectors of Mobility
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2 VIRTUAL MOBILITY
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Given _at _._ort has difficulties !n. resp0n_g to s0cie_'s .see_gly insatiable
needs for mobility, it may be fortunate that today's citizen and firm has possibilities for the
substitution of physical mobility, using v_ous f0n'ns of ¢!ec_o_c mobili_. While transport
seems to be increasingly constrained in its mission to supply serviccs:which are continuous,
costless and available in all directions, the telecommunications system seems to have no such
constraints and indeed seems to be developing ever more rapidly in terms of interconnectivity,
falling costs and multi-directionality (Mansell, 1993; Giannopoulos and Gillespie, 1993).
The traditional definitions of mobility have tended to focus on specific categories of
human interaction involving physical movement for a definite purpose. However most citizens
now accept the substitution of virtual mobility for physical mobility in the case of at least some
ii
forms of human interaction, most notably conversations made by telephone. Additionally, the
range of substitutions which have broad acceptance is growing. There is the fax, which is
substituting for printed paper mobility. There is e.mail, which is substituting for telephone
conversations, printed paper mobility and some types of meeting. There is the I._tTER_ET,
which is substituting for some traditional forms of marketing and service-product distribution
and creating a new world of electronic commerce. Theatre tickets, holidays, conferences can be
booked using the combination of telephone, INTERNETand the credit card system. Instead of
going to the cinema we watch movies on videotape. Live sports events can be watched
through television at home or on large screens in remote stadia.
Table 1 lists some basic trip purposes, the traditional transport modes associated with
them :and some new mOdal possibilities. In each case one can reflect on (a) the characteristics
of the interaction which influence the feasibility of substitution for the traditional transport
modes and Co) the potential market extent of the substitution, in terms of those market
segments which initially are most amenable to the substitution and the degree of substitution
which is likely to take place in the longer term.
Table 1: Trip purposes, traditional transport modes and new modal possibilities
Trip purpose Traditional modes New modal possibilities
Visit a friend
Commute to work
Long distance
meetings
i _ Supermarket shopping
Dine at a restaurant
R_I schools
Goto the cinema
Attend a sports event
Post a letter
, Deliver a typedreport
Dis_bute newspapers
Distribute software
Go to a concert
WaLk/bicycle/car
Car/public transport
Air/rail
Telephone/videophone
Telecommute
Videoconference
Car
Car
Car/bus
Car/bus/walk
Car/bus/train/air
Rail/ship/a/r/road
Teleshop, van deliveries
Home deliveries
Satellite broadcasts
Hire a video
Watch on television
Fax or e.mail
Car/van/air/sea Send via modem
R0ad/rail Display on WWW
-: - .......... homepage
Road/rail/ship Auto-install via INTEgNET
Car/public transport Listen to quadraphonic CD
It would be useful to have a new typology of trip/interaction purposes, which would
permit a categorisation of the service at the core of each interaction purpose, and a
reconceptualisation of purpose on the basis of its information-transfer content and the
significance of physical proximity to the effectiveness of the transaction. Many hospital
operations &e now carried out by 'keyhole surgery', with the surgeon using robot-type
equipment. Will the location of the surgeon at the location of the patient always be a
necessity?
For the purposesof this paper the most relevant observation may be that the list in
Table 1 is far from complete m because mankind's substitution possibilities seem to be
growing all the time as information technology develops and as the level of 'intelligence' in
information systems increases.
Even though the concept of 'virtual mobility' is still in its infancy we can state some
basic 'hypotheses':
v there seems to be a 'life-cycle' in the pattern of acceptance of new possibilities for
substitution, involving innovation, experimentation and a gradual spreading of the
application as experience grows and improvements are made
v there are some forms of virtual mobility which now have widespread acceptance as a
.substitute for physical movement (e.g. the telephone, the fax), and others which are
well on their way to widespread acceptance (e.g. Interact applications)
v behavioural patterns to date suggest that while few people or firi_ s may, in the case of
any given application, opt for 100% substitution of virtual for physical mobility, many
will accept partial substitution
v for freight transport, the potential for substitution depends on the information content of
the goods, especially in the context o!" the trend towards the 'de-materialisation ' of
products and the ability of the material content and information content to travel
separately
v as the traditional transport options are subject to increasing delays, costs or restrictions,
the relative attractiveness of options for virtual rather than physical mobility will
increase
v the propensity to substitute will differ by transport mode, given the known links
between trip purpose, origin-destination distance and mode choice
v the reaction to substitution possibilities seems to be generational, i.e. young people
appear to be generally more accepting of electronic media than older people and
become proficient more easilyi over_t_e, _e-re_ore, the population as a whole should
be expected td become ki0re accepting bf_l mobility
v in the evolution of new equilibria between physical and virtual mobility, elements of
the new information technologies may contfibute_t0 _e e-nhancement of the traditional
transport options (e.g. telematics for better control, routing, scheduling; onboard
telephone/fax facilities to enhance passenger services, etc.)
/
3 TWO KEY ISSUES
There can be little room for argument about the 'explosion' of innovations and advances
in the field of information technology, and about the spatial impact which the various
innovations are having m even though in most cases they are early in their life cycles and often
may be less than user friendly in the early stages. To quote TIME magazine: "It took
humanity more than 2 million years to invent wheels but only about 5,000 years more to drive
those wheels with a steam engine. The first computers filled entire rooms, and it took 35 years
to make the machines fit a desk _ but the leap from desktop to laptop took less than a decade"
(Lemonick, 1995). Today, the marginal cost of a telephone call has become so insignificant
that distance is no longer a determinant of telecommunications cost; there are views that this
development will be the single most important economic force shaping society in the first half
of the next century (Caimcross, 1995).
One key issue for transport policy makers, however, is whether virtual mobility actually
substitutes for physical mobility or whether both are potentially part of the same 'explosion' of
mobility, ultimately synergising, leading_to overall growth in bothtields, and adding to rather
than taking ameliorating transport demand.
In air transport, there is debate about whether teleconferencing technology will reduce
or increase business travel: here, it could be that while physical mobility (air travel) ultimately
may cater for a reduced market share of the total conference market, the total market will be
greatly increased by the stimulation provided by teleconferencing. Similar considerations
apply to the relationship "between television and leisure travel: for example, while the market
share of those watching events from home has increased, television has helped stimulate the
overall market so that there are increased attendanees at many major events. There have been
numerous analyses of actual and potential interactions between telecommunications advances
and travel demand (e.g. Salomon, 1986; Banister et aI, 1995). Button (1995) examines the
question of whether telecommunications acts as a substitute or complement to transport and the
difficulty in predicting the overall effect.
The co-evolution of communication and transport has been observed in history. Alt et
al (1996) recall that for the vast majority of human history, communications beyond the
carrying power of the human voice were subordinate to the transport infrastructure of the time.
Written correspondence or other physical tokens had to be carried physically until the advent of
the telegraph in the mid 19th century. The subsequent co-development of the railroad and the
telegraph in the USA provides an early example of communication/transport growth synergy.
. A second key issue is whether the advent of virtual mobility offers real possibilities for
pro-active responses by the transport sector, and new opportunities to address endemic
problems. In principle, the availability of acceptable substitutes for physical mobility should
lessen the impact on society of 'failures' of transport supply. Assuming one can identify those
trip purposes for which there are good substitutes for physical mobility, and those segments of
the transport market that may be diverted to the substitutes without an unacceptable level of
hardship, the supplier of transport infrastructure may find there is more room to manoeuvre
than wo01d otherwise have been the ease. This is especially relevant where there are severe
constraint s on the expansion of transport supply, e.g. for financial or environmental reasons.
Any spatial or social impacts of virtual mobility to date have, however, been the
outcome of a predominately passive, rather than pro-active, disposition of policy makers with
regard to the substitution of virtual for physical mobility -- i.e. the take-up has been largely
market- _dfi_'venor latssez falre and thequesti0n of'optimisation' of the virtual/physical balance
has beenmore or less unaddressed in transport policy making.
There are reasons for this: in most countries transport and telecommunications are
regarded_ as seParate sectors, and transport firms have tended to define their interests and
eompeteneies in terms of physical movement. There are various work-practice constraints and
traditions which make it difficult to redefine the role of transport as one of mobility pro_qsion
through either physical or virtual means. Additionally, it must be recognised that the
developmentsin telecommunicationshaveoccurredvery quicklyandwereneitherplannedfor
nor foreseen.
One way or the other,it is interestingto considerin moredetail the possiblebenefits
which the transport sectormight accruethough a more pro-activeapproachto demand
managementandsubstitution using the opportunities presented by the various new modes of
telecommunications. The indications are that the demand for mobility in total, i.e. whether
physical or virtual, is increasing at unprecedented rates. In developed countries, there are
signs that transport growth is plateauing, while electronic communications are growing at
exponential rates. In developing countries, there is a more even balance between the growth of
transport and telecommunications, given that both are growing from a low base. In some
countries which are facing abnormal economic adjustment, such as those in Eastern Europe,
there are indications that telecommunications investment may be used to redress inadequacies
in existing transport infrastructure.
It would seem to be impossible to contemplate the future demand for transport in
isolation from the future demand for telecommunications and the question of the optimal
interaction between the two mobility modes.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FREIGHT TRANSPORT
Developments in information technology have impacted on freight transport in at least
three different ways: (a) the increased information content of many products, coupled with a
general trend towards de-materialisation, has changed the character of products being
transported and in some cases has created new distribution options; (b) the use of information
technology to 'integrate' product supply chains, with a strong emphasis on inventory reduction,
has redefined the role of freight transport; and (c) information technology has provided new
management and control possibilities for the freight transport function itself.
4.1 Value chain developments
New organisational formatshave emerged--ranging from centralised ownership along
entire and ot_en international processing chains, to complex contractual arrangements between
firms which internalise risk sharing and enshrine eo-ope/'a_0n, to the elaborate inter-
organisational dependencies common in Japanese industry and for which the integration of
production is strongly cultural (Miles and Snow, 1986).
Within the various frameworks, product quality and delivery reliability have become
central to competitiveness, and the concept of product is defined not merely by the nature of
goods sold but by a combination of the goods and the quality of the service with which they are
delivered to the end customer. In this business environment, the traditional boundaries
between manufactured produce and services have become blurred, and many hybrid products
(well known examples include computer software, instantly developing photographic film, fast
food outlets, auto-diagnosis health devices) have emerged.
Figure 4: Recent rail freight traffic trends in Europe
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As products become lighter in terms of their material content (through the use of plastic
materials and better design concepts) and more information rich (through the use of
microchips), trends towards the 'de-materialisation' of products have been observed. Figure 4
shows the trend in rail freight traffic in Europe for the period 1980-1993. Chatelus et al (1995)
provide an interesting analysis of freight traffic versus GDP in Central European countries as
they transform from planned economy to market economy status.
4.2 Possibilities for innovation
The thrust of technology and of product innovation is towards the 'tailoring' of
individual product designs for each consumer; a growing task for the logistics function is to
find ever more innovative ways of allowing the marketplace the level of choicd it demands
while maintaining distribution cost and efficiency at affordable levels (Fuller et al, 1993).
Some forecasters envisage that, in those retailing sectors which currently favour the large-
store format, traditional retailing involving the movement by car of the customer to a retail
premises may be replaced by a channel structure in which manufacturers interact with
consumers directly through telecommunications, and use home delivery services to bypass
conventional retail outlets (Business Week, 1993b). Ultimately shops may become less central
in commerce, as direct distribution from electronically-triggered warehouses grows.
Entrepreneurial logisticians may begin to organise new types of distribution service
focused not as traditionally on the producer as origin, with multi-drop destinations, but on the
consumer as destination, with multi'pickup origins ('Just for You', or 'J4tYl-d]s_bution, as
shown _Figure 5). Late changes in orders or in destinations will be acco_odated via a
telecommunications link with the delivery van, freight train or aircraft, and by the use of
product finishing facilities which will be not at the factory but on board the vehicle (e.g. final
assembly, sorting, printing, labelling, packaging). Principles of value-adding distribution have
always been applied within the transport sector (e.g. the traditional sorting of mail on trains),
but the full potential of the delivery vehicle given the capability of onboard computers and of
miniaturised manufacturing equipment has yet to be realised.
The more accurate knowledge of customer requirements coupled with the technological
ability to fine-tune delivery parameters will lead to a greatly enhanced customer service
capability. Helping this process will be an increased use of "artificial intelligence" in the
logistics function. Apart from measures to enhance vehicle performance and co-ordination in
the form of "intelligent" vehicles and road infrastructure, there will be "onboard intelligence"
in freight consignments, in the form of embedded information and scannable codes.
Alt et al (1996) observe the evolution of what they term "transport governance systems"
aimed at driving costs out of transport value chains and enhancing efficiency levels with
greafl_,--re_d_ced labour inputs-_(Virasi_fsp_e-ds._Te-y see the fu_eof_o/h _ p_senger and
freight transport as fundamentally dependent on information infrastructure, ironically just as
communication was once dependent on transport. They see the great payoffs in transport over
the next two decades as coming from the leveraging of existing infrastructure through an
interlinking of future transport and telecommunications development.
The future scenario therefore is one in which the freight transport firm will play an
integral role in the prdduction processes, or value adding chains, of its customers. Its task will
be to provide the links between suppliers and manufacturers at the various stages in the chain,
with materials and goods flowing under careful control to minimise inventory levels and
respond accurately to consumer trends (OECD, 1992). The freight firm will play an increased
role in the final stages of production, helping to provide flexibility of destination choice,
delivery timings and product presentation (i.e. value adding distribution). All this will be
possible only through" a heavy linkage with information technology.
4.3 The virtual value chain: marketplace and marketspace
There is a need for a new typology of freight traffic categories, involving a re-
conceptualisation of the concept of goods movement. Rather than focusing merely on weight
or distance as hitherto, it would be useful to identify the core purpose and characteristics of the
goods as seen by the consumer, their required delivery characteristics, and their embedded
information content including accompanying services (which could have passenger transport
implications).
It is said that today every business competes in two markets: the marketplace, in which
resources and products exist physically and require traditional freight transport services and the
marketspace, which is a virtual world of electronic commerce in which the main object of
transaction is information [Figure 6]. Managing two interacting value-adding processes, in the
two mutually dependent realms, is seen as posing new conceptual and tactical challenges for
every firm (Rayport and Sviokla, 1995).
Some firmsmay choosetooperatewhollyorheavilyinthevirtualworld,inwhich case
theiroutputmay be mainlyinformation.In thecaseofsome products,forexamplecomputer
software,theratio fphysicaltoelectronictransportmay changeovertimetothepointthatthe
entireproducttravelselectronically.Where finnsoperatepredominantlyinthevirtualworld,
the challengeof cateringfortheirphysicalfi'cightflows may be lessthatof ensuringthe
required origin-destinationspeed as that of coping with rapidly-varyingoriginsand
destinations(BusinessWeek, 1993a).
inirespondlngt0_ese developmentsthetransportfirm is facedwith a choiceof (a)
continuifi_"_bplay tlid_itional roleof carryingphysicalfreightor(b)redefiningitsroleto
includg_c conduitingof informationflows.
: (a) Traditional Role: Catering for the traditional transport marketplace will have the
advanmgc of corresponding to the expertise and traditional scope and of the transport
professl_onl However, in many sectors, physical goods are likely to be a decreasing portion of
the modem firm's total output and a progressively weaker predictor of its mobility
requirements.
Co) Redefined Role: Catering for the customer's marketspace requirements
(info_ifi0n Conduiting), in addition to those of its marketplace (physical freight) will have the
advantage of permitting the full picture of the firm's mobility requirements to be addressed.
Howeve_-_ _it :could be argued, this role may be beyond the scope and competence of the
conventional transport firm.
Apart from the question of defining its main market, the freight transport firm should
also consider its involvement in ancillary markets appropriate to the era of electronic
commerce. Most transport firms generate and use information as a biproduct of their main
activity. This information and the systems which handle it may themselves have commercial
value and permit the offering of products in the marketspaee.
For instance the Computerised Reservation Systems (CRS) which have been developed
and used by the larger airlines to co-ordinate bookings and assist yield management have value
to smaller airlines and travel agents. Latterly, they have become available to prospective
customers via INTERNET. Airlines may earn substantial revenues from their hosting of CRS
services, in addition to their mainstream aviation activities. Similarly, express freight firms
can earn additional revenue through the provision of public access to their package-tracking
services in addition to their mainstream freight carrying activities.
5 LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
5.1 Transport infrastructure
In the light of the many developments foreseeable in the evolution of and demand for
mobility, it is relevant to consider the appropriate response of the supply side _0t:the transport
industry. In the first place there is the question of _ort _true_tuq'e,_ in Europe,
considerable analysis has already been conducted into the appropriate Trans-European
Networks for the next century, taking account of the continent's mobility requirements in the
light of its political goals for regional integration, cohesion and economic development.
The most basic question is that of the appropriate geographical configuration of
transport infrastructure, in terms of the routes, nodes and traffic capaei_ _to be p/ovided for
each of the transport modes. Some important 'missing i_'}iave bee_bf_-'llb_!led in
such as the Britain-France Tunnel and the Scanlinkc0_eciion [)-efis_'ee-nDenmark _d Sweden.
There also has been an identification of the busiest ports and airports and the priorities for
expansion taking a systemic view. There is the never-ending question of which of the
congested links to expand, always mindful of the environmental balance sheet. There is a
concern that future transport should be 'sustainable', and also that it be economic and
competitive.
To minimise unnecessary duplication between transport modes, and tO promote inter-
modal synergy, there is widespread interest in the promotion of Combined Transport and
transport intermodality generally (CEC, 1997). This is partly a matter of infi'astructure
development and partly a matter of transport service co-ordination.
/
The concept of Logistics PlaOCorms is especially relevant in this context. These are
nodes which provide 'hub and spoke' type route connections and vehicle load transfer facilities,
and as such provide the essential interface between transport infrastructure and transport
services. Increasingly there gill be the capability of bringing enormous amount of computing
power and intelligence to bear on routing and vehicle loading decisions, with the additional
advantage of allowing these decisions to be made on a whole-network basis (Smith, 1994).
5.2 Robust infrastructural needs versus flexible service needs
In principle delays caused by schedule clashes or late traffic changes can be foreseen
and eliminated through a widening of the appraisal scenario in both time and space. In
principle, the computer can pre-store arrays of contingencies for myriads of possible events,
and instantly provide the most appropriate system response to every operational problem. Not
only has ICT the capability of overcoming the various management and combinatorial
complexities that are endemic in transport systems, but it also can help the transport system to
harmonise with the new transport requirements of the virtual world.
In freight transport, for instance, the shipper may require real-time space booking
facilities, automatic monitoring of consignment status, and automatic delivery confirmations.
The merging of physical product components with virtual product components may be part of
the distribution task: for example, the programming of computing devices at their final
destinations, the printing of newspapers at their delivery points, or the cooking of hot meals for
home delivery.
In the context of the 'Information Society', the transport planner must consider
carefully the dual requirement for a robust long term perspective of infrastructural needs and a
highly flexible short term perspective of service needs. Some elements of transport have been
and will remain patently inflexible-- fixed rail infrastructure, airport runways, canals, harbour
berths, for example. The construction of these elements in the wrong shape, at the wrong
location or at the wrong time has always been associated with problems of early obsolescence
and financial loss. While the transport system may have rallied round such mistakes in the past
and adjusted or compromised traffic patterns to ameliorate the negative consequences of
imperfect planning, this tactic may not be as easily engaged in a fast-changing demand-driven
market environment.
Some long-lived fixed investments such as airports and undersea tunnels may be less
vulnerable than others where they provide central or pivotal elements of the network and are
robust against changes in traffic composition. Part of the planning task will be to identify such
'core' elements of the transport network. For these elements it is possible that state-of-the-art
'conventional' technology will suffice, and that obsolescence will not prove to be a major
concern. For the non-core network elements, however, the task will be to plan for usage
flexibility, in both traffic operations and market composition, and to ensure that fixed
in_'estments are robust against a Variety of contingencies. Elements of the new 'paradigm'
should embrace the following:
v multi-purpose vehicles, providing rapid interchangability between passenger and
freight configurations, have the advantage of reducing scheduling constraints and
assisting the rapid market rrsponsiveness required by both markets
V high-speed transport tends to generate higher service frequencies and shorter average
waiting/inventory times at transfer nodes
v several small airports catering for STOL aircraft might, in the context of the
requirements of the vertically integrated value adding chains prevalent in modem
in_dustry, serve a region better than one large airport
v t!3_e provision of onboard value-adding facilities (such as information processing
_pport and product processing/finishing facilities for freight) is likely to enhance the
flexibility of every transport mode
VV
V
V
V
V
In the
argued
all transport modes must plan for extensive use of ICT (telematics) both to enhance
modal efficiency and to provide the necessary integration between marketplace and
marketspace
the nodal positioning of logistics platforms should be kept as flexible as possible (i.e.
they should match the 'footlooseness' of industry), by minimising fixed installations and
storage infrastructure, and maximising redeployability
where the information content of a product is transmitted electronically and the material
content is transported in parallel, the value of 'material only' may be low enough to
permit moderate'increases in inventory levels in the transport system and corresponding
increases in operational flexibility
technologies for unit costing of transport are likely to improve enormously, for both
internal resource usage and externalities; revenue collection will be by smartcard and
highly transparent; all support activities of transport firms (customer information,
timetable changes, tracking systems, etc) will be conducted in the marketspace
in freight distribution, the emphasis will swing from single-origin-multidrop towards
multiorigin-single-drop as electronic shopping from retail warehouses becomes
prevalent; distribution vehicles will be 'intelllgent '_ i.e, _prgvide for _ controlled
refi-igeration of perishable goods, contro|ied heat_g of pre'eooked meals, onboard
printing of labels, etc.
as concern for the conservation of natural resources continues, industry will
increasingly emphasise the re-use/re-cycling of materials in product and logistical
design; the provision of economical reverse logistics channels will be a major new
transport pre-occupation
light of these, and many other similar observations which could be made, it may be
that the task of tile (regional) transport planner will in future revolve around:
the identification of the elements of the core transport network, in the context of
forecast population and industrial trends together with anticipated regional and
political priorities
the specification of non-core network elements, recognising that nodes
(platforms) may require to be adjustable in capacity (scaleable) and location
(footloose) and that traffic will be interchangeable between physical
(marketplace) and virtual (marketspace) moralities
more creativity than hitherto at the level of transport operations, on the basis there
will be an increasing level of technological capability and an ever-expanding
computational capal:iility, so that traditional operational constraints will be
decreasingly important.
5.3 The need for a pro-active strategic response
There have been step changes in transportechnology in the past which have had severe
effects on the industry. When aeroplanes replaced passenger ships in ocean transport, there
was a sudden and devastating decline in demand for ocean liners. When the internal
combustion engine became available, road transport grew rapidly and removed a large share of
what wa_ hitherto the railways' market, notwithstandin_ various attemt_ts to contain or imaore
the threat. Earlier, when the railways were built, the change in technology was quite sudden
and in this case had a major impact on the demand for horse-drawn transport.
These past step changes in technology had the common feature of being on the
transport supply side. They were to an extent controllable by the transport sector and they
involved an extension rather than contradiction of existing paradigms about mobility and travel
demand. Today, one can continue to observe the impact of changes in transport technology
which have been initiated by the transport sector and do not entail paradigm shifts. For
instance, due to advances in engine technology and the use of lighter materials in aircraft
construction, flying ranges have been extended progressively. Some airports and routes may
have grown in importance as a result, and some may have declined, but the overall effect can
be explained in conventional terms,
The changes which are being produced by advances in information and
communications technologies are, it is submitted, in a different category. For the first time
they provide opportunities to circumvent the need for physical mobility, without the corollary
ofdecIines in economic activity and living standards.
As a strategic threat, they imply that if the transport sector does not satisfy the mobility
needs ofsome or all segments of the transport market, by imposing unacceptable transit delays,
re-routings or postponements, these segments may quite literally evaporate. Because the
alternative forms of mobility appear to be habit-forming, market losses may not be easily
reversed. Because virtual mobility is developing progressively in its sophistication, the
alternative forms of mobility will appeal to a widening market segment.
--As a strategic Opportunity, the changes produced by advances in information and
communications technologies provide the transport sector with the means of 're-engineering'
itself to resolve endemic issues such as congestion and difficulties in management and co-
ordination.
:A difficulty in addressing the potential impact of telecommunications on transport is
that its impact is so invisible, diffuse and difficult to quantify. Nobody will deny the impact
that computerised reservation systems have had on airline market shares, or the impact which
the fax has had on the transport of printed paper, yet either change is difficult to quantify.
According to present indications, it is clear that the advent of e.mail will have a substantial
impact on the postage sector, that INTERNET will change the role of travel agents
fundamentally, and that tracking systems will have a positive impact on express freight flows.
Again, however, it is difficult to quantify these effects.
it is possible that ICT will simply have a continuous 'trickle' effect on the transport
sector, always diverting demand at the margin and always injecting efficiency opportunities at
the core. The 'trickle' effects are what will happen if there is no intervention, if nothing is done.
If, on the other hand, the transport sector chooses a pro-active response, decides to use ICT to
manage and harness transport demand, to create new variants of transport services, and to find
innovative solutions to endemic problems then the changes and opportunities are bound to be
more fundamental.
The air freight transport sector has every opportunity to manage traffic peaks better, to
deal more satisfactorily with real-timemarket needs through flexible routing and scheduling,
and to be an integrated pan of industry's vaiue_adding chains (Wilson, 1997).
5.4 A new transport planning framework?
The traditional transport planning analytical framework has proved remarkably
versatile and robust over several decades. Yet as pointed out by Bieber et al (1994), there are
certain drawbacks to.the use of the aggregated econometric approach in the investigation of
changes in mobility, which concern a 'small scale' or micro-social domain. In an attempt to
capture the more recent developments in ICT which establish it as a real satisfier of mobility
need, and also the various transport-telecommun{-cati0ns ]-nterplays discussed in this paper, a
framework such as that outlined in Figure 7 may be appropriate. Here, various geo-
sociological characteristics of regions are taken as given and act as generators of profiles of
'desired interaction patterns'. These could include, for instance:
-- a profile of social interactions, spatially and in time, for the average individual in
each defined socio-economic grouping in each zone
-- a profile of information-rich services, spatially and in time, required by the average
individual in each soci0-economic grouping in each zone
--a profile of material-rich services, spatially and in time, required by the average
individual in each socio-eeonomic grouping in each zone
-- a breakdown of the information-processing content of the various work categories
available in the zone, flagged according to their suitability for remote-based
execution
--a breakdown of the information/material content of various product categories
available in the zone.
Each zone would be defined by its mix of individuals and their types of household
affiliation, its mix of industries and their value chain characteristics (i.e. required supplier-
buyer affiliations), and its mix of work (employment) categories including product/retail
categories.
I
As an originator of interactions, each zone would generate a set of desired social
interactions, desired information-rich services, desired material-rich services, desired work
opportunities for the population, product manufacturing capabilities, and desired product
acquisition or retail shopping opportunities. Of particular relevance in the categorisation of
individuals would be age and/or educational qualifications, as an indicator of propensity to use
ICT channels, suitabili .t7' of household type to home-based work (i.e. availability of space,
adequate telecommunications capacity, etc), and the normal indicators of access to the various
transportmodes. •
The decision rules of the model would focus on the fulfilment of required social
interactions by either transport or telecommunications, the purchase of desired information-rich
and material-rich services, the performance of work, the manufacture of the various product
.... c ateg0ries , and the acquisition of the consumer goods required by the population.
The modal split between tr_sport and teleco_unications Would in the first instance
be according to the current or an anticipated equilibrium between the two mobility modes, and
then between the various sub-modes of each mobility mode according to the more conventional
mechanisms of cost and/or transaction time. In the case of information-rich services, the split
would be appropriately biased towards telecommunications and in the case of material-rich
services towards transport. Work opportunities in the zone would be categorised according to
the conventional descriptors and additionally according to the need to commute physically. The
......... ,-_ 1- ....... .-:_,.,_ ..... A;.. _t-, ;to lnob_t;r_l needs (i.e. rnarkett_lace/
==
;i
I
|
i
|
i
l_
=
!
i
marketspace proportions and value-chain requirements). Consumer goods acquisition channels
would be categorised according to the existing or a desired balances between physical and
electronic shopping, .and between multi-drop and multi-origin distribution in effecting
deliveries.
Interactions between a given {zone i} as originator and the other {zones j} as attractors
would be distributed according to the available infrastructure connections and predetermined
rules (e.g. always give preference to own {zone i} or to cheapest/most adjacent next best
option; or, alternatively, allocate between all {zones j} according to relative
costs/times/distances). As suggested by Bieber et al, the allocations could be subject to time
or financial budgets, with appropriate 'second best' allocation rules once the budget thresholds
are exceeded.
Axhausen an_ G_ling (1992) provide an interesting review of several conceptual
frameworks and models within the activity-based approach to the analysis of travel behaviour.
These frameworks would need to be extended to accommodate both forms of mobihty, and
also to deal with the 'time compression' implications of {physical_virtual} mobility
substitution.
In the case of services or industries with a strong inter-regional or international
character, the routing of transport connections would be through selected ports, airports, rail
terminals, or logistical platforms including combined transport interchange nodes. Where a
certain industry type had over-riding value chain preferences (such as where multinational
firms pre-specify their supplier locations or where a teleprocessing facility has a specific
country or firm affiliation) this could be imposed at the interaction distribution stage of the
model.
The model would permit various characteristics of-the transport system to be
highlighted as parameters, and likewise the various drivers of modal split between transport
and telecommunications. In conventional fashion, the model could be used to check various
'what if?.' type permutations of the pivotal variables, and various policy scenarios embracing
transport, telecommunications and/or vafi'ous aspects of social organisation.
For instance, in their work Bieber et al distinguished three over-arching scenarios:
'conservative' (in which importance is given to the cultural role of cities), 'modemist'
(characterised by a concentration of banking power and an emphasis on technology), and 'post-
modernist' (associated with an individuaIistic, liberal dynamic).
Figure 7: Composite transport-telecommunicationsmodel framework
Geo-sociological characteristics of
{zone i}: population structure,
household mixes, industry
locations, mix and location of
work categories
=I Time, cost budgets
il i
Desired interaction
patterns: social, work-
related, services-related,
industrial inputs and
outputs, retail, etc
* includingpre-
determined FA C
preferences:
(marketplace) (marketspace)
Physical Materials-
commuting rich services
M_ufactured Physical
goods: VACs shopping
Transport modal split
Electronic Information Information -
shopping products rich services work
Telecommunications modal split
Distributi°n °f {z°ne i} physical interacti°ns i[to all {zones j}.
Transport routings* i]
I
1
Distribution of {zone i} virtual interactions I
to all {zones j } I
Telecommunications routings* i
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to give a global image of the recent developments in the
business relationships of Air Cargo players. This study is basically the evolution of previous
work on air cargo economics, but this time more focalized on the strategies of the industry's
participants. Where firms compete, how they compete and what changes will take place in
the cargo environment in the near future are some of the subjects herein discussed. We will
also contemplate the strategic efforts done by both the integrators and the airline-forwarder
couple to move into each other's businesses. The cen_ issue _ however be the
problematic relationship e_i_ting between airlines and forwarders._D_fion _be _teocused
not only on today's situation, but also on the way vertical strategies can overcome the
airline's problem of having their aircraft loaded (the forwarders' commitment), and the
forwarder's problem in having a regular offer of capacity (the airlines' commitment).
i
w.
i
Introduction
During the past five years the world air freight industry grew at an average of 9.8% p.a. in
terms of tons'. Even though at a slower pace due to the impact of the Asian crisis,
MergeGlobal still expects growth rates to attain an average of 6.6% p.a. during the next five
years. This basically means that, if the industry continues to experience similar growth rates,
within ten years its size will have almost doubled in terms of volume. The main
contributors to this expansion are worldwide exchanges, growth in industrial output and
even the economic and social development of some particular industries such as electronic
components, pharmaceuticals or fashion. For the future, we expect that the development
of institutions promoting world trade, as it is the case of the World Commerce
Organization and regional organizations such as the European Union, the NAFTA and the
Mercosur Group, can generate further growth acting as huge catalysts of economic activity.
So basically the industry is definitely a fast growing one. Indeed, during the recent past the
number of participants in the industry has substantially increased and with it, new business
practices were developed. Hence, the reason to study business relationships in air freight
markets.
We xx-illbegin our discussion by introducing air cargo in an historical perspective. We will
thereafter enter in the reality of the industry itself by presenting all the major actors and
corresponding activities, while segmenting the markets in different businesses or market
segments.
The third part of the paper will start by contemplating the shippers' needs and its
interactions with the providers. A closer outlook will be given to the strategic trends
occu.tfing within the providers' scene, in order to perceive the direction of the industry in
the near future and have a better understanding of the problems that it currently faces.
Finally, in part IV, we will develop the discussion regarding the current situation of the
often litigating airline/forwarder couple. In addition, we will shortly incur into the theory
of vertical integration and try to foreword a possible solution to the problem based on
mutual commitment.
Compounded average growth rate. Source: MergegGlobal. Inc.
I. Air Cargo Historical Overview
The first cargo flights, dating as far back as 1916, were used to transport mail. During the
early 20s, postal services started to use air mode on a regular basis and in the United States
they have even created their own airline - US Air Mail. Nonetheless, it was only after World
War II that Air Cargo really took off. In the after war years the availabilit-y Of military
transports provided the airline industry with inexpensive airplanes that could be used for
commercial purposes. Likewise, manufacturers started investing on civil aircraft programs
using the experience already acquired gith the military ones. As a result, the development
experienced by the air cargo industry throughout the century is mainly due to the growth of
commercial aviation. Indeed, its growth accompanied the evolution of passenger markets
through the existence of available belly hold capacity.
However, events have led to see the transport of goods by air mode as a viable and
sometimes essential activity per 1e. In fact, in 1947 London Aero & Motor Services (LAMS)
operated regular cargo services between the continent and the OK, mainly transporting
fruits. In this way, a freight dedicated airline managed to establish a bridge between fruit
growers located in southern Europe and the British retailers. During the off-peak season it
has organized a round-the-world flight in which it could transport commodities on a charter
basis. LAMS was important because it showed the potential profitability of air freight
operations. On the other hand, during the Berlin Russian blockade of 1948, air freight
proved its vital role in suppl)q..qg isolated populations. But it was onl)_ in the mid 60s that the
industry started to gain a space of its own. Shippers begun to see that it was not just the
transport of perishables that was economically viable. They realized that the residual
difference they had to pay in order to use air transport instead of using surface modes was
offset by the savings in storing, insurance and "shrinkage". As a result, in view of the interest
demonstrated by airlines such as Pan Am and TWA, aircraft manufacturers started not only
to convert DC8s and B707s to cargo configuration, but also to build combined
passenger/cargo versions.
New developments were yet to come, such as the appearance of the huge and more cost-
efficient Boeing 747 Freighter, the development of the outsized cargo lifter Antonov 124 or
the unfolding of logistic systems. The fact is that for the past 25 years the industry has
experienced an astounding development through the implementation of computer
technologies, the development of cargo facilities and the emergence of new industry players.
II. Industry Structure
The nature and number of actors in the air cargo business have been keeping up with the
rise of the industry. During the 1970s shippers requiring air cargo services focused
exclusively on the cost of the shipment and used several providers (such as brokers and
traditional forwarders) in a complex transport process. With the 80s, the number of
intermediaries was reduced, while information has become increasingly important for logistic
managers. As we entered the 90s the industry starts to offer complete logistic solutions and
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seamless origin-destination services, values cost and service trade-offs, provides globa]
coverage, and applies "the voice of the customer". These new trends have thus developed
the emergence of newcomers in response to market needs: the integrators, the logistic
providers, and the contractors. The relationships existing between the different industr'."
participants can be structured as in the vertical setting presented in figure 1.
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Vertical Structure of the Air Cargo Industry
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Airport authorities, even though playing a fundamental role within the industry, are a side
party of the previous structure. They provide facilities and services to airlines, integrators,
forwarders and complement transportation modes (trains, trucks or ships). The airlines in
general and the forwarders complete the core of _e providers' group.
One can distinguish between three types of airlines:
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1. _2ombination Carriersl%
Pure Belly - Passenger carriers whose cargo capacity is restricted to the I
lower deck or combi space (e.g. Delta Airlines, Air Canada) I
Belly Flex - Passenger carriers with leased freighters (e.g. Swissair)
Mixed - Carriers operating not only passenger aircraft, but also theirown freighters (e.g. Singapore Mrlines, Northwest, Lufthansa)
2. [Scheduled and Charter All-Cargo Carriers (e.g. Air Foyle, Cargolux, M.illon Air)]
3_ [Integrators (e.g. FedEx, UPS, DHL)I
The forwarders establish the connection between shippers and carriers, i.e. the industry retail
level. This task includes the choice of inter-modal transportation from the shippers'
warehouses to the consignees' addresses, which basically means that they pick-up the
commodities, choose a carrier able to perform the line-haul phase, clear the goods with
customs and deliver them to the consignee. Whenever we are dealing with regional or niche
forwarders, the agent picking up the consignment is not the same delivering it to its
destination. However, forwarders have further responsibilities such as airway bill processing,
handling of consignments at the airports and insurance.
In operational terms, the competitive core of the industry - the providers - is thus formed by
the airline/forwarder axis on one side and the integrators on the other. Although the former
group had 96% of the international air carg o share in 1993 with the remaining 4% taken by
the latter, Boeing is foreseeing that by 2015.the inte_at0rs' market share will have risen by
six times__e basic strength of integrators relies on their service speed and effectiveness as a
single source supplier of fo_'arding, consolidation, time-defined transportation and
brokerage. Their major weakness is their inflexibility before customers since they only
provide Standardized services dealing with relatively small, low weight consignments. On the
other side, combination carriers and aU-cargo airlines are much more flexible regarding
special transport services, but they have to deal with external agents (the forwarders) which
are organized in a quite competitive market (20 multinational forwarders detain 40% of the
market). If there are no long-term agreements or partnerships, the couple airline/forwarder
will inevitably take longer performing the service than the integrated firm wiLl. It is all a
question of incentives since we are dealing with profit maximizing independent firms.
Apart from the core actors, we can still distinguish another industry provider: third party
logistic suppliers. These newcomers represent the ultimate outsourcing option in selling
complete logistic solutions to shippers willing to concentrate on their core business. They
provide a wide range of distribution services including: just-in-time and next day deliveries,
warehousing facilities in different locations around the world, accurate inventor" control and
a program that optimizes geographic stocking locations according to inventory requirements,
delivery schedules and corresponding costs.
Lastly, other recent actors of the air cargo industry include the so-caUed contractors.
Companies such as Atlas Air provide freighter lift capacity to both cargo/combination
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carriers and integrators on an 'Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance and Insurance' (ACM1) basis.
Companies such as Gemini Air Cargo and Evergreen International offer both ACMI wet-
lease contracts and all-cargo charter operations. The contractors business consists thus on
buying aircraft at the best prices, converting them (when the), are not pure freighters) and
afterwards operating them for carriers that were not willing to fly the planes themselves. This
option is pa_cdlarly-lnteiesfing whenever a carrier needs additional lift but does not want to
incur on aircraft investments before it knows the corresponding market return.
However, all of these actors work at different fronts inside the industry and in specific
segments___-d0=ffl_e_e with other modes, such as trucking or ocean shipping. As
Michael Porter once discussed, "definition of an industry is not the same as definition of
where the firm wants to compete (i.e. defining its business)". This is what market
segmentation is all about. A meaningful division of Air Cargo into different market segments
should be performed according to urgency requirements and the weight and nature of
consignments (product performance and product characteristics). Hence air cargo activities
can be segmented by product into three distinct cargo market segments:
PRODUCT SEGMENTATION FOR THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY
Market
Segment
Express/
Urgency
Segment
Routine
Perishable
Segment
Routine
Non-
Perishable
/Supply Chain
Segment
Description Customer Requirements Air Eligibility
A seamless door-to-door time-definite
transportation of documents, pamels and
low weight consignments;
Highly service driven;
Premium market;
Mainly operated by the integrators;
Transpodation of physical perishables
(such as flowers and fruits) and economic
perishables (such as fashion clothing,
newspapers and magazines);
• Comprehends the traditional heavyweight
industrial products (i.e. hard freight);
• Just-in-Time concept Is applied for ,,zero
stock firms,, _ J. TotaIDistribution Costs
• Covered by the airline/forwarder axis and
newcomers third party logisticproviders;
• Forwarders typically consolidate tenders
with which they arbitrage both belly and all-
cargo capacity;
• Speed;
• Reliability - Security and time-
definite guaranteed services
(e.g. delivery in 48 hours before
10 am or before 12 p.m.);
• IT Support - Real time
information of shipments status
and location;
• Flexibility and customization;
• Guaranteed se_ce, otherwise
the products may loose all its
intrinsic value;
• Good transportation conditions
in order to minimize product
damage or deterioration;
• IT Support - Track and tracing
capabilities
• Values cost-service trade-off:
• Flexibility and customization;
• Low Weight;
• High Value;
• Time Critical;
• Time Compression;
• High value-to-
weight
products...but not
ollly...
• Just-In-Time may
attract average or
low value goods
savings on capital
costs, inventory
and insurance;
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PRODUCT SEGMENTATION BREAKDOWN & MODAL 'POSITIONING
The US-Far East Market Example
Illustrative Industry Segmentation
U.S.-Far EastMarket
SHIPMENT
WEIGHT
IN KGs.
(WeightCriteria)
j 100,000
5000
500
45
1
0
FULL#LANELOAD (FPL) F'_.LL4bLANELOAD (FPL|
• A
LESS-THAN-PLAN LOAD LEIE-THAN-PLANELOAO
IL_.} ¢PL)
DEDICATED PUT
AIR CHARTER AM CHARTER
STANDAP.D AIR •
I_.#D IqtF.K_T
0 3 7 14 35
DOOR-TO-DOOR TRANSIT TIME IN DAYS
(Urgency Criteria)
Even though the above market selection was performed according to a product criteria one
may as well argue that there is also a certain customer segmentation on grounds of a carrier's
geographical coverage.
III. Shippers & Providers Focus
1. The Sh_p?ers' Need_
The imposing question is what characterizes shippers' needs since these will ultimately
determine the nature of each market segment. In other words, what makes them have such
needs and how well the providers are fulfilling these needs.
................. . _ _..... 7
_-_drcargo is basically the transport 9 f freight, excess baggage and mail by air mode, wherein
the notion of freight itself includes all types of commodities and parcels. The intrinsic nature
of the industry makes of its products a "derived demand"- a service that is acquired to
complement another activity and is valueless per se. Basically, shippers use the industry
services in order to sustain their supply chain management and/or to have their products
sold in different geographical locations.
.-lir Cargo Business Relationships - 6
ii ?ii_!!!
i
|
|
i
i
i
m
|
i
!,
|
In fact, the increasing globalization of business operations has been driving the shippers'
level of demand on transportation and logistics services. The reasons lying behind this
internationalization trend include:
• the need io have geographical diversification;
• the existence of market potential elsewhere;
• the possibility of expansion based either on a distinctive capabilit3', such as reputation,
or on a cost competitive advantage acquired through a particular technology or the
development of economies of experience;
• the sourcing of raw materials;
• the economic benefits of low labor costs in the hosting country;
Therefore, as far as the cargo industry is concerned, the operations of such firms can be
viewed in two fronts:
• the production of goods (plants established in different regions of the globe or even
distinctive phases of the production process differently located);
• the marketing of the goods produced (consumer markets covering distinct continents of
the planet);
As a result, firms are being constrained by the need to have well-implemented distribution
channels and consequently resort to transport providers capable of satisfying the
requirements of these distribution structures. This means having an expanded network of
multi-modal transportation services with customer support in each of such locations.
Moreover, this means as well having not only the flexibility but also the know-how to
respond to different sorts of shippers' requirements.
As these requirements get more complex, firms will ultimately wish to minimize the
number of transport providers they deal with. This is only natural because in this way
shippers can develop a closer relationship with their provider and thence get a more
customized service (the provider adapts to the shippers' conditions and not the other way
around)_ _Such partnerships between shippers-and providers would eventually enable the
latter to develop a fixed portfolio Of di_ni_-c_mpanies _d in that way allow them to
understand better the shipper's needs and reduce market uncertainty, simultaneously
decreasing operational costs. Moreover, to the benefit of providers, if there is a long-term
relationship defined on a contract, dr even an external architecture based on shared
knowledge, the costs of a break up might be considerable. In other words, the offer of
flexible responsiveness and a customized is_b_fi-/:i_would inevitably bear switching costs to
the shipper and namely: the research for a new service providing the same capabilities as
the former one or even the potential subsfil-ution of IT supporting systems. On the side of
the shipper, the advantage of the situauon inevitably lies on the simplicity provided
through the 'one-stop shopping' e0nc:ept both in terms of transaction costs, and the
structural organization of distribution pipelines. Even though facing switching costs, the
former group would also benefit from some bargaining leverage with the providers due to
the volume that their business may generate.
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One-stop shopping will then be quite important for shippers wanting to implement 'just-
in-time' systems in their supply chain structure. Working with "zero stocks" demands
highly reliable services from the transport providers which means that time-definite
products will be quite demanded. The core process of implementing a JIT system relies on
increased inventory velocity, which has turned out to be one of today's main shipper
concerns. Basically, it s relevance resides in the ability to decline production _'cle times to
optimal levels. But not only. The application of the JIT concept in logistics management
also allows savings in inventory carrying costs and specifically:
• inventory costs of stocking - investment in working capital;
• inventory risk costs - material costs of obsolescence, spoilage and pilferage;
• capital costs of warehousing;
• inventory service costs such as insurance and taxes.
Naturally, the air freight industry has a determinant role in this process since it can speed the
turnover of inventories and therefore diminish total distribution costs when compared to
other modes. The key is that even though air is typically more expensive than surface, the
decrease induced on inventory investment more than offsets the transportation cost and
consequendy reduces the overall distribution cost.
This analysis is above all valid for the routine non-perishable market segment, which will
increasingly demand a more reliable service in order to sustain a supply chain operation. We
should then bear in mind that JIT does not necessarily mean speed, but time-certain delivery.
As a result, alternative modes have serious chances of competing with air on the transport of
industrial hard freight and namely, fast ships are capable of a relatively good performance in
terms of speed combined with vet')" attractive costs per kilo. Moreover, ocean shipping
companies have been heavily investing not only on the modernization of container ships but
also on information capabilities through the use of satellite technologies'. This will help
them to tackle their problem of reliability and simultaneously compete within the routine
non-perishable segment.
In a more radical perspective, one of the latest trends driving shippers' needs is their
willingness to outsource third party logistic providers. The need to focus on the firm's
central activity and optimize production plans according to demand has been taking an
increasing number of companies to opt for suppliers of transport, logistic solutions,
inventory management services and distribution optimization. This outsourcing option will
ultimately allow shippers to both rationalize infrastructure by needing fewer warehouses,
and improving their operational profitability by increasing plant productivity.
In practical terms, this settlement is 6sually based on the alliance of a shipper with a third
party, which may include a logistics consultant, an IT specialist in order to develop
information systems and a firm responsible for the transportation role. But to succeed the
' It is nonetheless commonly known that one of the main problems with shipping products by ocean mode
is the fact that they get stranded in ports due to congestion. However, sea port authorities have been
introducing computerized clearance systems that enable them to reduce handling time at port sheds to just a
couple of hours.
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logistics provider must offer not only the flexibility and reliabilit'y desired, but also
implement systems of quality control in every phase of its process.
ALL THEY WANT IS...
Shippers' Needs \Xhat do the) tee uire from the industry?
Global Distribution Pipelines
One-Stop Shopping
Increased Inventory Turnover
Infrastructure Rationalization
& Focus on Core Business
• Geographical coverage and local market knowledge
* multi-modalProviders with extended networks,
capabilities and a vast offer of sen'ices
• FlerdDility
• Customization
• Time-Definite services
• Reliability
Providers able to offer not only transportation
services, but also inventor), management systems,
logistic solutions and storing facilities.
2. The Providers" Endeavors
At the providers' scene we may distinguish different strategies according to each fm'n's
market position..Mthough positioning should be related to each company's source of
competitive advantage, the increasing offer of distinct services provided by each type of
participant in the industry has been outstanding. Specifically, the endeavors of scheduled
carriers in entering the express business and the attempts of the integrators to penetrate
the industrial hard Freight market, which characterizes the supply chain segment. We will
first tackle the forwarder scene and the integrators' plans for the near future before
analyzing combination carriers' strategies.
At the forwarders' level the main trend is probably the consolidation process occurring in
this business, as multinational companies are either merging or taking over smaller agents.
The decking yields that the traditional hard freight markets have been experiencing
combined with the need to become more competitive (both in terms of cost and services
offered) iustif 3- the recent moves at the Cargo retailing level. In particular, the fact that
shippers have been rationalizing their source of transportation supply is probably one of
the main reasons stimulating the market's consolidation process. The exception is niche
forwarders who have either gained expertise in the transport of specific commodities or
dominate a certain geographical area. This specific group will probably continue to enjoy
above average market returns. AU of the middle-sized forwarders that are not proficient in
any particular market or were left out of the tie-ins will be what Michael Porter called
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"stuck in the middle ''s. In other words, they will not be able to compete with multinational
forwarders since they do not have either the scale or the scope to do that, nor will the)" be
able to rival the niche agents. Such scenario will probably induce many of these forwarders
to leave the market.
Similarly to what has happened between Swiss forwarder Danzas and UPS, DHL has
recently announced a strategic parmership with Kuehne & Nagel 4. For the forwarders, this
is their chance to take a share of the express market segment by using the integrators'
networks to have their low weight packages delivered. For the integrators, this is a
guaranteed way of having high load factors and enhancing market returns. It does not
necessarily mean that they are giving a part of their business to competition. Basically, its
incentive is filling the opportunity of selling what they are good at to a third party that has
not the capabilities in terms of lift, scale or know-how to perform it by itself. This only
makes more sense when we consider the current shippers' trend of consolidating the
number of suppliers they deal with.
In addition, the integrators' parmership with the forwarders may as well represent an
entrance door into the ham freight market by using the agents' expertise and multi-modal
capabilities on industrial shipping. Yet, the integrators' endeavors into the supply-chain
segment are not constrained to tie-ups with forwarders. In fact, they have been inducing
the shippers they work with to submit their hard freight in smaller but more frequent
tenders instead of the usual large shipments. In this way, the integrators are trying to enter
the profitable market of the supply chain without making substantial investments in
equipment that would otherwise be necessary to handle the consignments. The problem
with this approach is that by using their current capacity to explore another market
segment, they are not solving their inflexibility issue. Indeed, the integrators o_ra_ons are
based on a hub and spoke system with shoif connections an-d-Where_f_gbt punctuality is
essential in Order for the whole system to work. Such structure does not_a_oWddays of a
tender. Moreover, due to handling efficiency optimization the product they sell is highly
standardized, which significantly reduces their ability to customize their services s. Lastly,
their network is prepared for a door-to-door delivery of up to 3 days - the problem is that
not all time-certain services are time critical. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the
integrators' efforts should be taken lightly. They do represent a threat to the traditional
airline/forwarder duet, since they are offering something that the latter group has been so
far, unable to rival.
The interesting discussion will therefore concern the next moves coming from the
integrators. Clearly, they have been performing extremely well in their core business and
they have been able to develop a reputation for a seamless and reliable door-to-door
service _. But would they be able to redeploy this distinctive capability into a completely
"Stuck in the middle" is being interpreted here as the relationship between a firm's overall strategy and
that of its competitors. Porter's approach was not about mid-market positioning, but of confused strategy or
the lack of it.
4 Both Danzas and Kuhne & Nagel are major players in the forwarding community.
s In other words they cannot receive lumpy tenders without cannibalizing their express market capacity.
6 The figures are quite explicit. When integrators first started in the United States, they carriedno more than
5% of national air freight. However, nowadays they control over 60% of the US market.
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different market segment, where brand loyalty is virtually overlooked? Simultaneously, they
essentially have no competitive advantage over incumbent carriers since:
they would be forced to acquire new aircraft - the existent capacity is already allocated
to the highly precise express operation where turnaround times are short, and
accumulated delays would corrupt the whole structure of the business;
• investments in personnel, premises, handling equipment and trucking would be
required;
they are vertically integrated companies that rely purely on their own services or those
of subcontracted parts; however, the spot nature of the hard freight market makes this
business substantially different from what they know at the express segment.
The only economies derived from the integrators' current operations would probably be
the existence of bargaining leverage in aircraft acquisition and the benefit of getting lower
airport fees. The conclusion is therefore that such a scenario does not seem to be a
particularly viable option, especially if we take into account the yield difference obtained in
both markets s. In other words, why should the integrators diversify into the riskier heavy
freight business if their return is much smaller. Even if they could charge a higher rate in
this market segment due to the offer of a reliable service, how much more would shippers
be willing to pay for their vertically differentiated product? Would that be sufficient to
attract the integrators? The question is raised.
The success of combination carriers in playing a role at the urgency segment is still quite
unclear. Airlines such Singapore or Air Canada have been developing airport-to-airport or
in some cases airport-to-door express products, with money back guarantees in case of
failure to deliver the consignments within a pre-determined time span. In Air Canada's
case, there is last minute acceptance and quick retrieval times at the airports but the system
is only available within Canada and valid for packages up to 32kg 8. For a door-to-door
service an additional fee is charged. On the other hand, Singapore Airlines' Swiftrider and
Timerider products cover the airlines' entire network and comprise as well large
shipments. Like in Air Canada, the service is available on an airport-to-airport basis.
The central point is that the airlines are not able to work as integrators, since they do not
have the trucking capabilities required to offer a door-to-door service and they cannot rely
on the forwarders to operate in such a limited time scope. We may distinguish two
different situations according to the type of combination carrier involved:
1. Belly airlines such as Air Canada are basicallyusing their highly frequent incrementally-
costed belly lift in order to sustain an express product line. This is the reason why most
airlines only offer these services within Europe or North America where they can
operate several daily flights. The rationale is that they can only compete with
integrators in regional markets because they do not have the structure to support a
round-the-world express operation - that is not their core business. In other words,
Even taking into consideration that integrators have also been experiencing declining yields in their
documents business.
8 Source: Air Canada
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most of combination carriers' focus is the passenger market and the)' are only using
their available belly capacity to market express products.
. The time-definite sen'ices introduced by carriers with organic freighter capacity (e.g.
Lufthansa, Singapore or KLM) are indisputably more flexible in terms of density
allowance than those of DHL, FedEx or UPS. Even though these services closely
resemble those of the typical integrator, the latter is still able to perform it on a door-
to-door basis in any part of the world.
What would then be interesting to know is if this incursion into the express/urgency
segment is being profitable The rationale is that belly airlines are unable to discern their
true costs of carrying freight, which means that they cannot know if they are making
money or not Indeed, their passenger operation may well be subsidizing the costs of cargo
lift In a certain way, the same reason applies to mixed carriers since their time definite
product is performed by using not only freighters' capacity, but also belly lift Indeed, most
mixed carriers do not have enough freighters' frequency in order to sustain a global
express product - they must resort to their daily belly capacity
EXPANSION OF SERVICES TO OTHER
.... ------_ ......... ..... _:'_ _ _r _ : _ T_ _ --_ " L L _
MARKET SEGMENTS BY TYPE OF AIRLINE
U.S.-Far EastM arket
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IWithin this scenario competition in each of these market segmen" ',ill be fiercer. Still, the
nature of the express/urgency segment will not allow differentiar2on as a way to reduce
market rivalry. In effect, express delivery customers are a sort o" premium market with
very objective needs. As a result, the players of this market have to keep up with all
product innovations that occur in the market if they want to remain competitive (copycat
strategies). We should stress that this is above all, a service (not a price) driven segment.
The routine n0n:perishable Segment Wli probably be more af:ected by _the increased
rivalry. This will not contribute much to the augmentation of hard-freight yields, which
have been experiencing a sustained fall of approximately 3% p.a. for the past twenty years _.
Differentiation as a way to smooth competition will be basically vertical. We believe that
the players in the segment (integrators, airlines/forwarders and third party logistic
providers) will offer distinct services at different quality levels and prices. For example,
third party providers will be selling complete logistic solutions while integrators will offer
reliable hard freight transportation. At the same time, the airline/forwarder couple may sell
know-how and flexibility in their transportation product or, max" act as in a spot market
through consolidation processes and rates' arbitrage. In this last case the "couple" would be
providing a non-reliable se_fce but at a lower cost to the shipper. This is what is currently
happening in most situations. But is this what major shippers are looking for? If airlines and
forwarders do not put in practice a common strategy to hold the supply chain segment and
satisfy their customers' needs, the integrators will be successful in taking over this market.
The "couple" has the resources and know-how to provide both reliable, time-certain, door-
to-door quality services, and regular air freight operations with time estimated deliveries (as
opposed to time-definite ones). What has been preventing them to take _rofit of their joint
capabilities is what we will be now analyzing.
IV. Insight into the Providers' Group
1. The Airline/Fonvarder Duo: The Present Situation
The traditionally endemic relationship characterizing the "couple" airline/forwarder can be
resumed as follows.
at the fonvarders' level,
Air forwarders have a short-run profit maximizing goal. Hence they exert from airlines as
much surplus per transaction as possible. The ultimate objective is to optimize their own
surplus since the shippers will always pay the same price for the consignment. Specifically,
theirway of doing business goes as hereinafter:
• they optimize their consolidation process;
• they arbitrage between different.airline bids for a specific tender:.
• they book at least one flight in order to guarantee the lift, and t.h.ereafter,
9 Source: Lufthansa Cargo
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• if they are able to find a lower rate than the one booked, the)" will relentlessly change to
the cheaper carrier;
Then if anything goes wrong, such as any delays or losses, they will frequently deny their
responsibilit 3, and blame the airlines for indifference towards freight. This is particularly true
for small/mid-sized non-integrated forwarders, although freight consolidatio0 and rates'
arbitrage are intrinsic elements of the forwarding business.
at the airlines level,
r
lVlost combination carriers usually focus on the passenger market, leaving cargo as a
secondary activity. In fact, the offer of lifting capacity is most of the time passenger driven in
terms of routes, schedules and equipment type. One of the other forwarders' complaints
concern the fact that in some cases, airlines having a particular interest in the cargo business
tried to pass over the forwarders. They claim that such carriers try to overrun them by
contacting directly with _e-s-l'iippers, i.e. work both at the'wlaolesa[le 'and retail levels. The
carrier's common argument is that they need a certain security and in specific routes they
must have a base load. Moreover, airlines are regularly accused of overbooking and then
being unable to transport the goods. But they claim their need to diminish the probabilit 3' of
having their lifting capacity unused clue to forwarders' typical behavior.
This is quite simply the "ping pong game" that has been going on for too long,
2. Economic Ana[ysis of the Current Spot Game
Whenever forwarders book a flight with an airline abe, and afterwards they search for a better
rate by arbitraging between airlines, we may well be facing a typical principal-agent situation:
the so-called moral-hazard problem. The basic argument of moral hazard, otherwise called
the problem of hidden action, is that once a contract has been established, the principal
cannot observe and/or verify the actions done by the agent. This means that there is
symmetric information ex-ante but not ex-post. In our current game the agent is the forwarder
..... drid-_e pfincipaI'is the airiirle.
The situation goes as follows: the forwarder has consolidated several consignments and
"built" a tender to be shipped in day X. He researches all the potential capacity available in
the market for that day. He will then book the tender on airline abe in order to make sure it
departs on day X and in the meantime, he will use its leverage (if any) in order to get the
rates down from other airlines. If he succeeds he will no longer have its tender transported
on airline abe. Economically speaking, once the contract was formally established (booking),
airline abe could not observe nor verify the forwarders future ac_ons before the completion
of the contract. As there is typically no penalt 3" for no-shows, the agent does not bear any
uncertainty for contingent outcomes of the transactionl Only the principal is affected by the
result of the deal, which means that it is the airline bearing all the risk inherent to the
transaction. The relevant question would then be why is there asymmetric information in
this situation. In other words, what has changed after the booking that gave an informational
advantage to the agent? The rationale is that the forwarders make money by taking
advantage of having all the pricing information on the market and "bluff" in order to get the
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lowest rate. As airlines do not know each other's bids for the available capacity, they cannot
predict the existence of opportunistic behavior from the forwarder. Moreover, the more
credible the forwarders' bluff, the bigger the surplus the agent will get from the principal,
especially _'henever the tender concerns perishables. In practice, airlines have been
protecting themselves by overbooking. However, carriers such as Emirates or KLM have
been supporting the introduction of penalties for both no-shows and not-flown-as-booked.
These would work like incentive schemes against opportunistic behavior in the ex-post stage
of the transaction _''.
The recent development of Cargo 2000 n will bring the industry Electronic Data Interchange
compatibility. If this happens, the forwarders will loose their informational advantage
because all airlines with available capacity wiU know the offers of the market and will not be
willing to reduce their bids as before. Unless multinational forwarders truly want to form
partnerships with major carders in order to provide better services, there is no motive what-
so-ever for the forwarding community to be keen on establishing an industry-wide EDI
platform. Clearly, the main loser will be the mid-size forwarder that will no longer be able to
make profits of arbitraging. Its survival will depend on its consolidation process. If we then
take into account the tenders of multinational forwarders and the mergers taking place in
this community, we can easily conclude that Cargo 2000 will only accelerate the shrinkage
that will take place at the forwarders' scene. Multinational groups and niche forwarders will
then dominate the market.
In practical terms, the fundamental problem with the airline/forwarder relationship is
probably the fact that both carriers and forwarders have been ignoring until now their
ultimate customer, the shipper. Carriers treat forwarders as price driven clients and not as
partners while the latter are more preoccupied with eventual talks invoMng shippers and
carriers at the same table than with shippers' needs. The point is that airlines and forwarders,
instead of competing against each other, should agree on the best way to satisfy their
customers' needs, that is: i) what do they want? ii) how can we provide that ? This is the only
way the traditional airline/forwarder axis _ be able to survive, otherwise the shippers will
opt for the less flexible, though more reliable product offered by the integrators. As Guenter
Rohrman from Air Express International (multinational forwarder) stated, _¢we [forwarders]
don't generate a single kilo of revenue producing freight. Our customers do. And the
comments in the aforementioned white paper [the European Air Shippers Council white
paper concerning the future of Air Cargo, dating from September 1995] indicate that
shippers believe they are being left out in the coldi).
_0Asymmetries of information may raise a further _roblem involving forwarders. It can be argued that
there might be some moral hazard actions from the forwarder at the downstream side. The rationale is that
the shipper does not know if the agent _s giving him the best service he can for the price the former has
paid, or if the latter values more its own interests (at the expense of the shipper). As an example we know
that shipments are usually held for consolidation at airport sheds before being tendered to airlines. We also
knowthat the choice Ofairline is done by the air forwarder. It might happen that the cargo agents' choice is
very convenient to him in terms of cost and/or airline/forwarder relationship but not as favorable as it could
be to the client, i.e. it might exist a better/faster solution to the shipper's request that is not taken in view of
the forwarders' interests. This does not necessarily mean that the choice done by the forwarder results in a
ba d outcome. In fact, it can even respect all the shipper's requests, but may be there was a better option.
The present situation is all about the best rappori price/quality.
n Cargo 2000 is an alliance of major forwarders and airlines grouped to standardize business practices.
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The bottom line is that, unlike integrators, multinational forwarders can provide a whole
range of supply chain management products tailored to the specific needs of the customers
and airlines have the lift capabilities in terms of payload, frequency and network. Apparent])-,
combining both skills seems to be the problem faced by this axis. So the relevant question
is : what has prevented them from reaching a consensual arrangement in the past ?
Airlines have been focusing on their passenger activity, which is the one that gives them
higher returns (for many airlines cargo represents no more than 7% of their revenues). Then,
it often happens that freight is scheduled to be transported in a particular flight but because
of the passenger payload, it has to remain on land (due to space and weight constraints).
This situation, which has been common practice until now, encloses the essential problem:
airlines cannot invest in capacity nor can they upgrade their services if they do not know if
this upgrading will be profitable. In other words, they need forwarders to give long-term
volume commitment.
We will now cover some issues regarding the theory of vertical strategies in order to
understand the economic problem lying underneath this situation.
3. Theory of Verlical Strategies and the <<L2m'ng-Togetben> Solution
Nowadays transactions can be organized in innumerable ways. Basically transacting at the
market implies one of the following forms of contract:
Short-term contracts (spot contracts)
Long-term contracts :
1. Classic Contracts
2. Implicit Contracts (similar to extemal architecture)
Or transactions can also take place internally, that is, without passing through the mmkets.
This last situation corresponds to a transaction that occurs inside the same fm'n or within an
integrate_d _,
The type of contract or transaction option that will take place depends on the costs
associated with each transaction's nature. When contracting via the marke(two main types
of costs arise:
1. those occurring before the signature of the contract (pre-contract stage) and,
2. those occurring during the implementation of the contract (i.e. once it was signed).
/
1. Ex-Ante Transaction Costs - Costs of negotiating, drafting, designing and safeguarding a
contractual arrangement. Safeguarding is particularly important because it addresses
simultaneously, at least to a certain extent, ex-ante and ex-post costs of contracting.
Safeguarding costs exist because there are cognitive limitations of mind, otherwise
designated as bounded rationality, which do not allow the agents to write complete
contracts, i.e. contracts contingent on every possible state of nature. Moreover even if it was
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humanly possible to foresee all possible contingencies it would be too costly and time-
consuming to enumerate them all. An example of safeguarding in transaction cost
economics might be the creation of an incentive scheme or a governance structure to protect
a contractual part from bounded rationalit T problems or opportunistic behavior, especially
when specific investments are involved. The incentive scheme might be a simple penalty for
contract premature ending. A governance structure is a sort of pre-established code of rules
(agreed by the contracting parts) that determines how disputes should be solved at the ex-post
stage. Thence, in face of unexpected events, the agents will not get involved in self-interest
bargaining (which might be a "painful" experience) because a governance structure has been
defined ex-ante.
| :
2. Ex-Po.rt Transaction Costs - Costs incurred in order to control the correct application of
the contract by one of the parties n and the costs of enforcing the contract. However, when
defacto the implementation of the contract drives away from a certain alignment, there will be
subsequent costs of correcting these mischangements. An example of monitoring and
enforcement costs are the agency costs - the principal controls the effective application of
the contract and thence incurs in some costs (e.g. shareholders of a firm), and the agents are
given an incentive scheme (e.g. managers of a firm).
But the most relevant question is probably to know when should transactions take place in
the markets or when should they be organized within the firm. The answer, given by Ronald
Coase in 1937 stresses that the transaction option taking place depends on the costs
associated with each transaction's particularities. According to Coase (1937), whenever the
costs of market procurement are higher than the administrative costs of organizing within
the firm, the transaction should take place internally.
The transaction particularities mentioned above (that _11 determine the associated costs)
include a group of economic factors that are particular to each situation: asset specificity,
uncertainty and frequency. The first of these factors is the most important one in
determining the type of transaction that wilt take place.
• Asset specificity is a special purpose investment (opposed to general purpose investment)
and thence has a non-iredeployable characteristic. It is human nature that makes of asset
specificity a problematic factor. First of all, because there is bounded rationality and thence
not all the potential hazards are taken into account - this might lead to opportunism due to
the existende of information asymmetries. In addition, the fact that within a bilateral
relationship one party has to make a specific investment that has no value outside, implies
that the other part obtains a bargahaing advantage over the locked-in firm.
• Uncertainty refers to: potential disturbances that may occur in the surrounding
environment at an ex-post stage, existence of broken channels of communication and
behavioral aspects. As a result, uncertainq" arises due to the existence of both bounded
rationality and opportunistic conduct (due to information asymmetries). Examples of
uncertainty include: i) suffer variations of inflation, interest rates or demand levels; ii)
*_Or in the case of a double moral hazard problem, costs of mutual monitoring.
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unwillingly miss the strategies carried by other firms in the market; and iii) be subject to
hidden actions from the agents at the ex-post level of the contract (the previously discussed
moral hazard problem).
• Frequency regards the fact that asset-specific transactions need specialized governance
structures. However, particular governance structures imply a considerable cost and hence a
trade-off should be done between the benefits of haxfing such a structure and the cost of
implementing this same structure. The point is that "the cost of specialized governance
structures will be easier to recover for large transactions (...). Hence the frequency of
transactions is a relevant dimension ''13. In fact, Williamson arguments that whenever there
are transactions that need a specialized governance structure but that have a low frequency,
we can aggregate those transactions that have similar nature into one governance structure in
order to reap transaction economies. This means that firms cannot only benefit from the
special safeguard scheme (and thus economize on transaction costs), but also implement the
specific investment (and hence have its production costs decreased).
Resuming these are basically the sources of transaction costs. Whenever these three sources
are very important in a certain trade situation, we _'ill have transaction costs that are
extremely high and thence an internal organization of transactions will be preferred to a
market one. This is particularly true when there is asset specificity. According to Williamson
(1975), the factor that justifies firms' preference for an internal organization operation over
market procurement is the existence of an asset specificity. As a result, _e main driver of
vertical integration is transaction cost economies, i.e. it is the exploitation of these type of
economies that induces firms to have a common ownership and not necessarily the fact that
there are technical economies at the production process !evel. That woul d not iustify
common ownership per se. It is the sunk cost investment (probably technical) associated with
asset specificit T that induces the firms to choose a vertical integration option so that they can
avoid the transaction costs mentioned above.
However, as Grant 14 stresses, this does not necessarily mean that long-term contracts are
unable to insure the parts against opportunistic beha,,4or for example. It can be done
through the imposition of governance structures. In fact, it all depends on the trade-off
between the intensity of these costs and the administrative costs of internalization, which
should also be considered. The costs associated with organizing the transactions internally
include : the differences in the optimal scales of operations and distinct needs of flexibility
(operational coordination and rapid technological adjustment _fav0rs vertical integration
while efficiency in meeting unexpected demands favors market operations). Consequently, as
CrOmer Is asserted, the problem of a firm is not really whether to integrate or not a certain
group of activities, but what is the optimal extent of this integration.
13in Oliver E. Williamson. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Chapter 2, The Free Press, New
York, 1985
14in Robert Grant's Contemporary Strategy Analysis. Chapter 12. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985
ts in Jacques CrOmer Integration verticale: Vers un Guide pour le Practicien, CNRS, GREMAQ et Institut
d'Economie Industrielle - Universit_ des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse
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The dilemma is therefore the comparison between the intensity of transaction costs and
namely the type of asset specificity involved, and the costs of internalization. We win now
introduce Air Cargo into this setting.
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We can distinguish between four types of asset specificity:
* site specificity,
• physical asset specificity,
• human asset specificity, and
• dedicated asset specificity.
In Air Cargo, the type of asset specificity involved when airlines are required to upgrade their
services and invest in capacity to respond to the forwarders' needs (without compromising
the passenger market) is dedicated asset specificity '6. However, vertical integration is not
necessarily a good solution to prevent the hazards associated with this sort of investment.
What regularly happens is that a contractual relation can be extended in order to allow the
existence of what WiUiamson calls symmetrical exposure. That is, if both patties are subiect
to similar levels of hazard due to the existence of dedicated assets, then the transaction
problem is fairly resolved in the sense that it prevents opportunistic behavior from each of
the parties. However, in our air cargo problem only the airlines are due to make an
investment in a capacity that might be potentially underufilized. In fact, after the investment
done, the forwarders would have an increased bargaining power over the prices charged by
airlines, threatening that they would search a lower cost carrier in case its demands were not
satisfied (opportunistic behavior) '7. As a result, a long-term contract might be a good
solution provided the forwarders remain committed to tender a specified number of
positions. In other words, the airlines will only invest on the capacity that they know they
will sell to the forwarders. In this way, depending on the contracts established and thence on
the space bought by the agents, the airline will make its investment. In the same way, the
carrier will only upgrade the quality of its service if it knows that it will have a demand. Once
there is a fixed allotment from each forwarder contracting with the airline, we will know that
demand exists.
Yet, such a solution raises a further problem: how can a forwarder commit himself to tender
huge levels of goods in the long-run ? The answer might be :
• multinational forwarders should choose a major airline with which they want to be
associated and with which they often carry a great deal of business ;
• the agents should not commit thehaselves to honor extremely high volumes ; and finally,
16According to Williamson (1975) this type _of specificity refers to those investments "'in generalized
production capacity that would not be made but for the prospect of selling a significant amount of product
to a specific customer".
17It is clear that in such a situation, the airline could always try to sell its capacity - dedicated assets,
especially lifting capacity (aircraft) are not sunk drs_s_-In _reality, the main loss would come from the
investments made in quality upgrading.
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• as Gunter Rohrman (Air Express International) stated, even though _some forwarders
will jump from airline to airline in search of the lowest rate, many would gladly lay down
their price-cutting weapons in return for high quality service from the airlines_. This means,
that if airlines invested on quality, major forwarders could commit themselves with an airline
or a strategic alliance of carriers. The fact is that multinational forwarders can no longer act
as consolidators in search for the better rate, if they want to survive the integrators' threat.
Moreover, with the development of one-stop shoppingand the consolidation taking place at
the retail level, competition within the forwarding community will be much fiercer. As a
result, we should expect major forwarders to start offering a full range of supply chain
services, and for that they need a quality service.
These are two complementary businesses that need parmerships based on mutual
understanding and on the definition of a certain number of commitments in order to secure
this parmership. The multinational forwarder Schenker International AG has already
proposed some lines through which this relationship can be designed:
• honoring of space commitments by the forwarder (otherwise it provides compensation) ;
• as little bulk as possible - forwarders tender whole containers or pallets ;
in <<exchange>>of,
• guaranteed lift - the airline commits to board every pallet or container for which space is
reserved or provides compensation ;
• improved on-time delivery ;
• honored reservation rebates by the airline based on performance by the forwarder ;
• preferential access to capacity during peak demand periods;
The advantage of this sort of partnership over common ownership is that such a contract
does not imply exclusivity as with a full integration option. In reality, airlines will give within
this setting a preferential treatment to the associated forwarders (and hence, load all the
reserved space by them), but Can always occupy empty space with demand coming from
other forwarders. Simultaneously, the agent is only responsible for the space it has bought -
he can also go to another airline iff case its associated does not cover a specific route (for
example).
The administrative costs of integration are somehow connected with the arguments we have
just seen. Despite the need for flexibility in coordination (element favored by vertical
integration), the airlines want above all, the flexibility to respond to a high demand in case its
forwarders do not fill all the available capacity (which is something that would not happen if
the firm was vertically integrated).
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To conclude, we can say that this type of diving-togethen_ partnership is value-adding since:
• it offers the flexibility of a market transaction but avoids the costs associated with spot
contracts;
• improves customer service through better quality and a guaranteed delivery (more
reliability);
• it optimizes the allocation of resources;
• stimulates the sharing of -knowledge between firms, which will be important in order to
have a clear understanding of the customers' needs.
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Conclusion
Farare the times when the US Air Mail operated night services between Chicago and New
York in their biplane Curtis R.. Almost eighty years after and a histot 3' filled with ups and
downs, Air Cargo proved its economic feasibility and its valuable service, which granted the
industry an indisputable role in today's world economy. The growth figures corresponding to
the past two decades and the forecasts regarding the forthcoming years are quite revealing.
But this is no mature industry. Air Cargo is still growing, learning about its own
idiosyncrasies.
Several problems still remain on today's agenda and namely, the hottest debates have been
turning around the complex relationship airline/forwarder and the consequences this tie-up
is generating. As carriers search for a suitable agent, they gill try to remain stronger by
consolidating their networks and reducing costs where possible. In order to implement this
strategy, airlines will engender global alliances 18. At the forwarders' side, the reverse is
simultaneously happening. The agents, in the spectrum of tying-in their services with those of
airlines', will proceed to horizontal mergers as it is already occurring in the United States.
Such trends will therefore promote concentration at both the airline and the forwarding level.
The question is then, how can we insure that we are not strolling towards the monopoly
danger? We believe this is just a developing phase of the industry to a rather competitive
situation stimulated by the imminent diversification of the integrators' business into the
supply chain segment. Concentration is just a survival strategy implemented by the
airline/forwarder axis in order to gain a market share in the prosperous logistic business and
to anticipate the integrators' move. As far as we are concerned, we think there will be a place
to both integrators and airline/forwarders. But until now, the integrators are taking the lead
since they only depend on their own.
_8 Route re-structuring and cost reduction can be attained by integrating cargo networks and sharing both
facilities and handling equipment. Such cargo alliances will also enable carriers to develop new products
and make common use of computer networks.
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